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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

UTOPIAN DREAMS, NATIONAL REALITIES:
INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Utopian Dreams, National Realities: Intellectual Cooperation and the League of
Nations chronicles the work of the League of Nations’ International Committee on
Intellectual Cooperation (CICI). This dissertation demonstrates how the CICI’s utopian
vision of international peace was actively challenged by national tensions and agendas in
the interwar period. It examines the idealistic goals of the movement by focusing on the
narratives and motivations of key committee members as they worked toward their own
ideas of peace. The challenge of nationalism is illustrated through an analysis of major
disagreements between CICI members as well as through biographical case studies of
lesser-known members. The pursuit of “moral disarmament,” or the process of changing
mentalities towards war, was a central component of the CICI’s work. Both education
and film were envisioned as ways to influence the public and engender anti-war
sentiment. This work argues that the League of Nations’ conception of internationalism
was Eurocentric and moral disarmament was formulated within an Anglo-American
context. Both of these limitations narrowed the influence of the CICI’s peace work to
certain geographical areas of influence and effectively marginalized less powerful nations
and individuals within it.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.
- Albert Einstein, CICI member, 1930

Interwar internationalism had limits to its inclusivity and did not directly
challenge nationalism. In the interwar period, the League of Nations (LN) was the
spearhead for a broader understanding of fostering peace and therefore a centralizing
agent where terminology and practice were debated and considered. As British LN
delegate Lord Renell of Rodd argued in 1935, “the word ‘International’ has its uses and
abuses. It reminds us of successes and of failures. But its introduction into the language is
an indication of the broader outlook of recent times and a less restricted horizon.”1
However, while it allowed for a “broader outlook,” League of Nations internationalism
was tied in direct relationship with nationalism. Could internationalism survive where
nationalism thrived? While most nations did not desire war, they also did not want to
relinquish their national identity. It was when nationalism was used in the cause of war—
when its power was used to influence other nations negatively—that internationalism was
considered desirable.
Establishing and maintaining world peace is an enduring aspiration that has been
sought by politicians, peace activists, and intellectuals across many ages. Almost one
hundred years ago most of the West was still reeling from the devastation of the “Great
War.” After the end of the First World War, public opinion provided a unique
opportunity to address the issue of a sustainable world peace. The leaders and citizenry of

Quoted in Frank Howes, “The International (European) Folk Dance Festival,” Journal of the
English Folk Dance and Song Society 2 (January 1, 1935): 9.
1

1

the West seemed unified in their horror and weariness of war and in their commitment to
avoiding future violence between nations. There was a growing sense that the old
institutions and societal mores had failed humanity. Amid this disillusioned atmosphere
emerged a group of individuals committed to avoiding future catastrophic wars.
Memory, whether in the form of personal account or public veneration, such as
memorials, plays an important part in life as well as historical scholarship.2 What a
society remembers, and what it forgets, is a telling indicator, and for the interwar
generation the memory of the First World War loomed large. It was a trauma that ran
deep. The experience and memory of war directly led to the formation of the League of
Nations and later its International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (CICI).3 The
CICI attempted to establish a lasting peace in the interwar years through the exchange of
ideas to promote cultural understanding among nations. The CICI envisioned intellectual
cooperation as a vital mechanism in securing a peaceful future. Just as political ideas can
be exchanged through diplomacy and material goods through commerce, the members of
the CICI sought to exchange peace-promoting ideas while also establishing intellectual
relations between nations. This committee was formed in 1922 by the League of Nations

2

Jay Winter. Remembering War: the Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth
Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 1. Winter argued that the First World War
triggered what he termed the “memory boom” of the twentieth century and that the war served as a
sort of template for understanding, and remembering, later wars. “The images, languages and
practices,” Winter wrote, “which appeared during and in the aftermath of the Great War shaped
the ways in which future conflicts were imagined and remembered. It is in this sense that I refer to
the survivors of the Great War as the first (although not the last) ‘generation of memory’ in the
twentieth century.” The trauma of the First World War led to a certain infatuation with memory as
a means of coping, which he explained as causing the current fascination with memory among
ordinary citizens, politicians and reporters.
The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation’s acronym stems from the French
Commission internationale de coopération intellectuelle. See Appendix A for a list of acronyms
used in this dissertation.
3
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and, with the haunting images of the Great War and its carnage fresh in their minds, the
French government provided funding when the CICI founded the International Institute
of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in 1925, located in Paris. The focus of the CICI was to
use education and media as a means to ensure continual peace.
The process of “disarming” the minds of individuals and nations, which the
League of Nations eventually called “moral disarmament,” was a primary goal of the
CICI and was considered a complement to material disarmament. This dissertation uses
the term “moral disarmament” and associated CICI work in the fields of education and
film as an entry point to discuss the different approaches of national committees and
individuals toward the problem of peace. Additionally, it focuses on the wider peace
work of the CICI and pulls from the rich, and largely neglected, stories of some of the
many individuals who dedicated themselves to achieving lasting peace. However, a very
real atmosphere of distrust and political maneuvering in the interwar period challenged
these utopian dreams, and this work illustrates how national agendas reigned supreme at
the expense of internationalist goals.
This dissertation assesses the challenge these national agendas posed. While
historians focused for many years on the League of Nations as a “failed experiment,” as
discussed below, this dissertation argues against such an approach. By looking beyond
narratives of success or failure, we are better able to assess the challenges facing the CICI
as well as the organization’s contribution. I argue here that the most significant challenge
to the CICI’s work were national tensions. Avoiding a narrative of failure does not mean
ignoring the significant challenges facing the CICI in the interwar period. This work
argues that the League of Nations’ conception of internationalism was Eurocentric and

3

moral disarmament was formulated within an Anglo-American context. Both of these
limitations narrowed the influence of the CICI’s peace work to certain geographical areas
of influence and effectively marginalized less powerful nations and individuals within it.
However, this should not overshadow the strides made during the CICI’s tenure, and I
also argue that its most important contribution was the growth in the transnational
networks it facilitated.

The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
The overarching goal of the CICI in the work of intellectual cooperation was to
“safeguard peace by a closer union and better understanding between peoples.”4 The
general aims of the CICI can be broken down into two areas: practical and visionary. As
CICI chair and British scholar of classics Gilbert Murray explained in 1928, “in the
limited sense, intellectual co-operation aims at the joint study and practical achievement
of means of co-ordinating and promoting intellectual life…But intellectual co-operation
has also a wider and more lofty meaning.” What Murray called the “real purpose” of the
CICI was to “inspire” intellectuals of the “whole world with the conviction that their
interests and duties are everywhere identical…For no reconstruction of an economic,
political or social character will be solid or permanent unless it is based on spiritual and
intellectual harmony.” 5 In this way, the visionary aims of the CICI were focused on
altering attitudes, especially as they related to international cooperation and the
promotion of peace. With the specter of the Great War still haunting their memories, the

4

League of Nations Publications, Essential Facts about the League of Nations, 1935 (Geneva,
1935), 181. League of Nations Publications hereafter cited as LNP.
5

LNP, International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation: Tenth Plenary Session, Official No.
A.28.1928.XII (Geneva, 1928), 5.

4

members of the CICI thought it was imperative to promote international, rather than
national, attitudes toward cooperation. Memories of the First World War informed
another important visionary aim of the CICI, the effort to promote peace, which they
viewed as directly linked to the encouragement of international attitudes.
The practical aims of the CICI were centered on facilitating intellectual work
around the world—an effort in which national committees of intellectual cooperation
played a central role. In an attempt to improve the working conditions of intellectual
workers, the CICI facilitated studies to assess national working environments. Another
practical aim, which was largely unsuccessful at the time, was to establish intellectual
property with international recognition. The conventions held in pursuit of this goal were
met with resistance, such as the British government’s fears that it would “interfere with
industrial activity.”6 The Japanese government echoed this concern a few years later in
1931.7
Peace efforts of the CICI, which were gathered under the umbrella term of “moral
disarmament” by 1931, centered on increasing communication and collaboration between
intellectual circles in different countries, establishing expectations for teaching about and
the representation of other countries in textbooks and films, and using film and
broadcasting to support the peace-making goals of the League of Nations. To facilitate
communication and collaboration, the CICI investigated such areas as language barriers,
and student and teacher exchanges and set up a series of “Open Letters” designed to

6

“Intellectual Cooperation” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 1770 (Nov. 30, 1928): 547.

7

LNP, International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation: Minutes of the Thirteenth Session,
Official No. C.471.M.201.1931.XII (Geneva, 1929), 38.
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provide examples of how weighty questions could be debated on an international
platform.
Logically, communication was a fundamental area of concern for the CICI in their
quest for moral disarmament. Writing in 1928, The British Medical Journal noted that
communication difficulties were “the principle hindrance to full international cooperation
and understanding” and “in spite of the skilled army of interpreters at Geneva, difference
of language is a constant impediment, leading every day to embarrassment and
frustration, and sometimes with more disagreeable results.” Notably, their suggestion for
improving the situation was not the use of an invented language, but instead through “a
wider acquaintance with the French language amongst the English-speaking peoples, and
with the English language among the Latin peoples, a great deal of good might be done.”8
No mention was made of other languages in their article, though official League
publications were also published in German. Recognizing this difficulty, one of the early
efforts of the CICI was to assess the use of an international language and in particular
Esperanto.9 However, the application of the language was limited, and by 1923 the CICI
officially abandoned their support of an artificial language in favor of encouraging
scholars and students to study foreign languages and literatures in what they thought
would be the “most effective” method of “bringing about a moral and technical
understanding between men of different nationalities.”10 Although a number of member
states did include Esperanto in their curriculum, the LN never significantly used it.

8

“Intellectual Cooperation” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 1770 (Nov. 30, 1928), 547.
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LNP. Universal Esperanto Association, telegram requesting that the LON promote the teaching
of Esperanto in schools of member states. (Reel XII B-1) C.261.M193.1921. [XIIB]
10

LNP. A.31.1923.XII, 12.
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Language barriers continued to be a hindrance to international cooperation in the interwar
period. Additionally, the usage of English and French as the dominant languages
effectively limited the international nature of the organization.
As a direct means of facilitating intellectual communication and cooperation, the
CICI instigated “Conversations” and “Open Letters” between leading intellectuals in a
variety of fields. Different scientific and artistic specialists were encouraged to participate
as well as members of the CICI. The topic of the conversations ranged from the growth
of intellectual life in Europe, the future of civilization, and art in relation to the state.
These open letters were published by the CICI in several different volumes: A League of
Minds; Why War?; East and West; and Intellect, Ethics and War. Other areas these
conversations addressed included the avoidance of over-specialization in fields such as
medicine, the future of culture and the “European mind,” as well as training teachers in
modern education techniques. Again, the reason for facilitating such conversations went
beyond the desire to encourage debate in a specific area. The overarching goal was to
contribute to internationalism and, as a result, peace. As a 1934 report stated, “it is not
enough to exchange ideas – their exchange must lead not, of course, to unity of thought,
but to one way of thinking.”11 While this ultimate goal was certainly not achieved by the
CICI, such open letters and conversations made the work of the CICI more widely known
and were especially useful in opening up exchanges between “the two great civilisations”
of the East and West, specifically China and India.12

11

LNP, International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation: Report on the Work of its Sixteenth
Plenary Session, Official No. C.399.M.156.1934.XII (Geneva, 1934), 4.
12

Ibid.
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Effectively utilizing modern means of communication was another central interest
of the CICI.13 Notably, the CICI was not only concerned with how film and broadcasting
could be effectively used, but also how to prevent abuse of these communication forms,
such as using them to disseminate false information and to support nationalistic
sentiments that worked against internationalism. In addition to cinematography,
broadcasting was a means of communication the Committee viewed not only as a way
intellectuals could communicate, but also as a vehicle for ideas central to the cause of
peace. In a report on behalf of the CICI concerning the role of communication in the
cause of peace, Swiss historian Gonzague de Reynold argued that “the education of
listeners seems to be one of the most important factors in the development of the cultural
role played by [broadcasting] wireless with a view of the promotion of better mutual
understanding among nations.”14 Similarly, a 1932 report stated that towards the goal of
creating mutual understanding, “the opportunities which [radio] offers, in this respect, are
infinite.”15 Not only did the CICI envision the use of broadcasting and film as a way to
educate the world about the LN, but also to contribute to general understanding of the
culture and traditions of various nations, specifically through folk songs, folk lore and

13

LNP, The League of Nations and modern methods of spreading information utilised in the cause
of peace. Report furnished in accordance with (3) of the Assembly resolution of October 10th,
1937, Geneva, 1937.
14

LNP, Gonzague de Reynold, Modern Means of Spreading Information Utilised in the Cause of
Peace (Geneva, 1938), 6.
15

LNP, International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation: Report of the Committee on the
Work of its Fourteenth Plenary Session, Official No. A.11.1932.XII (Geneva, 1932), 40.
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histories.16 In a more practical sense, the CICI also used broadcasting and film for adult
education, especially for agricultural instruction.
The education of youth in the aims of the League of Nations and work to establish
international standards of teaching was another important focus of CICI peace efforts. In
addition to serving an instrumental role in the formation of the first international
organization of education—in the form of the International Bureau of Education—the
CICI carried out the work of the League to increase international understanding of the
LN’s structure, work and aims. After Julio Casarés of Spain suggested in 1925 that
efforts should be made to edit textbooks that incited national hatred and tension, much of
the CICI’s work in education fell under two different areas: education in the aims of the
LN and textbook editing. In CICI peace efforts, education, communication and effective
use of communication media such as film, were all intertwined.

Challenges to Peace
The League’s intellectual cooperation initiative drew many well-known public
figures such as philosopher Henri Bergson, Dutch physicist H. A. Lorentz, Gilbert
Murray, scientists Marie Curie and Albert Einstein, psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, and
authors H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley. Although the institution did hold significant
name recognition, as this list suggests, it was also an elite movement. Not only was the
CICI made up of the culturally elite, but it also did not seek to involve—only inform—
the common man. As CICI Chairman Gilbert Murray wrote to Sir Frank Heath: “I feel
again the great importance of getting at the man at the top, especially if he is a man of

16

Ibid., 50.
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reasonable intelligence.” 17 This elitism, as well as the significant emphasis on national
membership, further limited the Committee in its efforts to have a substantial, worldwide
impact.
Intellectual cooperation was an idealistic movement that was consistently
challenged by an environment of distrust and political maneuvering that were a legacy of
the First World War and hundreds of years of conflict. For instance, the most common
example of this was the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations.
Publicly, relations between members appeared optimistic and in most cases cordial, but
an undercurrent of distrust emerges from the personal papers of committee members.
Regardless of the institutional goals, the CICI was populated by individuals with the
mindset that the views of other members and nations should be changed to align with
their own values and perspective. There was a significant disparity between the public
face of intellectual cooperation and the views and actions at national and personal levels
where conflicts ran counter to the movement’s idealism. As national citizens and as
individuals, CICI members had much to overcome. Longstanding national enmities, such
as between the recently allied countries of Great Britain and France, and distrust of rising
powers, such as the US, were significant and crippling challenges to establishing a
sustainable international peace. The terms of the First World War peace treaty and
continual diplomatic and monetary demands made by the French led to recurrent friction
with Germany. Fear of Communism influenced views towards the USSR, which resulted
in their exclusion for all but five years of the LN’s tenure from 1934 up until the country
was expelled in 1939 after their invasion of Finland.

17

Gilbert Murray to Frank Heath. 1 November 1938. Murray MSS, 365: 56.
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Although the members of the CICI thought it was imperative to promote
international, rather than national, attitudes toward cooperation, national agendas were
one of the major barriers to CICI peacebuilding. This tension between the ostensible goal
of the CICI to create a new international mindset and the national agendas of committee
members challenged the efficacy of their work. In an August 1923 report to the Council
and the Assembly, the CICI argued that “mutual assistance and exchanges will become
much easier when [National] Committees of this kind exist, not only in countries with
deprecated exchanges, but also in more favoured countries.” In other words, regardless of
the financial power of a country, international goodwill would be strengthened if each
founded its own Committee. Some of these “more favoured” countries began to form
committees soon after the August 1923 report. Belgium, Brazil, France and Switzerland
all joined in the months following.18 By 1926, the CICI had stimulated the founding of
thirty national committees.19 Two more nation-states had formed national committees by
1928.20 The membership peaked to over forty in the 1930s, with many more nation-states
giving their participation, if not their membership. Notably, quite a few states formed
national committees while not having a membership in the LN, such as the United States,

18

The first of the national committees formed spontaneously as a product of the need to expedite
communications and urgent requests from individual scientists and universities to the CICI. The
University of Tartu founded the first national committee in Estonia by mid-December of 1922. Six
days later, the Hungarian Academy of Science set up a second national committee. In the next
month, January of 1923, a Polish committee was set up at Marie Curie’s prompting. After nine
more countries followed suit in the next several months, the CICI used the inception of these
initial twelve to draw attention to the need to expand the system. Of the nine, in order of inception:
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia.
See Appendix B for a list of represented countries.
Vernon Kellogg, “The League of Nations Committee and Institute of Intellectual Cooperation,”
Science 64, no. 1656 (1926): 291.
19
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“Intellectual Cooperation” News Bulletin (Institute of Pacific Relations), (Feb., 1928).
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Japan and Brazil. These countries were active in the work of intellectual cooperation
from the early inception of the CICI and sent delegates to early conferences and
meetings.
The American countries, such as the US, Canada and Mexico, looked favorably
upon on the efforts of the CICI and many countries formed national committees in the
early years of the intellectual cooperation movement. The CICI national committees were
“a means, not only of interesting ever-widening intellectual circles in the League of
Nations, but also, and in particular, of carrying out effective work with a view to
promoting a better mutual understanding between peoples.”21 While the United States did
not join the LN, it was a member of the CICI, along with many other North and South
American countries in the interwar years. Intellectual exchange was considered an
acceptable goal by US policy-makers, even if the US was not officially part of the LN
body. For instance, American historian James T. Shotwell served as a member of the
international committee and director for the United States National Committee of
Intellectual Cooperation. Notably, he held both an international and national post.
Similarly, Gilbert Murray, long-term chair of the CICI, was also directly engaged in
Great Britain’s national committee. In fact, the majority of the international committee
members were also members of their respective national committees. This was a logical
organization at the time, but it also underscores the dual roles these members played.

21

LNP, National Committees on Intellectual Cooperation (Geneva, 1937), 6-7.
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Intellectual Cooperation: A Transnational Minor Utopia
In order to assess the challenges facing the CICI and the contributions it made,
two main frameworks inform this study and help give it structure: transnationalism and
what historian Jay Winter would call “minor utopia.” The study of this international
institution, which was made up of national committees and their respective national
membership, requires a framework such as transnationalism that is able to take into
account both international and national goals. Transnational connections are often
described as “border crossings” that illustrate how ideas and connections can pass over,
across, and through a nation-state, being transformed in the very process. In transnational
history the nation-state is deemphasized but not ignored. As Patricia Clavin explains,
“‘Border crossings’ permits the study of encounters that both attract and repel, between
people, institutions and artefacts of all kinds, which are represented and analyzed through
a host of different types of evidence.”22 Clavin’s emphasis on connections that attract and
repel, such as not only how ideas might spread and be incorporated in different ways but
also how the act of transmission might be met with resistance or be selectively utilized, is
important when considering the LN. In the transnational focus of this dissertation,
cooperation is obviously an important theme, but so is resistance and repulsion. For
instance, the CICI thought the education of children in the aims of the League was an
important step towards peace, but national boards of education and individual teachers
resisted this, such as in Great Britain. Similarly, the US national committee and the
international organization based in Europe often had conflicting approaches and interests.

Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 4
(2005): 422.
22
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An emphasis on interactions that both attract and repel help support this study’s argument
concerning the divide between an idealistic aim to create lasting peace and the reality of
the numerous personal and national conflicts which undermined it. While the conditions
that repelled were plentiful, the main attractor for this group was the commitment to
create a lasting international peace. Though there were obvious exceptions in such
ideologies as National Socialism and Communism, the desire to create lasting peace
seemed to be a universal desire in the West following World War I. Even so, the
methodologies being used by the League of Nations and the ways it suggested to realize
peace were contested.
It is unwise, and arguably impossible, to view the nation and transnational
influences in isolation. For instance, focusing on the external versus internal factors in
American history would be a misleading dichotomy, especially for the nineteenth century
when the state was relatively weak and trade, capital and labor flowed freely. However,
even when a nation-state becomes powerful enough to exude a national identity, that
itself is produced transnationally. The global context of security, economic competition,
and demographic change prompt the formation of national boundaries. Nation-states do
not exist in isolation. National identities are defined against other influences, including
the transnational pressures that affect the nation as it is shaped. This making of the nation
through a variety of borders—from immigration controls to state projects of national
memorialization—has occurred decisively only in very recent years, for most from the
1880s to 1940s particularly. The character of national development is directly influenced
by transnational phenomena and as a result, historians cannot study the nation in
isolation. This is especially important when you consider that many of the CICI member

14

nations were newly formed and were taking advantage of the prestige of the committee to
increase their cultural capital.
Because this dissertation is assessing interwar intellectual cooperation through a
transnational framework, it is necessary to explain how I am using this terminology. In
the interwar period, “international” was used to describe any sort of interaction that
involved more than one country. Transnationalism, however, is more than
internationalism, but it was not a term used within the period. It is a theoretical concept
introduced in the late 20th century to explain what arises from the interaction between
different countries. As I apply it to the interwar context, the transnational is something
new to each national culture that was created as a result of its interaction with other
nations. I use “transnational” to describe such moments and “international” as a reflection
of the period’s broad, general use. Additionally, since intellectual cooperation was not the
only form of internationalism in the interwar period, I will borrow Akira Iriye’s term
“cultural internationalism” to describe the work of the CICI. This work differed
significantly from the main alternate form of internationalism, Communism, in that it
focused on the realms of ideas, or culture, rather than materialism.23
In Dreams of Peace and Freedom, historian Jay Winter set out a framework of
“minor utopia” that is very useful for a study of LN intellectual cooperation. Winter
intended to cast utopia in a more positive light, especially what he calls minor utopias,
which he distinguishes from major utopias in the following ways. Violence was a
defining characteristic of major utopias (e.g. Stalin and Hitler), which resulted in
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numerous victims. The idea of politicians as “weeders” lies at the heart of what Winter
considered major utopias—where figures try to take out the “undesirable” aspects of the
world. Winter focused instead on minor utopian moments, which he described as small
moments of possibility where a better future was imagined (although not laid out with a
specific blueprint like major utopias). In Winter’s formulation, a minor utopia is not one
envisioned for the whole of the world, but instead a small part that can possibly be
transformed. Minor utopians are figures who are committed and then “hit a brick wall.”
They are either partially or fully frustrated in their attempts, but they do not “turn cynical
or passive.” Indeed, they get up again and still “dream dreams which reconfigure their
initial commitment in new and imaginative forms.”24 In the case of the CICI, many of
those who took up the work in the interwar period continued to do so after the Second
World War, but in a new form in a new organization. While members of the CICI
ostensibly held the goal of world peace and relied on rhetoric of internationalism, this
study will demonstrate how their formulation was essentially limited to only certain
spheres of influence: North America and Europe.
Winter’s work was based on the Marxian idea that men make history, however,
not under the conditions they chose and their movements often carry within them the
“same contradictions they seek to supersede.”25 Winter then adapted this framework to
view times when the “link between past and future is fractured,” or a time of collective
violence, which in many cases gives rise to minor utopias.26 The First World War was
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one such time of collective violence, and this dissertation views those who took part in
the interwar intellectual cooperation movement as minor utopians—subject to the same
inconsistencies, such as nationalism, they hoped to overcome. While, like Winter, I view
intellectual cooperation as a whole as a minor utopia, I have also analyzed minor utopian
“moments” within the movement, including moral disarmament, textbook editing and
anti-war film. Each of these were idealistically conceived as unique opportunities to
create lasting peace.
Attempting to address world peace through cultural work was a utopian hope.
Those involved in intellectual cooperation were endeavoring to promote an idea-based
form of cultural internationalism at a time of increasingly ardent, militant nationalism. It
was a significantly different approach than of those who claimed that the cure for future
war rested on national self-determination alone. The CICI was filled with helpful, yet
flawed, individuals and, quite arguably, the CICI attempted an impossible task. This does
not undermine the fact that what they were trying to accomplish was consequential and
unique. Cultural internationalism was the minor utopia they were trying to create and
film, broadcasting and education were the vehicles they hoped to use. However, these
arenas were also the most potent tools for the very forces they hoped to overcome.

Historiography
In a 2011 French-language article, historian Daniel Laqua made a start at
assessing the dual roles of CICI members (international and national) when he addressed
the disparity between cultural internationalist goals and national agendas within the
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CICI.27 This dissertation builds upon his research by providing additional examples and
an expanded analysis through case studies of lesser-known female members. While
Laqua did illustrate tensions between nationalism and internationalism within the
organization and suggested frameworks for studying the topic, his analysis was brief. His
primary emphasis on French members was a very useful start to this topic, but a deeper
analysis is needed.
Though much work still remains to be completed to effectively assess the LN and
its many committees, in the past few decades it has been the subject of an increasing
amount of academic research. While scholarly work on the League of Nations in the
interwar period was common, after the Second World War, the topic, like the
organization itself, fell out of favor. Many of the post-WWII scholarly works are now
considerably out of date and had a heavy emphasis on the organization’s decline and
fall.28
The League of Nations, so often depicted as the “Great Failed Experiment” by
historians or, somewhat more optimistically, as the practicing grounds of the United
Nations, has not received the serious study it is due. As one League of Nations
publication noted, “one of the most important and fascinating chapters in the history of
international endeavor has come to an end,” but “the romance goes on. The League is
handing over to the new body which has sprung from its loins and is to take over the
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work and the traditions, made richer by the great adventure, made bolder by League
timidity, wiser by League failures and stronger by League frailty.” Unfortunately, the
close of the League “chapter” for the “richer,” “bolder,” “wiser” and “stronger” United
Nations seems to be of more interest to historical scholarship.29 Of the historical works
published concerning the League, many have focused on the failure of the League of
Nations Covenant rather than the social strides made during its term.
In response to the common “failure” narratives of the League of Nations,
historians have pointed out the many areas in which LN work extended beyond
peacekeeping, such as the protection of minorities, addressing health concerns, or in the
case of CICI, establishing intellectual-property rights.30 Indeed, as part of their
assessment of the Economic and Financial Organization (EFO) of the LN, Patricia Clavin
and J. W. Wessels argued that questions of failure or success should be ignored.31
Although this change in approach has resulted in a significant rise in revisionist academic
interest, as well as in the LN as a field of inquiry, continuing to focus on the topic of
peace keeping efforts while also rejecting the “failure” narrative is equally important.
Until recently, historians have viewed the LN’s work in the realm of intellectual
cooperation similarly. While certainly part of an organization that quite publicly failed in
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its effort to avoid another World War, the CICI should be regarded as an indicator of
changing views concerning international cooperation rather than studied on the terms of
whether or not it was a failed experiment. While the CICI’s peace efforts may have had
little impact on political events, they contributed to evolving peace strategies within
education, media and intellectual work. The central importance of the CICI to historical
study is not in its successes or failures but as an example of how transnational
connections were facilitated for the cause of peace and intellectual progress during its
tenure.
The focus on decline and fall narratives began to shift in the 1990s when the
world faced similar challenges after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
The resulting ethnic conflict called attention to the work of the League concerning
minorities’ protection as a possible working example.32 By the mid-1990s, mounting
interest in transnational studies also brought increased scholarly attention to the LN and
its various international efforts. As Susan Pederson argued in her 2007 review of LN
historiography, around this time the focus on the LN as a failure shifted to research
questions concerning the work it completed, how it was perceived, and its impact during
its term. She argued that there were three main narratives in more recent LN scholarship:
1) an emphasis on peace efforts, 2) the balance between national and international power,
and 3) the LN “as a harbinger of global governance.”33 She pointed out that, while all of
these narratives have contributed to a greater understanding, the more common emphasis
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had been on security, and more attention needed to be paid to the interaction between
state development and international cooperation.34
The interwar intellectual cooperation movement has also benefited from the
revival of interest in the LN. However, institutional histories of the CICI and its
international institute, located in Paris, do not study individuals—their views, national
commitments, or biographical information—in any real depth.35 Studies focused on LN
work in individual countries also largely leave intellectual cooperation unaddressed.36
Similarly, biographies of CICI members do not thoroughly address their intellectual
cooperation work.37 While even the biographies of the major players—most of them male
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with the exception of Marie Curie—tend to contain only a passing mention of their work
for the CICI, most of the female members are essentially absent from historical work.
There is a significant gap in the historiography concerning the contributions of female
CICI members.38
The literature written about the CICI and its members has largely neglected two
important areas: 1) the individuals, especially women, who made up the committee and
their personal views about intellectual cooperation, moral disarmament and peace, and 2)
the internal inconsistencies, such as national conflicts, which undermined the CICI’s
vision of cultural internationalism. This dissertation addresses these gaps. In order to
analyze the influence of national sentiment on the work of the movement, this study will
focus on themes related to moral disarmament, as well as the life and work of individuals
working with the CICI towards the goal of peace.
Chapter one, in addition to providing a better understanding of the CICI’s goals
and the lives of its members, assesses the evolving use of the term moral disarmament
and how it was a central part of the CICI’s work. This chapter argues that moral
disarmament was hobbled from the outset due to the League’s limited, Eurocentric
internationalism. Chapter two analyzes the work of the CICI in the realm of education,
how the LN was instrumental in the realization of the International Bureau of Education
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(IBE) and how the CICI and IBE pursued peace through the education of youth. Chapter
three uses film as another entry point to address how the CICI envisioned cinema as a
way to influence the public and engender anti-war sentiment. In this, they worked closely
with another League institute, the International Educational Cinematographic Institute
(IECI), which was located in Rome and heavily influenced by Fascist ideology. Although
the IECI ostensibly focused on the study of cinema as an essential tool for the
maintenance of peace, as the Second World War loomed closer, the goals of the CICI and
IECI became increasingly divergent. As Chapter four argues, though the IECI’s location
in Fascist Italy effectively limited the tenure and work of the organization, fascist
ideology about the role of women did provide an opening for women to take an active
part in the debate over film and its use. The life and LN work of American expatriate and
reformer Laura Dreyfus-Barney provides a case study for how women took advantage of
assumptions about their “natural” role as mothers to give them a political voice. Chapter
five uses biographical case studies to illustrate the marginalization of women and
minorities within the CICI. This chapter also assesses the life and work of German
historian Margarete Rothbarth, who served as Deputy Chief for the IIIC, to demonstrate
how national tensions challenged the work of the LN in this area, as well as how the
atmosphere of distrust could forever alter individual lives in the interwar years.
This study addresses some of the areas that have been neglected by the
biographical and institutional histories of the CICI and its members. By focusing on the
role intellectual cooperation played in the lives of individual members and their
interaction with one another, we can learn more about the tensions within the movement.
Since similar tensions, often revolving around national agendas, remain a significant
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hindrance to peace efforts, this historical assessment will provide insight into current and
future endeavors to secure lasting international peace.
It is often the impulse of historians studying the LN and, likewise, the CICI, to
evaluate it on a scale of failure or success. This is a very limited view. In the words of
CICI chair Gilbert Murray, “it is not fair to judge intellectual co-operation by the
practical and tangible results it has obtained: account must be taken of the
imponderabilia.”39 He continued, arguing that “the most important and the most essential
outcome of intellectual co-operation consists in the multitude of relationships what are
constantly being established between divers [sic] persons, institutions and groups, which
would otherwise, perhaps, never have had the opportunity of entering into contact, much
less collaborating with another.” If only by this measure, disregarding all other efforts
and successes, “intellectual co-operation would have justified its existence.”40 Viewing
intellectual cooperation as a minor utopia diminishes the emphasis of CICI as failure or
success. Such a framework also places the importance on effort and why such an effort
was deemed necessary. Just as CICI chair Gilbert Murray argued, the most important
work of the CICI was the establishment of international connections—likewise, these
connections should be a primary concern of historians.41 Such an approach also has the
added benefit of shedding light on an oft-ignored aspect of historical scholarship: the
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lives and labor of the silent workers, which in the case of the CICI most often included
women and members from less influential member nations. This study hopes to give at
least some of those individuals a voice.
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Chapter Two: Moral Disarmament and the Limits of Internationalism
In 1922, the same year the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation
(CICI) was formed, the Fellowship of Reconciliation published a leaflet titled “The
Problem of Moral Disarmament,” claiming that when it came to disarmament, “A Moral
Question can be solved only by Moral Means.”42 This pamphlet was written shortly after
the perceived failure of the world’s first disarmament conference, which was held from
1921-22 in Washington, D.C. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (FoR) called for a
different form of action that placed the emphasis on the “moral” in moral disarmament—
making a direct link to religious morality. However, use of the term within the CICI
deemphasized religion in favor of a more broadly defined term representing the pursuit of
international political and cultural goodwill. In the interwar period, uses of the term
suggested a range of meanings from simple international amity to one with deep religious
underpinnings. However, two of the most influential members of the CICI—British
classics scholar and CICI chair Gilbert Murray and American internationalist James T.
Shotwell—resisted connections to religion. Both were also convinced that their
respective countries could best take the lead in efforts to make moral disarmament a
reality. Indeed, both Murray and Shotwell considered their countries to be “neutral”
parties in international politics and therefore best situated to set the tone of international
events. However, British and US interests did not align, let alone those in continental
Europe and beyond.

“The Problem of Moral Disarmament” in The Messenger of Peace (Peace Association of
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National agendas reigned supreme in the interwar period, which made
international peace efforts in the period particularly difficult. This chapter will discuss the
role material and moral disarmament played in CICI peace efforts, as well as the limits of
League of Nations internationalism. This chapter argues that the League of Nations’ view
of internationalism was limited to a European conception of the term and the CICI
formulated moral disarmament within an Anglo-American context. Both of these
restrictions narrowed the impact of the CICI’s peace work to certain spheres of influence.
This chapter will consider the context of world disarmament efforts—including the
Washington Naval Disarmament Conference—and how this was perceived as a failure by
groups such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, who called for moral disarmament.
While the CICI did take up the work of moral disarmament, it was not under the religious
formulation suggested by the FoR. This chapter will assess how moral disarmament
provided a centralizing term for the CICI’s utopian vision of maintaining peace with the
goal of encouraging cultural internationalism and mentally disarming individuals and
cultures. Additionally, this chapter will analyze how influential members of the CICI,
including Murray and Shotwell, perceived moral disarmament. Little scholarly attention
had been paid to interwar moral disarmament. What has been written has primarily
focused on the press and efforts made in France.43 This chapter explores the largely
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neglected formulation of moral disarmament that arose within the Anglo-American
context with a focus on education, rather than the press.
The CICI’s strategy was in the world of ideas or cultural work. They believed that
intercultural ideas could stave off war, destruction and militarism. This was a utopian
vision and very neatly fits into the concept of minor utopia because the same historical
changes that made such cultural work a possibility also supported the strengthening of
militarism and nationalism. Namely, mass media was the prerequisite for cultural work,
but it was also one of the most potent tools for the rise of militant nationalism in the
interwar period. While the CICI focused on cultural internationalism, the League was
also trying to address material disarmament and limiting the military industrial machine
through arms control.
Material disarmament served as a catalyst to the development of moral
disarmament as an official consideration of CICI work. Under the banner of collective
security endorsed by the Treaty of Versailles, support for disarmament continued to rise
following the First World War until direct action was achieved in 1921 in the form of the
Washington Naval Disarmament Conference. Although material disarmament had
already been a consideration of the League of Nations, the first official arms control
conference was called by a non-member nation, the United States and held outside the
auspices of the League. The United States was one of the strongest supporters of
disarmament, though the nation had also proved to be the greatest stumbling block to
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such a policy developing in the Paris Peace Conference.44 Notably, while the United
States was not a member of the wider League of Nations, it did hold membership in the
CICI and its members were highly influential in the development of moral disarmament.
The United States’ interest and support of material disarmament provided a strong
foundation for involvement in the CICI.
The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference was held from 12 November
1921 to 6 February 1922 and included nine nations: the United States, Great Britain,
Japan, France, China, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. It was the world’s first
disarmament conference and an important step in laying the foundation for an
international moral disarmament effort. Peace organizations were central in the
promotion of the conference and women were particularly active in supporting it. Popular
support for disarmament in the United States was strong following the First World War
and many women were eager to make use of their newly gained political influence and
voting power to support the peace movement. Indeed, they argued that the nation could
cut costs and avoid future war by halting the arms race.45 The Washington Naval
Conference gained traction due to rising costs of munitions, negative public opinion
regarding these costs, and the desire of nations—especially the United States, Great
Britain and Japan—to decrease required expenditure by reducing competition.
The treaties that came out of the Washington Conference focused on limiting the
relative naval strength of countries in agreed ratios, as well as the ratio of types of ships
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that could be maintained.46 Although generally written about in terms of a success, the
limited scope of this disarmament conference left some groups, such as the Fellowship of
Reconciliation, disappointed with the results. The FoR was formed in 1914 in an effort to
forestall war, and continues to this day. The US-based Fellowship of Reconciliation,
included pacifist members such as Jane Addams, who had been a staunch supporter of the
formation of the League of Nations. As a reaction to the perceived failures of the
Washington Conference, the FoR distributed their leaflet titled “The Problem of Moral
Disarmament.” The leaflet explained that the problem facing the world was the need to
move nations “away from the basis of Suspicion, Jealousy and the Threat of War to the
basis of Mutual Co-operation and Fellowship.” The leaflet argued that a number of
solutions had been proposed, but none had dealt with the central issue: the moral
underpinning of disarmament. For instance, naval disarmament conferences, the FoR
claimed, took away battleships, but left “the spiritual equation what it was before.” The
League of Nations’ use of “compulsion,” they felt, negated “the spirit that is desired.”
Here they referred to the League’s policy of sanctions. Additionally, while “Disarmament
Groups” were “more encouraging than other methods” (presumably disarmament
conferences and the League), they were too “timid” and “narrow” and based their
methods on a “paraphrase” of Oliver Cromwell’s famous line: “Trust in God and keep
your powder dry.” A group the FoR felt was more successfully addressing disarmament,
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or “Some of Those Who Believe in Jesus’ Way,” got to the heart of what the FoR felt
was required: true fellowship that replaced economic rivalry with cooperation. The leaflet
concluded with a call to establish such fellowship and “a new conscious alert to all social
and racial inequities” before stating their main argument and slogan: “A Moral Question
can be solved only by Moral Means.”47 As an organization formed and supported by
Christians, questions of religious morality were central to their vision of a peaceful
future. However, the challenges facing peace in the interwar period were considerable
and pursuing these “moral means”—whether in a Christian or secular formulation, as
discussed below—was complicated by the political atmosphere of distrust that followed
the First World War. Within the CICI, moral disarmament was not conceived along
religious lines, but instead was tied directly to the encouragement of cultural
internationalism.

Limited Internationalism
Central to moral disarmament was the effort to promote internationalism. Other
forms of internationalism in the interwar period focused on materialism—whether by
increasing it or limiting it. In the interwar period, capitalist ideology thrived on
competition and non-governmental interference. In contrast, communism limited
materialism by focusing on the interconnected nature of people and argued that those
working together as equals could achieve a greater good for all. As a form of
internationalism, this was an appealing approach for many nations and individuals.
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Unlike communism, cultural internationalism did not challenge materialism, but focused
on changing hearts and minds through education.
Communist internationalism called for the abandonment of nationality. In
contrast, the LN’s form of internationalism did not challenge the nation, but rather
supported both national self-determination and international amity. They were trying to
ameliorate national differences, while still allowing nationalism to stand. However, while
the League stressed wide-ranging involvement of countries, it did not challenge Great
Power hegemony or empire.48 In 2015, Klaas Dykman pointed out in his assessment of
the League’s secretariat that the administration was only international in the European
comprehension of the term. His analysis of the secretariat revealed that the machinery of
the LN was “built on an understanding of international affairs that implied a separation of
European ‘high politics’ and non-European regional affairs.”49 Undeniably, in the case of
the LN secretariat, European countries dominated, especially in the early years of LN
tenure. A similar balance of influence existed within the CICI, but it differed in one
important aspect: the United States, though not a member in the League of Nations, took
part in the CICI from the outset.
Dykmann found the League Secretariat to be especially dominated by the interests
of Great Britain and France. However, in the case of the CICI, the United States, Great
Britain and France dominated, with the latter significantly losing influence in the late
1920s. This was especially true in the case of the moral disarmament initiative, which,
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although initially proposed by Poland, was largely presented in an Anglo-American
formulation. Two CICI members and historians, Australian-born Englishman Gilbert
Murray and American James T. Shotwell, strongly influenced the CICI’s conception of
peace through moral disarmament. Murray was the third and final chair of the CICI.
French philosopher Henri Bergson served as chair of the CICI from 1922-1925 and then
Dutch physicist Hendrk Lorentz held it for a three-year term from 1925-1928. The
remaining years of the CICI’s tenure Gilbert Murray held the post.50 Murray was a
member of the CICI from its inception in 1921 until it was reformed under the United
Nations in 1945. Shotwell was professor of medieval and modern European History at the
University of Columbia, as well as CICI member and chair of the United States
Committee on Intellectual Cooperation from 1931 to 1943. Murray felt that peace
through cultural internationalism was best attained through fostering intellectual
networks and positively influencing public opinion. Shotwell took what he felt was a
more active approach of promoting the study of the political processes and suggested
special schooling in international civics. Shotwell’s conception of moral disarmament
resisted common urges to include censorship in favor of requiring nations to report to the
LN ways in which they promoted international understanding.
Murray considered it very important to have a representative of the United States
on the committee and went to great lengths to ensure that Shotwell took over the position
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of physicist Robert A. Millikan—who had served as chair of the US National Committee
from its founding in 1926—when the latter retired from his position on the international
committee in 1931. This was despite the fact that Murray and Shotwell fundamentally
disagreed about the overall goals of the committee. Shotwell criticized the committee for
not addressing political matters and not having enough political scientists serving on the
international committee, while Murray thought the committee was more effective
because they formed connections between intellectuals without creating division over
politically charged topics (he made an exception for disarmament). Both Murray and
Shotwell were highly influential in guiding the work of the CICI and especially in their
efforts towards moral disarmament. Though Dykmann found the LN secretariat to define
internationalism in a European sense, this study argues that the LN intellectual
cooperation movement defined cultural internationalism in an Anglo-American
conception. While this widened the sphere of the CICI’s influence beyond Europe, it did
not mean that moral disarmament was more broadly accepted. In fact, even Murray and
Shotwell faced significant challenges in getting their own countries to support it, as will
be discussed below.
Though he only served as chair starting in 1928, Murray was active in the
embryonic stages of development and served as vice-president after the LN formed the
CICI in 1922. While Murray would spend thirty years of his life involved in international
intellectual cooperation, he was initially anything but eager to be part of it. He wrote to
his wife, Lady Mary Murray, that the topic “bores me stiff,” but he was stuck with it
because he was “one of the few people who know anything about it.”51 He initially
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resented being placed in an intellectual cooperation post for the League Assembly of
1921, writing to South African LN advocate Jan Smuts that it was a “hazy and obscure
subject” in which only “a few cranks” had any “clear views.”52 However, after spending
some time in the meetings, he wrote Lady Mary that he had found himself “getting
interested in the wretched business, from having to explain and defend it.”53 By the time
he served as chair he was thoroughly committed to intellectual cooperation, and his views
of its work were integrationist and anti-nationalist. As he wrote in a letter to Rev. Francis
M. Downton: "Nationalism is really the enemy of world peace, as it is of economic
prosperity, and I fear Nationalism is on the increase everywhere.”54 He argued that the
future of the world depended on the interdependence of nations. “The experience of
mankind has proved that nations in the modern world are not independent units but
members of one society,” he wrote. “Nations can destroy one another or help one
another; but one cannot destroy the rest and prosper in their ruin.”55 He felt promoting
understanding through intellectual channels was central to fostering this interdependence.
As a long-term member and chair, Murray was highly influential in the CICI’s
work. Though committed to cultural internationalism, it is important to note that there
were crucial inconsistencies in Murray’s political ideology. Much of this rested on the
internal inconsistencies of British liberalism in this period, which resisted state
sovereignty and ardent nationalism, while at the same time reinforcing paternalistic and
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imperialist rhetoric.56 In an article assessing Murray’s political views, political scientist
Peter Wilson depicted Murray as a sort of conservative in liberal’s clothing.57 However,
as Wilson noted, "In many ways the Committee embodied all Murray's high-minded
hopes for a better, more civilised…world. A distracted world needed the guidance of
philosopher kings, and in Murray, [Henri] Bergson, [Marie] Curie, [Albert] Einstein, and
other members of this committee, it—or rather Bergson and Murray—had found them."58
Despite a veneer of liberal rhetoric, Murray’s internationalism was elitist, paternalistic
and Eurocentric. As noted above, this was the case for the wider League of Nations
movement—the CICI included. While Murray’s faith in public opinion may have been
overly optimistic, the power of increased international interaction is undervalued in
Wilson’s portrayal of him. Murray’s, admittedly limited, integrationist view was still an
important step towards the kinds of cooperation the CICI envisioned.
While Murray held an integrationist dream for intellectual cooperation,
isolationism was the more common theme on the part of the United States. Shotwell’s
predecessor, Millikan, emphasized this isolationism in 1926. “In this whole movement,”
Millikan wrote, “we Americans occupy the role of interested and sympathetic observers
rather than very active agents. Our remoteness and our political situation both conspire to
make this inevitable.” He thought the main role they could play, despite this, was “in the
way of restraint.” In order to be a restraining influence, however, the US had to not only
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have representation within the CICI, but also power. “I therefore regard it as very
important,” Millikan wrote, “that we are as well represented within the organization as
possible.”59 In moral disarmament, Shotwell would serve as the restraining force that
Millikan imagined here and Shotwell’s ideas would run counter to Murray’s vision of the
CICI. Notably, Shotwell wrote Murray on 13 December 1928, explaining how he felt
approaches to peace were quite different in what he viewed as the main spheres of
influence. He wrote:
If we look back over the last ten years, it seems to me that we already distinguish
certain national formulations of general principle; the approach to the problem of
international peace is distinctly different on the Continent from what it is in
England, and our American approach, while somewhat resembling the British in
its negative attitude towards the Continent, is still quite distinct from even the
most liberal British point of view. I wonder if we have not been trying to impose a
single strand upon these diverse elements… I gather that the feeling in England
toward America is much more hostile than we have any clear idea of over here.60
While he noted it was his goal to make the US and Europe more aware of each other’s
views, he did not feel they could force “a single strand,” on the three spheres. Shotwell
also seemed to suggest that the US approach to peace was more progressive than even
Great Britain and that trying to find a common approach was futile.
By the end of 1928, the League of Nations had still not secured disarmament. Part
of the reason for this was the very nature of competing interests Shotwell outlined to
Murray. The CICI was not immune to such divergence of national interests. Indeed,
conflict within the CICI underscored the contrasting approaches within the movement.
Additionally, it illustrates how interpersonal disagreements could have long-term
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negative effects within international organizations. For instance, in 1929, French director
of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) Julien Luchaire accused
British IIIC worker Alfred Zimmern of shirking his duties.61 While is seems there were
grounds for Luchaire’s accusation, the public way he handled it caused a rift within the
institute. The US national committee felt it was best not to weigh in, but wrote of it
among members in terms of a conflict between French and British interests.62 Though
Murray also felt it best to remain out of the conflict, Zimmern quarreled with him in
addition to Luchaire and in his role as CICI chair, he could not avoid being pulled into
the issue.63 The result was an embarrassing confrontation reported to the IIIC Board of
Directors that resulted in both Luchaire and Zimmern abandoning their work at the IIIC. 64
However, this was not a clear matter of handing in resignations. What started as a conflict
between two individuals expanded to include the nations they represented within the IIIC.
The issue simmered for months and Murray dreaded the annual CICI meeting in July as a
result. Writing to his wife, Lady Mary, on 26 July 1930, he noted that “the fight over
Luchaire” had developed into “a sort of black cloud” and France refused to accept
Luchaire’s resignation. “Unless France gets this, that and the other,” he explained, “there
may well be a regular explosion.”65 Murray spent a large portion of his time in Paris
trying to soothe ruffled feathers on all sides.
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Despite such challenges, and in comparison to Shotwell, Murray felt that worldwide public opinion could be unified. Murray's views closely aligned with the British
League of Nations Union (LNU), which had been instrumental in the formation of the
League and continued as a separate, but closely aligned, organization in the interwar
years. Fellow British LNU member John Power Bart summed up LNU views, as well as
some of the financial challenges such institutions faced, in a speech delivered in 1929.
“Anyone who enters the service of the League of Nations Union knows that he or she
must get their reward in the knowledge that they are rendering a great service to the cause
of Peace, for they get very little pay," he declared. "The task we have set ourselves is to
help change the mentality of the people from a mentality of War to a mentality of Peace,
for it is upon the public opinion that World Peace depends.”66 Though Murray’s faith in
the power of world public opinion may have been overly optimistic, it was the foundation
of both his views and his work for the CICI. This belief also underpinned the peace work
of intellectual cooperation.
For instance, that same year, working with British politician Lord Robert Cecil,
Murray wrote a form letter sent to British public schools in preparation for Armistice Day
celebrations that urged schools and teachers to remember the oath they made when
entering the League of Nations. In it, Cecil and Murray reminded the British public that
Great Britain signed the covenant ten years ago and the Kellogg-Briand Pact a year
before. This pact, which was also signed by Germany, France, the United States, and
many others, was a promise to not use war to settle disputes. “Great Britain has signed
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these treaties, and Great Britain does not break her word," they wrote. "Yet how many
people in their ordinary thoughts about politics are really prepared to live up to this high
standard?” They continue, noting that war had been considered natural for “countless
generations” but that Great Britain “has agreed in all its disputes with other nations not to
use its superior strength but willingly to submit to justice." They continued, in rhetoric
directly aimed not only at increasing support of the League, but also at propping up
national pride:
The statesmen who meet at the League of Nations, who know and trust one
another and have the Covenant before their eyes, understand this. But in every
country there are multitudes of people who know nothing about the Covenant, do
not realise that their country is bound by it, [do not feel war to be wrong ]67 and
do not see why they should be just to foreigners. They do not yet understand that
the civilised world has put war behind it, like the torture of witnesses, the burning
of witches, gladiatorial shows and other savage things. The people who do not
understand are always a danger, in every nation. We want you to be among those
who do understand: who see that the world has changed, that civilised nations can
prosper only by helping one another, not destroying one another, and who mean
their country to keep in letter and spirit the solemn Covenant that she has
signed.68
In other words, Great Britain had to be better than all the countries that sought to
undermine the institution Great Britain had been instrumental in erecting. Additionally,
Murray and Cecil equated those who felt that war was acceptable as a “danger,” but those
who did understand the need for peace as an integral part of the civilized world.
The next year, though writing in support of the League in a September 1930
article submitted to Harper’s Magazine, Murray conceded the challenges facing the
League’s work. The article, entitled “The Real Value of the League,” explained that the
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challenges were considerable. “The League started with a distracted world, not yet at
peace and not making the thoughts that lead to peace,” Murray wrote. “It had as its
material the nations as they then were, and led by the statesmen as they then were. There
is not, there never can be, any other material possible.” While he admitted that those who
took part might have had their “prejudices or ambitions or ignorances of one country or
another,” he pointed out that they were “the same men, the same countries, as before.”
Despite these limitations, however, he thought there was tremendous growth recognizable
at LN meetings. He continued:
The extraordinary thing is that, met together in the atmosphere of Geneva, with
the eyes of fifty odd of nations upon them, they do show a sensitiveness to the
general opinion, and a consciousness of their duty not merely to their own voters
at home but to a wider constituency. The nationalists become less nationalist, the
violent drop their violence, but both will boast of their concessions and not of
their victories; and almost every man goes home to some extent a missionary for a
new cause to which most of the home constituents are not yet awake.69
Even in trying to provide support for the League of Nations, he revealed the main issue:
while individuals may have been ready to enact change, their nations were not. The
article also illustrated his hope for an international community where standards of
behavior were applied and a sensitivity to compromise maintained. However, it is clear
that he still placed more emphasis on the opinion of Great Powers as leaders in such
communities.
Early the following year, in 1931, due to rising criticism about French influence
within the IIIC and the controversy sparked by the conflict between Zimmern and
Luchaire, the institute was significantly reorganized. French diplomat Henri Bonnet
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replaced Luchaire as Director. Writing on 9 February 1931, CICI member and former
French Prime Minister Paul Painlevé revealed just how significantly popular opinion had
turned against the IIIC within the wider League body, which thought it was unduly
influenced by the French Government:
The Committee was much surprised to learn of the motives attributed to
them. They have no consciousness of ever having had in view any object other
than the efficient fulfilment of the task entrusted to them by the League of
Nations. My colleagues are also convinced that, when the re-organisation of the
Institute is completed, the results will afford striking evidence of the scrupulous
impartiality with which they are endeavoring to maintain a fair balance between
the different forms of culture, in so far as that is possible within the limits of the
small number of posts available in the Institute.70
With a new IIIC director intent on addressing such charges of partiality, the CICI also
thought it prudent to provide new regulations for staff. In the report to the wider League
about the IIIC’s overhaul listing staff duties: “The officials of the Institute must always
bear in mind the essentially international character of their duties.”71 However,
considering Gilbert Murray wrote that same month to British politician Arthur Henderson
that, despite Great Britain’s lack of financial support for the CICI they had “insisted on a
drastic reform of the Institute on English lines,” it seems that partiality likely only leaned
a different way across the English Channel.72
Great Britain, of course, was not the only country facing the challenge of
drumming up support for peace. For instance, though the United States did host a national
committee of intellectual cooperation, the US government was resistant to making
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official connections. This was illustrated in February 1931 when Henri Bonnet asked a
member of the American Consular Service—who was sympathetic to the goals of
intellectual cooperation—if it was possible to set up an official liaison between the US
Government and the IIIC. In reply, the American Consular Service member noted that it
was unlikely, but that he could “at least inform the Department of your activities.”73 Such
“interest” without official support was a challenge that faced many national committees.
Part of this lack of interest stemmed from isolationism, but for some countries
who had limited influence within the CICI, it probably seemed like a poor political
investment. Murray, writing in March 1931, noted the imbalanced power in the League,
though without apparent concern. Responding to a Mrs. Matheson who wondered how
much power each country had in influencing League policy, Murray wrote: “The League
is never entirely subservient to any nation, but different individuals and nations have at
different times great ascendancy there.” In a clear indication of his biased British point of
view, he continued:
Sometimes Great Britain is especially powerful owing to her comparatively
disinterested position… France is normally very influential, but loses influence
when she becomes nationalist. During the Ruhr occupation, for instance, she had
almost everyone against her. The recent Nazi successes, on the other hand, greatly
damage the influence of Germany.74
Not only did he believe that Great Britain’s powerful position was appropriate within the
League, but as France and Germany “damaged” their reputations in the early 1930s, it
only fueled his sense of British superiority. As will be discussed later in this chapter,
Murray thought that Great Britain’s “comparatively disinterested position” ideally suited
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them to have greater influence within the LN and CICI. James T. Shotwell would make a
similar argument for the United States based on rhetoric of American exceptionalism.
While the LN did respond to criticisms regarding their limited view of
internationalism by carefully including a range of different nationalities to increase
diversity, this did not change the balance of power. Women and members from nonEuropean countries—with the notable exception of the United States—were added into
committees in a type of quota filling or balancing of groups and nationalities. For
instance, in March 1931, LN secretariat official Armi Hallsten-Kallia contacted Murray
for suggestions concerning whom to appoint to spaces recently occupied on the SubCommittee of Experts for the Instruction of Youth. She mentioned that they had recently
appointed a Chinese member who would be particularly helpful in addressing “the
problem of League instruction in distant countries.” Hallsten-Kallia suggested the
appointment of an Indian member for the same reason.75 “If there is another Indian
appointed by the Council,” Murray replied, “it might for diplomatic reasons be worth
while having him. But I should not lay any great stress on this.”76 Although a show of
diversity was politically expedient, especially in cases where the topic of concern directly
affected these groups, such attempts to fill quotas did not, as Murray’s reply suggests,
mean that those individuals would necessarily have any power to enact change. Indeed,
even those countries with relative strength within the LN were not necessarily successful
in convincing their own countries to support LN policy.
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Moral Disarmament
Though already a concern from the outset in 1922, the CICI’s visionary goal of
promoting peace was given specific direction and impetus by the Disarmament
Committee with the use of the term “moral disarmament” in 1931. It was adopted as an
official area of work after Poland made a declaration about it in the January 1931
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. In the declaration, Poland
noted the rising tension and embittered atmosphere in international politics, which they
said “engenders a state of mind highly unfavourable to the reduction of armaments.”
Changing mentalities was the central focus of moral disarmament, which the Polish
delegation noted had “been talked about for some time in the League” but no “practical”
results had come of this discussion. They thought a number of steps could be taken,
including to “arrest the hate-inspired propaganda,” to “compel States to rectify false
information about other countries” in public opinion and writing, and most ambitiously,
“to have war propaganda recognised as a crime by the law of all countries.” The Polish
delegation felt that as long as propaganda became “increasingly violent” there was no
hope of achieving material disarmament. Notably, Poland’s formulation of moral
disarmament relied heavily on censorship.77 When discussed by the wider League,
censorship was demphasized in favor of international amity. For instance, moral
disarmament was considered by the LN as the “best methods of bringing about a moral
détente in order to create an atmosphere favourable to the pacific solution of international
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problems.”78 Notably, this definition is quite broadly envisioned and its lack of focus a
clear indication of the need to gain the support of a range of different national members.
Taking up the work suggested by the Polish delegation, the CICI made its first
resolution on moral disarmament later in 1931, arguing that money spent in armaments
could be better spent supporting intellectual work. The CICI wrote, “the military burdens
borne by the different nations render increasingly difficult the studies, the training and
even the continued existence of an intellectual class, and thus hampers the intellectual
progress of mankind.” In this resolution, they directly linked their work instructing
children about the League to the work of disarmament, since knowledge of the League’s
work was essential to moral disarmament.79 That same year, the LN decided the CICI
would work in conjunction with the Political Commission to draw up suggestions for the
Disarmament Committee. One of the resulting reports, which stressed the importance of
the press, education and cinema in peace efforts, highlighted areas that were already in
the CICI's purview. The Disarmament Committee proposed that the CICI to consider
ways governments might “ensure that education in all degrees, imparted by means of
broadcasting or cinema, might be inspired with mutual respect and understanding
between the nations” and also look into changing domestic legislation to facilitate the
work of the press in promoting international understanding.80 Since the CICI felt this was
something they had been pursuing for many years, they saw the Polish proposal as a way
to redouble their efforts in the area of education.
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It took the CICI almost a decade after the term moral disarmament became
popular in the early 1920s for it to be officially used in their work. The CICI’s
formulation differed significantly from that suggested by the pacifist Fellowship of
Reconciliation. As Gilbert Murray wrote to fellow British League member Robert Cecil
on 26 January 1931: "I have just been sending a message to the Christ and Peace people,
saying that peace will not come by mere aloofness and abstinence from war, but only by
the full recognition of mutual duties between nation to nation of cooperation and of
brotherhood.”81 He was happy to use the same term the FoR had used in 1922, but his
disdain of their “Christ and Peace” methods was clear. Unlike the FoR’s focus on
Christian morality, the CICI’s formulation of moral disarmament rested on a combination
of encouraging cooperation and threatening sanctions for those who stepped out of line.
Murray felt that Great Britain was ideally suited to take the lead in the LN and
CICI because of what he viewed as their more neutral political position, as he had
suggested in a letter explaining the relative influence of different nations discussed
above. An interchange with a German League representative further illustrates this view.
On 17 January 1931, Murray received a letter from German professor of law Albrecht
Mendelssohn Bartholdy, which explained he had a number of negative experiences in
Geneva as a German representative. However, Mendelssohn Bartholdy was glad that
there were those who did not agree that Germans should be excluded and was pleased
Murray was among them.82 Murray gave Medelssohn Bartholdy his sympathies, noting
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that on occasion he had had uncomfortable experiences in Geneva as well. “I have
sometimes received very painful impressions from debates of the assembly,” he wrote,
“and in the early years, even from the proceedings of my own committee.” While he
noted that the “Stimmung,” or mood, “of the Secretariat generally animated by the wish
for peace and justice,” he did note that there were exceptions. Speaking of a situation
revolving around the Quai d’Orsay, or French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and France’s
Prime Minister Raymond Poincare, Murray wrote:
In the early days of the [CICI] I remember a serious incident. Some of the
committee wished to take some conciliatory or progressive step, but Bergson,
under pressure from the Quai d’Orsay, did not agree. He explained to some of us
in private that M. Poincare held a strong view on the matter. One of my
colleagues said ‘After all, M. Poincare is not immortal,’ and Bergson, lifting his
hand, said ‘Oh, if I could believe it!’83 I think that represents fairly the
unsatisfactory side of some of the league activities, but of course I fully realize
that it is easy for those who are not suffering to preach patience.84
Judging by his audience in this letter—a German citizen—and the context of French and
German tension following the First World War, the “conciliatory or progressive step” he
described likely had to do with interactions between these countries. This reply also
suggests a certain exceptionalism he assumed in his country, when he considers Great
Britain transcending, or not “suffering” from, such a tense political environment.
Murray explained to Mendelssohn Bartholdy why he thought Great Britain was
better situated to lead international affairs compared to France and Germany. “I’m afraid
I become less democratic as the years pass," Murray wrote by way of apology before
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launching into criticism. "Your Government could do infinitely better if it were not afraid
of outbreaks of popular passion, and my French friends are always insisting quite
sincerely that Briand and his associates are straining on the leash towards peace but are
constantly held back by the latent forces of anger and fear, which are always ready to be
stirred up in the French masses." In comparison, he felt that opinion in Great Britain—
among both politicians and the public—was more politically neutral. He argued: "Here
things are a little different: we used to be like that in the first years after the war, but our
people have very short memories, and have relapsed into their ordinary condition of
vaguely wishing everyone to be comfortable and not make a fuss.”85 To explain Great
Britain’s neutrality, he fell back on the tried and true national stereotype of keeping a stiff
upper lip.
Additionally, Murray sought to court North American interest in intellectual
cooperation by calling attention to what he called Great Britain and North America’s
“similar” intellectual goals. On 31 October 1931, Murray wrote in “Interdependence,” the
journal of the Canadian League of Nations Union:
IDEAS, like diseases, pay no attention to political frontiers, and unlike diseases,
fly easily across oceans and continents. In much of the business of the League of
Nations Canadians must often feel that they are too far off to give much practical
help, but for the work of Intellectual Co-operation we want only what you can
effectively give—your interest, your thoughts and your feelings. The great New
Fact which this generation has to face is the INTERDEPENDENCE of Nations.
The world is becoming more and more One Great Society, though it is still
governed by some 60 separate National Governments, all much inclined to shout
‘Me first, and the rest nowhere’! That, as sensible thinkers now know, is the road
to ruin, the road that led to the Great War. To escape from that road the first step
is Intellectual Co-operation.86
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To Murray, moral disarmament hinged on the ability to successfully form this “One Great
Society,” and the integrationist exchange of ideas was the best way to realize it. Forming
connections of all sorts was what lay at the foundation of Murray’s cultural
internationalism.
Though they were in agreement about the need for intellectual cooperation,
Gilbert Murray and James T. Shotwell disagreed on one important point: the role of the
CICI in political matters. From its formation, the CICI had been carefully separated in the
League structure from committees that dealt with governmental policy, and Murray was
careful to continue this legacy. Up until 1931, Shotwell had been very critical of the CICI
and had refused to take part on grounds that it was a forum for scientific and literary
celebrity, with very few social scientists in leading roles. Writing to Henri Bonnet,
Murray noted that he was pleased that Shotwell might be coming to represent Millikan at
an upcoming meeting because he had “‘the international mind’ and a power of
initiative.”87 However, when the CICI, working on Millikan’s suggestion, requested he
take Millikan’s place in the upcoming meeting, Shotwell replied that if the CICI was
unwilling to change its views he would not come. Despite this assertion, he accepted the
role, but made it clear that he would use the time to argue for a reorganization of the
CICI.88
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Murray refused his suggestions of reorganization but instead offered to form a
special committee of social scientists.89 While Murray’s proposal did not seem to differ
significantly from what Shotwell had originally suggested, Murray’s refusal prompted a
strong reaction from Shotwell.90 This was likely due to a misunderstanding, but Shotwell
was not pleased with the compromise and threatened to resign completely from the
intellectual cooperation organization, and “dissociate” himself from the American
National Committee. “I must,” he wrote to Murray, “concentrate upon what seems to me
the all-important problem of bringing the disciplines of the political sciences more and
more into the study of international relations.”91 To Millikan, Shotwell wrote that he had
“no other choice” but to resign from the committee “which I do with much regret, both
because of the personal associations and because I think the Committee on Intellectual
Cooperation is on the wrong track.”92 Bonnet wrote Shotwell saying he thought there had
been some misunderstanding and counseling patience. “I am still convinced that not only
are you right but, further, that your views will be adopted. The matter will certainly take
rather longer than we would have wished,” he cautioned. However, he also stressed that
this change would mean increased representation for social and political scientists, not
the overhaul Shotwell had initially imagined. Indeed, Bonnet wrote in a way suggesting
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such an overhaul had never been Shotwell’s intention.93 Responding to claims that the
issue was a misunderstanding, Shotwell wrote the executive secretary of the US National
Committee that he “couldn’t agree” that he had misunderstood Murray’s response and
that the “opening paragraph was all that I needed to read.”94 While this seems to
underscore the reactionary nature of his response, the conflict was already set in motion
and Shotwell remained resolute. Serving as intermediary between Murray and Shotwell,
Millikan urged Shotwell to reconsider and also warned Murray not to underestimate the
importance of having Shotwell on the CICI. In fact, he suggested that if Shotwell was to
break ties with the intellectual cooperation movement, US participation would likely drop
precipitously, and the American National Committee could fold as a result.95
After Millikan’s warning—which very clearly threatened a withdrawal of US
support—Murray became more conciliatory but still refused to reorganize the CICI into a
political committee. In reply, Murray pointed out to Millikan that the constitution of the
CICI was “meant to represent ALL the branches of knowledge.” Murray felt that to
“make it predominantly a Committee of Political Science” would leave it ill-suited for the
kind of work a political committee would require because it would be filled by historians,
physical scientists, mathematicians and the like. He once again pointed out that Shotwell
could address political questions through a subcommittee without prompting an overhaul
in the CICI that would leave many members out of their depth. “On looking through the
correspondence,” Murray wrote, “I cannot help wondering whether some incident
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occurred without my noticing which in some way hurt Shotwell’s feelings.” If so, he
hoped that Millikan could help him to “set it right.”96
Shotwell, however, seemed placated and agreed to an arrangement not altogether
different from what Murray had originally suggested. In a letter to Murray on 23 January
1932, he wrote in a way that made it seem his suggestion from the outset was simply to
expand membership for political scientists, rather than the complete reorganization he
originally, rather forcibly, proposed.97 This was a quick reversal of attitude since less than
a month earlier he had written that he “wholly” disagreed with CICI policy and that “a
regard for intellectual honesty makes my resignation necessary.”98 It is not clear exactly
what Shotwell sought to gain by threatening to leave. It is possible he simply resented
what he viewed as a hasty dismissal, and the wound was soothed by Murray’s attempts at
conciliation. It is also likely that it was a common strategy for him, as he used it again the
following year in a disagreement with the American League of Nations Association.99 Of
course, in any major organization, interpersonal conflict can have a significant impact,
but in the case of an organization set up to be an example of international cooperation,
such instances were particularly damaging. When individuals representing entire
countries disagreed, the repercussions did not remain between only them.
Possibly keeping the conflict between Zimmern and Luchaire in mind, Murray
also reminded Shotwell that the status of appointments to the League was not a simple
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matter of picking the best person, but was often a political decision. This may have also
influenced Shotwell’s change of position. IIIC worker J. D. Montenach wrote to Murray
that, while he agreed they should include more political scientists and they would soon
have the opportunity to bring in some of the “persons of the highest reputation in this
field,” they were “not entirely free” in their choice “as questions of nationality will
inevitably arise and the Council has already promised several Governments
representation in the C.I.C.I.” He continued
I do not think I anticipate too much when I tell you in confidence that some
members of the Committee whose term of office ends this year will have to be
replaced. We very much hope that Professor Shotwell will consent to replace Dr.
Millikan; but if such a case seems to be easy, as it is the privilege of the Great
Powers always to have a national in the main committees of the League, the
question becomes much more complicated when one comes to getting an
equitable treatment to the smaller States. We must always avoid treating them as
if their case is easily solved when the privilege of the Great Powers has been
observed. We must act, on the contrary, with great caution, and therefore we
cannot vary the application of rules and practice, as Professor Shotwell seems to
think.100
Though Shotwell had the political backing and influence to ensure him a position in the
CICI—despite years of being critical of its work—other countries were not so fortunate.
Indeed, in the same letter that Montenach noted CICI members were not allowed to
choose their replacements he also made it clear an exception would be made for
Shotwell. The United States, as a Great Power, was guaranteed a seat at a table carefully
set to support Great Power hegemony.
At least ostensibly, moral disarmament was meant to mend rifts. As Murray wrote
in August of 1932, the CICI was attempting to address the wounds left by the First World
War and moral disarmament was one of its “healing instruments.” However, to expect it
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to work quickly was asking too much. “The story of a healing process,” Murray wrote,
“is always slow, unexciting, devoid of sudden incident.” He cautioned patience for
disarmament and especially the moral disarmament portion of its work. “Originating in
the attempt to deal with the friction between Germany and Poland, it was at first treated
as a trifle and almost an unreality,” he explained. “But when the Committee, comprising
of some 19 nations, sat down to work and come to grips with its subject it began to
discover that ‘moral disarmament’ was not a trifle but one of the most important matters
in the world.” He asked his reader to consider why disarmament drags on or why “Nazis
and Fascists and Communists rage and vapour and successfully prevent men of sense
from coming together” to address it. “The obstacles,” he argued, “are mostly not material
but psychological.” Indeed, he thought it was the one true obstacle between the “civilized
world” realizing peace and that moral disarmament itself hinged on the success of the
CICI to “keep up regular communication with the countries in most need of guidance.”101
While he does not provide a list of these countries, considering he was writing to a
British audience and was the chair of the CICI, it is clear that Great Britain was not on his
list. As a call to action, this article suggests that he envisioned Great Britain as a leader in
this reform.
Like Murray, Shotwell also shaped the formulation of moral disarmament. It was
Mary Emma Woolley, long-term president of Mount Holyoke College and the first
woman sent as representative to the 1931 World Disarmament Conference, who
introduced Shotwell to the term. She suggested he consider the proposal made by the
Polish delegation to the LN to adopt an international agreement for the suppression of
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ideals that fomented war. As discussed above, this proposal suggested that each nation
would take steps to prevent communications—in the press, cinema and radio—that would
spark discord and hostility.102 Shotwell did not agree with the proposal’s focus on
censorship, feeling this was the domain of individual countries. He also felt that such an
emphasis on censorship was unlikely to be accepted by liberals and especially American
liberals and if it were, “reactionaries” too often used it “even when founded for a good
purpose.”103 He focused, rather, on the development of internationally minded individuals
through education.
Shotwell was initially dismissive of the idea of moral disarmament, but warmed to it
after some thought, and it became clear he would be allowed by the Disarmament
Conference to propose a reassessment of its aims. “The term itself was unfortunate,”
Shotwell wrote, “for it seems to carry a suggestion of hypocrisy; at least, so it was
interpreted by the hard-headed delegates of more than one country represented at Geneva.
One can imagine with what feelings some of Poland’s neighbors, especially the Germans,
received this proposal.” Poland had recently increased its expenditure on armaments, and
it was in that way he felt it suggested hypocrisy. He continued: “They wanted first of all
to see some practical evidence of this moral movement toward the international mind by
a lessening of such armies as Poland itself had been so busily building up in recent
years.” Notably, Shotwell, did not mention the increase in armaments of his own country,
but instead presented this reluctance in terms of a conflict between Poland and Germany.
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While noting the resistance of Germany, his main concern was that it called for
censorship, which he opposed. “Liberal minds,” he wrote, “are suspicious of government
censorship, even when used for good purposes, because it nearly always tends to get into
the hand of reactionaries.” Additionally, he pondered: “How could one distinguish
between fomenting of war and the legitimate warning against real dangers?”104
Aside from suggesting “hypocrisy” and being based on censorship, Shotwell also
disliked the connections between the “moral” and passive approach to peace taken by
religious organizations. In notes for a speech about moral disarmament, his first main
point was that “the term moral disarmament connotes negative pacifism and church
theology!” Like Murray, he saw disarmament efforts separate from the church. He
continued, noting that moral disarmament should instead not be about the “renunciation
of war, but the positive support of law” and the active development of international
studies programs. His speech conclusion was titled “why the United States should take
the lead,” which included four points:
1. In line with democratic principles of justice in dealing with peoples, and
depending upon the weight of public opinion.
2. Wilsonian Idealism the actual forerunner of any such idea.
3. Kellogg Pact demands it.
4. Our present organizations and educational associations have always stood for
idealism and support for citizenship – Scouts, etc.105
As with Murray’s assumption that Great Britain was ideally positioned to lead the CICI
because of their relatively neutral political stance, Shotwell made similar arguments
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about US traits that made them best suited to take the lead. While this list specifically
addressed moral disarmament, it effectively sums up Shotwell’s views of why the US
was important to the wider intellectual cooperation movement.
Though the CICI did not officially use the term until the 1930s, when peace
efforts were already obviously losing traction, the CICI had been pursuing the goal of
peace through intellectual channels since its inception. Regarding the area of moral
disarmament, a report of the CICI’s fourteenth plenary session in 1932 stated, “directly or
indirectly, all that [the Committee] has done in the last ten years tends towards moral
disarmament, this being the aim and inspiration of all its efforts and all its work. It
possesses a sort of prior claim to the intellectual part of moral disarmament, to the
success of which it proposes to devote itself more than ever.”106 The CICI focused a large
portion of their energy towards the goal of moral disarmament and by 1932 it was
considered the “dominating question” the CICI addressed.107
In the words of Wellington Koo, “It is easy to drift into war, but peace can only
be secured with resolute efforts.”108 As one American supporter, Methodist Bishop
Charles Wesley Burns, noted, “the outlawry of war will come no faster than war is
outlawed in the hearts of individuals. We must look to our own emotional and intellectual
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attitudes before we can hope for world brotherhood.”109 Efforts of the CICI were meant
to directly pursue peace through influencing public opinion. Rhetoric of cooperation in
the interwar period was based on the actions of groups that transcended the nation-state.
This language was directly linked to the conviction that peace could be promoted through
the interaction of elites in intellectual and cultural circles, who would then guide public
opinion through popular culture.110 However, this same emphasis on the intellectual elite
translated into one that favored the influence of the Great Powers within CICI work.
Shotwell agreed with the original moral disarmament proposal that there would need
to be a change in mentalities before peace could be established, but rather than
censorship, he stressed education in a new field he called International Civics. “The only
way to rid the world of war is to provide adequate substitutes for it,” he argued. “There is
a strategy of peace as well as of war, and it must be studied in the same careful way and
worked out for unimportant, trivial things instead of risking all on supreme issues.” He
felt such an approach would be best done in the safe environments of schools. “To
enlarge the field of civics so that it included the international community is,” he argued,
“the surest way to secure a sane, well balanced judgment as to the place of any nation in
it.”111 He drafted his own moral disarmament proposal that removed all mention of
censorship and focused on International Civics. He also suggested, rather than placing
pressure to conform through censorship, that countries would provide reports to the LN
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explaining what steps they had taken to promote moral disarmament and international
understanding. Additionally, he felt an important step to ensuring effective international
relations was to require public officials to pass exams before taking office.
He was also concerned that in its initial form it would be quickly rejected by the
United States. This was partly due to the increasing isolationism he noticed developing
within his country. For instance, he wrote Murray on 15 February 1932 pointing that the
peace movement was “almost completely submerged by a rising tide of nationalism” and
that the “peace forces” had “lost courage and leadership.” He explained that the
“extremists are becoming more extreme, and the middle-of-the-way people are frankly
turning their interests from idealism to domestic economic questions.”112 However,
Shotwell remained optimistic in April that the challenges would actually serve to
strengthen the peace movement. “Even if the French nationalists win in the next
election,” he wrote to Murray, “and Europe comes to the very verge of a new cataclysm, I
think there is a good chance that such a test of realities in the peace movement will
enable us to act more intelligently and less in the mood of doubting idealism…but I admit
that the obstacles at the present time seem at first glance overwhelming.” Speaking of the
US and the financial strain of the Great Depression, he noted: “The country is so
absorbed in its internal troubles that the problem of peace and war seems unreal and far
away.”113 Though still optimistic, he recognized the need to carefully draft his moral
disarmament proposal in a way that would be acceptable to countries where nationalism
was a “rising tide.”
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Shotwell wrote Mary Woolley in June 1932, apologizing for not initially giving the
issue his attention despite her urging on more than one occasion. He explained that he
had redrafted it to encourage US adoption and to make it an issue “not to be easily
evaded” by governments. “I have found,” he explained, “on many occasions that my
European colleagues are tempted to regard us as using technicalities for pretexts in order
to escape responsibilities.” He addressed this in his proposal, as well being careful “not to
give offense to the French,” who were notorious in US and British public opinion for
their resistance of progressive measures, in the hope that “something real come out of this
proposal.” He placed great faith in his moral disarmament draft, commenting that if it
was accomplished along the terms he suggested then “history will not record the failure
of the [1931-32] Disarmament Conference even if the technical experts do not agree as to
the ratios of military and naval armaments.”114 However, when he turned it over to the
Disarmament Committee they removed what he thought were the two most important
aspects: international civics and examinations for public office.
He sent his suggested draft protocol to Woolley, who forwarded it to the US and
British delegates to the 1931-32 Disarmament Conference meeting in Geneva. In a letter
sent 21 July 1932, Woolley explained that she discussed his protocol with members of
the US and British delegations, including British delegate and feminist Margery Corbett
Ashby, and they had formulated a “Declaration” based on his suggestions. “Although it
does not go as far as the American Delegation would like,” she explained, “we consider it
a distinct achievement…”115 They revised his suggestions and removed international
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civics and the suggested reports. According to Shotwell, it was Woolley’s suggestion to
remove international civics because he had included the phrase “examinations for public
office,” and she felt it unlikely the US would agree to such a restriction.116 Woolley
claimed that it was at the suggestion of Corbett Ashby.117
Shotwell was displeased and responded by contacting US Secretary of the Interior
Ray Lyman Wilbur, writing that he was “longing” to see the line calling for examination
for public office back in the proposal. He was careful to note that any work the CICI did
would “not politically involve your Department,” but would cooperate with it.118 When
Wilbur replied with interest, but no concrete action, Shotwell cast a broader net and wrote
other countries in an attempt to garner their support. He contacted German diplomat
Albert Dufour-Feronce in August 1932, hoping that it would be possible to expand the
reception of the moral disarmament proposal, commenting that he thought it was an
essential “element in the creation of the international mind” and he would “be very sorry
to see the proposal emasculated or ultimately dropped.”119 Similarly, he wrote German
delegate Dr. Arnold Wolfers, who recognized that because the original proposal came
from the Polish delegations that Germans might be “inclined to scoff at it, regarding it as
an effort to substitute a hypocritical and unreal suggestions for actual steps towards
disarmament,” but still felt it was an important part of creating international
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understanding.120 In January 1933, he wrote Pierre Comert in the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs that he could “get the support of the entire educational system” in the US
for moral disarmament, urging Comert to convince his country to adopt it. He closed the
letter commenting that he had “always been a heretic about disarming by arithmetic.”121
He received a tepid response from these inquiries, which might have had something to do
with the popular title of the “Anglo-American Proposal” for the redrafted version of
moral disarmament. Additionally, after Japan’s occupation of Manchuria starting the
previous September, it was clear support for disarmament was rapidly eroding. Despite
this, Shotwell was eventually successful in convincing US Secretary of State Henry
Stimson of the validity of his moral disarmament protocol and through Stimson’s
influence was able to convince the League’s Disarmament Committee to accept many of
his suggestions. Shotwell was pleased with this turn of events, but his optimism would
not remain for long, especially after he saw one of his most favored aspects, examinations
for public office, was never reinstated by the Disarmament Committee.
Though disarmament was obviously losing traction in 1933 to the point it was
lambasted in political cartoons, those invested in it were still attempting to drum up
support. Writing in the Pittsburg Press on 31 March 1933, journalist Anne Weiss
summarized the goals of moral disarmament within a call to action: “We must learn to
disarm our minds; substitute faith for suspicion. We must adopt a higher code of morals
in our international relations.”122 This appeal coincided with a plea made by Mary
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Woolley to maintain faith in disarmament and to inculcate in the next generation this
higher moral code. “They must be trained from infancy,” Woolley argued, “in this new
code of international relations. Our children’s minds must be trained to new feelings in
regards to the settlement of disputes.” The battle cry of “to the battlefield,” she continued,
had to be replaced with the call of “to the conference table” and on this evolution rested
“the hope of civilization.”123
Such an educational approach aligned with the CICI’s formulation of moral
disarmament, but such appeals were not sufficient to maintain support of the initiative.
Though the CICI adopted the goals of moral disarmament as soon as it was proposed in
1931—while also claiming it had already been pursuing the goal for almost a decade—
the League’s Disarmament Committee was not as willing an audience. In a May 1933
letter marked confidential, Corbett Ashby wrote Shotwell that the General Commission
was still stalling the efforts of her Moral Disarmament Committee. “Most members of the
Committee,” she explained, “have considered it useless to discuss moral disarmament,
while the main purposes of the Conference, material disarmament, security and control
seem unrealisable.”124 Mary Woolley also struggled to maintain the interest of the United
States, despite her efforts to call for the nation’s patience, faith and support.125
In June 1933, the Disarmament Committee adopted a moral disarmament
proposal, but by then many of moral disarmament’s supporters, including Shotwell, had
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lost interest.126 The protocol they adopted included Shotwell’s emphasis on international
civics, but excluded required reports and examinations for office.127 While Shotwell was
able to briefly gather patronage for moral disarmament in the form of Stimson’s political
pressure on the Disarmament Committee, this did not lead to broad US support. In an
August 1933 letter to fellow US National Committee member Alice S. Cheyney,
Shotwell noted that the CICI remained “a mystery” for many people of influence in the
US and “is not warmly supported in certain quarters.”128 Despite efforts made by
Shotwell, Murray and Bonnet, such apathy was the most common reaction to their efforts
to increase support for the CICI in their home countries.
This was despite initial reports that same month received by the US National
Committee from state superintendents saying they endorsed moral disarmament and
would positively represent the League in their curriculum. Delaware, for instance, said it
would be one of their “main objectives.”129 A study of school textbooks in Japan and
China, with the support of Chinese LN delegate Wellington Koo was undertaken by the
CICI in early 1933 and reported on in June, but political developments stalled any efforts
to revise textbooks in support of moral disarmament goals.130 Japan had just left the
League that May, and Germany was soon to follow suit in October. Analysis of these
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women working with the CICI provides a glimpse into what it was like to take on
international cooperative work with men, many of whom did not appreciate what they
brought to the League’s intellectual cooperation movement.
Moral disarmament efforts struggled along hopefully for a while after Japan’s
exit, but Germany’s decision to withdraw from the disarmament commission was a death
knell for both material and moral interwar disarmament efforts. In a July 1934 memo to
US National Committee members, Shotwell explained that moral disarmament would no
longer be on the US National Committee’s agenda. “Failure of the Disarmament
Conference,” he explained, “renders it necessary to reconsider the whole subject.” He felt
that the broad terminology would have to be abandoned and instead the CICI would need
to “deal with its elements separately.” Those separate elements were the essential
foundation of moral disarmament, including education, the cinema and radio.131 “Each of
these subjects,” he argued, “offers a wide field for positive action and will gain rather
than lose by being considered apart from the others.” Though Shotwell’s efforts to make
moral disarmament a binding expectation of behavior and to launch international civics
had borne little fruit, his vision of an education-based approach was more widely useful
to organizations such as the International Bureau of Education. This organization,
working in close collaboration with the CICI, had been pursuing similar goals and also
latched on to the idea of moral disarmament. A discussion of this organization and its ties
to the CICI will be a main focus in the following chapter.

James T. Shotwell. “Memorandum by the Chairman: Moral Disarmament.” 3 July 1934.
Shotwell MSS, 207.
131

66

As support for moral disarmament evaporated, Murray and Shotwell continued to
disagree. In a 1934 wireless talk on the League’s “Radio-Nations” channel, Shotwell
posed the question, “How can history and economics, for example, be broadened so as to
deal with world problems, instead of remaining fixed within the boundaries of single
countries?”132 His answer, of course, was international civics, which he viewed
intellection cooperation and the work of the CICI as central to addressing. “Political
science,” Shotwell concluded, “is a field in which men of different nationalities work on
similar problems under different circumstances. There is everything to be gained by
bringing them in contact with one another.”133 He felt the CICI’s main role should be to
bring those studying politics and the political challenges facing the world into contact—
not just intellectuals interested in sharing scientific bibliographies or protecting museums.
His emphasis on politics is clear. However, unlike Shotwell, Murray saw value in any
situation where intellectuals from different nations effectively collaborated, even if that
collaboration did not directly influence political decisions. The problem lay in the fact
that the relative influence of countries within the LN international forum was not equal
and strongly favored the Great Powers.
Writing in 1935, Temperance Elizabeth Smith noted criticisms of the term
“international” that suggest contemporaries recognized the limitations of the League’s
form of the term. Smith would later serve as executive secretary to the United States
National Committee, and she secured this position after writing a lengthy overview and
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analysis of the CICI for a Master’s degree at Claremont College in California. Her 1935
thesis addressed some of the main criticisms directed at the CICI, which included
perceived improper claims to internationality due to European and US dominance of the
work. This was especially a concern in relation to the Institute in Paris and the
Educational Cinematography Institute in Rome, since both were almost entirely
supported by the national government hosting them. She noted that some people accused
these institutes for not being “imbued with an international objective,” and that they
instead were “the tools of excessive national influence.”134 After arguing that the CICI
had mitigated these issues within the institutes by being careful to staff them with a range
of nationalities, she addressed the issue of internationality in a way that actually served to
underscore these criticisms.
She argued that “the rule at Geneva is the rule of courtesy” and, while not all
members might agree on a proposal, they nevertheless came to consensus. This resulted
in some “satisfactory and unsatisfactory aspects for everybody,” she declared. “It was
observed,” she wrote, “that, because of a greater similarity in cultural background, the
Anglo-Saxon contingent of the Committee, have a similar way of looking at the problems
of intellectual co-operation, often quite different from the viewpoint of either the Latins
or the Orientals.” The example she used is revealing and supports this chapter’s argument
that the CICI was heavily influenced by the United States and Great Britain. As she
reveals, one of the main criticisms leveled at the CICI was that it was unduly dominated
by Great Britain and the United States. In the CICI’s defense, Smith noted situations
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where even Great Britain and the United States had conceded to the desires of other
countries. Her first example was of the United States, which “felt that for the Committee
to consider the problems of scientific property was a futile sort of thing at best and only a
grandiose scheme.” They considered intellectual property something to be addressed by
individual countries and that tracking claims internationally at the time would have been
very difficult. They still, however, provided their support.
That she followed this example with one where countries with less power in the
committee gave way suggests she was unable to find another significant situation where
the Great Powers did not hold sway. In this second example, she folded India and Japan
into one group of “Orientals.” Indeed, she separated spheres of influence by Europeans,
the United States, “Latins,” and “Orientals”—suggesting that Asian and Latin American
countries did not have anywhere near the same level of influence as the Great Powers.
She wrote that “the Oriental group” was quite keen for the CICI to support the adoption
of Esperanto but accepted the CICI’s decision to instead focus on the study of practiced
languages.135 Notably, her comparative example explained how India and Japan had to
give way in a vital area related to effective communication—one that placed them at a
distinct disadvantage. The status quo of LN official languages (French, English and
German), heavily favored the Great Powers.
As war loomed closer, national support in the remaining Great Powers waned,
including the United States, which had never given the League of Nations its official
support at any point in the interwar period, despite the existence of a US National
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Committee of intellectual cooperation. In March 1939, a little over five months before
Germany invaded Poland, the CICI sent out mass letters asking national committees to
share “the best passages of the history text-books in their respective countries.” This was
towards the goal of calling attention to the “constructive aspect of the question” by
providing exemplary samples for future textbook editors.136 Though he had previously
supported such a positive approach to moral disarmament, Shotwell replied on 25 March
1939 in a letter marked “Personal” to IIIC director Henri Bonnet, that he would be
“frankly bothered to present” it to his associates. He argued that because anyone who
could effectively weigh in was too busy to do so meant that the CICI would only get
“second rate people” to address such a study. He continued, looking at it from a
“practical standpoint” and claimed “American history teaching is so far removed from
contact with Europe that the whole suggestion seems unreal when viewed across the
Atlantic.” Indeed, he thought it was not “a pertinent request for American historians” and
hoped that they would “not be asked to contribute.” He closed the letter saying he was
sure Bonnet would understand: “I’ve learned in the course of a long life that sometimes
disagreement is a much more friendly thing than agreement in matters where there is no
real possibility of achieving results.”137 While he ostensibly refused on grounds that it
would be unlikely to achieve any result, the subtext was one of differing national interests
and US isolationism. Isolationist rhetoric in the interwar period was used selectively,
leading many scholars to use the term “independent internationalism” to describe
interwar US policy. However, with another World War looming, the United States had
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been towing a strong isolationist line for several years, especially after President Franklin
Roosevelt likened international aggression in Europe to a disease and called for a
“quarantine” of Europe and a separation of the United States from its conflicts.138
Although the US National Committee was still a part of the CICI in 1939, it is clear that
Shotwell had internalized this view.
Murray remained more optimistic, and even in May 1939 he was still doggedly
attempting to garner the monetary support of the British Government for CICI work.
Towards this end, he was still attempting to “get Intellectual Co-operation put on a more
popular basis in England. The Government will not help us, and the National Committee
is merely a learned body without funds…” This continued to vex him because he was
convinced there were “circles we have not yet touched” who could benefit from the “raw
material” the CICI provided. “However,” he wrote, recognizing the significant challenges
he faced, “it may all come to nothing.”139 In this, he was correct. National tensions
continued to increase and several months later, after the 1 September 1939 invasion of
Poland by Germany and subsequent declarations of war against France and Great Britain,
the Second World War officially began.
While the CICI had been pursuing peace in intellectual channels from its
inception in 1922, their official use of the term moral disarmament was a late addition
and rather desperate attempt to stem the “rising tide” of nationalism and its competing
interests. Even though the members of the CICI were sincere in their hope that moral
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disarmament could attain peace, they were unable to garner any significant support for it
beyond official proclamations of the League of Nations that by the 1930s held little actual
sway. To the public, moral disarmament seemed, to borrow from David Low’s imagery,
as a “face-saving” veneer on a lost cause.

Conclusion
This chapter has addressed some of the major disagreements within the CICI, as
well as the significant influence of competing national interests had on its work. The
formulation of internationalism in the interwar period was contested and mutable. In the
context of the League of Nations, European interests held significant sway, and therefore
internationalism in this context mainly meant cooperation between European nations.
However, this chapter has argued that, in the case of intellectual cooperation, the United
States was also considerably influential. Indeed, moral disarmament within the CICI—
though initially proposed by Poland—was largely an Anglo-American conceptualization.
However, in each of these cases, dominating opinions and influences remained
concentrated in the Great Powers. Countries with less political power were accordingly
less influential within the intellectual cooperation initiative. In the case of the CICI,
though many countries took part, the United States and Great Britain were
disproportionately influential. Gilbert Murray justified this influence by claiming Great
Britain was ideally suited to take the lead in the LN and CICI because of their
comparatively “neutral” political position in Europe. James T. Shotwell and the
American National Committee based their justifications on the assumption that the
United States was best able to represent the views of all of the Americas, pointing to a
long history of idealism and commitment to principles of justice. That these assumptions
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were contested is not surprising. Additionally, while Murray sought to increase American
involvement in the CICI, Shotwell selectively chose to take part on grounds that some
issues were only of European concern. At the heart of all of the issues discussed in this
chapter were competing interests. For a committee formed with the express goal of
providing an example of how individuals and the nations they represented could
effectively work together in harmony, such competition ran counter to their stated
mission, and, as illustrated in the example of the conflict between Zimmern and Luchaire,
negatively affected their public image.
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Chapter Three: “In the Hearts of the Teachers Lies the Destiny of the World”
To those who courageously strive to change what we do to
children under the guidance of the dead hand. For what we
have done to children in the name of education has planted the
seeds of resentment and frustration, - has made all of us what
we are today. So war begins in the nurseries, and in the
chancelleries the choicest product of our system in perplexed
predicament promote and provoke future wars.

Porter Sargent, Between Two Wars,
Dedication, 1945
It only took two words left out of the League of Nations (LN) Charter to quash the
hopes of American educationalist Dr. Fannie Fern Andrews, who was sent by President
Woodrow Wilson as an American representative to the Paris Peace Conference. She
spent much of her time at the Peace Conference unsuccessfully lobbying for education to
be included in the LN Charter.140 Although she felt provision had to be made for
education in order to promote understanding among nations, members of the LN council
resisted efforts to form a committee for education within the LN. This resistance
eventually led to the popularly accepted view that “national education lies outside and
will always lie outside the competence of any official committee of the League.”141
Although when drafting the resolution that would form the basis of the LN Gilbert
Murray was careful to include provision for women, he blocked the formation of an
international office of education linked to the League by omitting the words "and
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education" that had been in the draft version. This had been a long-held goal of women
such as Andrews, and while one was formed later by prominent figures in Geneva in
1925 as the International Bureau of Education (IBE), these women had hoped such an
organization would exist directly under the auspices of the League of Nations.
As historian Joyce Goodman noted: "The suppression of the words ‘and
education,’ and with it international women's organizations' aspirations for an
International Bureau of Education, hinged around notions of national sovereignty and
self-determination.” These areas, especially in an organization that had been carefully set
up to leave Great Power hegemony unchallenged, were similarly not contested by the
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (CICI). “An International Bureau,”
Goodman continued, “collecting information about the 'progress’ of education in
different countries opened the League to the charge that mapping out a scheme of
education would lead to ‘interference’ in national education systems and so move
towards the creation of a ‘world state.’”142 As this chapter will discuss, the CICI was
essential in the formation of the IBE, but it worked with the IBE as an affiliated
organization, rather than as one officially part of the LN agreement between signing
nations. Both institutions would work together towards the goal of moral disarmament,
but in a formation already narrowed by fears of a “world state.” Before the CICI even
began working in connection with the IBE, their efforts had already been limited in scope
by competing national interests. While continuing an analysis of challenges associated
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with competing national interests, this chapter will also discuss the formation of the IBE
and the many informal networks that contributed to the rise of international education.
Despite the setback in the formation of the LN, education was an essential
component of moral disarmament and, while hobbled from the outset, it was an important
part of the CICI’s efforts towards establishing a lasting peace. In the area of education,
the CICI worked in coordination with national committees to form national education
centers which would help with the revision of textbooks, reorganize national education
(the Chinese system was of special interest to the CICI in the 1930s), and instruct youth
in international relations as well as the aims of the League of Nations. Still, while nationstates were generally willing to accept outside intervention in areas such as health, for
example in controlling disease, governments were more resistant to reform efforts in
national education. Although ideas flowed transnationally across national borders, when
it came to the implementation of international education, national agendas won out,
especially as the Depression took its financial toll in the 1930s and governments such as
Germany stressed nationalism as a way to promote solidarity. As in other areas of the
CICI’s work, national agendas severely limited minor utopian efforts made to promote
peace education. The IBE experienced similar limitations, but despite these challenges,
both of these institutions were essential in the interwar development of a coordinating
center for international education. In comparison to an emphasis on material
disarmament, the CICI focused on winning the hearts and mind of others, which included
what the rising generation was exposed to in school and their daily lives. Rather than a
focus on the material aspects, the CICI attempted to address cultural production. They
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felt it was important to be careful what was included in textbooks and what children were
exposed to in films because of the type of negative behaviors they could engender.
Writing while the Second World War raged, American educationalist and CICI
member Isaac Kandel reflected on the importance of dealing with nationalism before
internationalism could be considered. In his 1944 book Intellectual Cooperation:
National and International, he argued it was a lack of attention to national concerns that
challenged internationalist education in the interwar period. “Not only have differences of
national character been ignored in the movements to promote international
understanding,” he maintained, “but adequate attention has not been given to the
differences in the organization of national systems of education and the content of
methods of instruction.”143 He pointed not only to the failure of politicians to “utilize the
intellectual resources of the world for the preservation of peace” but also the inability of
the LN to view education as anything more than wholly a national concern, regardless of
IBE efforts. “In the end,” he argued, “time was to show that education misused could be a
greater danger to the world than any dangerous drug, and that the ideal of social justice as
the basis of peace could not be attained without education.”144 Essentially, where the LN
and the IBE fell short was in the successful navigation of international politics and the
counteraction of narrow, nationalistic ideology.
CICI efforts in education began at the outset in 1922, but were expanded when the
CICI worked in conjunction with the IBE. In 1925, three years after the formation of the
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CICI, the IBE was founded by Ecuador, Poland and the Canton of Geneva as a private,
non-governmental organization located in Geneva. Both national governments and
organizations were accepted as members of the IBE organization after paying a fee.
Before the IBE was officially formed, the International Institute on Intellectual
Cooperation (IIIC) served as a centralizing agency and meeting ground for the
developing IBE. While the IBE’s general aims centered on the support of education and
research, like the CICI, it was also concerned with the maintenance of peace. Although
an international bureau of education had been considered for many years before the
League was formed, the IBE was the first true execution of such ideas. The IBE was not
formed in a vacuum, but was a result of a lengthy process of discourse that evolved
within and across national boundaries. The concept of international education spread not
only through formal networks, such as institutions and organized events like conferences
and World’s Fairs, but also through personal connections and the migration of published
works.
International education garnered considerable scholarly attention after the
interwar period and scholars have expanded our understanding of its development
considerably in the last two decades.145 Most useful to the study of League of Nations
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educational initiatives has been the focus on international connections.146 In the interwar
period, these connections arose in the form of international organizations as well as
private interactions between individuals. Like much of League of Nations historiography,
study of education in relation to the LN has suffered from the emphasis of failure
narratives. However, the influence of the IBE and CICI in the formation of formal and
informal international networks of education should not be undervalued, which is often a
result of coloring LN history as one of disappointment. As historian of education
Eckhardt Fuchs argued, “The league’s function as the main point of reference of virtually
all kinds of educational movements should not be underestimated. Its central location in
Geneva – as the seat of the IBE…and the League being practically the capital of
international education of this time – facilitated its work.”147 The IBE served as both
center and mediator for international education and effectively launched education to the
international plane, while still directly involving governments in transnational exchange:
where interactions between other nations helped form new approaches to education.
However, this process was not without its challenges.
International Education
The same competing national interests in attempts to form an international center
of education in the interwar period plagued the precursors of the IBE. As educationalists
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David G. Scanlon and J. Shields pointed out in 1968, “international education can be
traced to antiquity.”148 However, the first man to directly envision a framework for
international education was Marc-Antione Jullien. As he stated in 1794, “In the long run,
education alone is capable of exercising a decisive and radical influence on the
regeneration of man, the improvement of societies, true civilization and the prosperity of
States. Each generation, if entrusted to teachers worthy of their mission, should be the
more perfect continuation of the generation it replaces.”149 Based on these ideas, Jullien
published his pamphlet Outline and Preliminary Consideration for a Work on
Comparative Education in 1817.150 It was because of Jullien that “comparative
education” became a part of the science of education. In the midst of the French
Revolution, Jullien actively supported education as a means to bring about social change.
Jullien, disillusioned with politics after his experience in the French Revolution, turned
exclusively to education as the key to social change.151 At the turn of the century, he
began focusing his energy solely on education, writing several pamphlets before his wellknown 1817 publication. His attempt to develop a “science” of education led to his
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forward-thinking view of creating comparative education. The aim of his 1817 work was
to compare educational systems throughout Europe, to set up a “Special Commission on
Education” and an “Educational Institute,” and to found an “Educational Newsletter.”
While Jullien met with little success in creating these institutions, his work did
influence educators, who pursued international forums to discuss education. The World’s
Fairs gave them that chance. The first international educational congress was hosted by
the United States in Philadelphia for the World’s Fair of 1876. During the meetings,
participants decided to make an educational congress a permanent fixture at World’s
Fairs, with the first formal International Congress of Educators held in Brussels in 1880.
These congresses were the grounds on which individual ideas migrated through
international channels. It was in 1893, for instance, when American psychologist and
educator Stanley Hall presented his concept of “child study” at the International Congress
of Education in the Chicago World’s Fair. Not long after, Germany and Great Britain
founded child psychology associations.152 The international scientific congresses that
coincided with World’s Fairs set the groundwork for international educational congresses
and began the process of developing an international community of scholars.153
Expanding this community would later be one of the main aims of the CICI.
Education as the key to progress is a fundamental aspect of liberalism. The ideas
underpinning international education in the early 20th century arose from the influence of
Classical Liberalism in the 19th century. Education in the 19th century was a force for
national identity and an important way nations helped support their war effort during the

152

Fuchs, “Educational Sciences”: 772.

153

Ibid, 758.

81

First World War. This important role of education in supporting nationalism explains the
CICI’s emphasis on using it as a tool for cultural internationalism. However, this meant
that they were working against the most common use of education in the interwar period.
At the same time they were making a call for international education, it is also a tool of
militarism, Jingoism, and nationalism. It was essential for the creation of national
identities, especially for those countries throughout Europe and Latin American that were
newly formed and were building a national identity shortly after the First World War.
Writing almost seven decades after Jullien, and no doubt affected by the presence
of international congresses, Dutch author Herman Molkenboer published his pamphlet,
originally written in Dutch in 1891, The Permanent International Council of
Education.154 Although no direct link exists between Jullien and Molkenboer, the latter
was no doubt influenced by a culture that had absorbed comparative education as a
possibility, which was observable in the formation of educational congresses. Drawing
upon the existence of Chambers of Commerce, which had been used for centuries, for
inspiration, Molkenboer wondered why educationalists could not follow this example and
create a “Permanent International Council of Education.” Such a council would also
include experts who would advise national educational authorities. He drew upon the
Council on Education in the United States as a viable example of how a federation of
states could be guided by one body. His plan did not take root, however. As he stated in
1890 after his movement collapsed: “The governments are waiting for the educationists
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to take the initiative, and the educationists are waiting for the governments.”155 When his
plan was revised under the title of the “Kurnig Plan” in 1904, it also failed to be
implemented. Although German author Kurnig met with some success as he disseminated
Molkenboer’s plan (with no mention made of Molkenboer) in the form of short
pamphlets that read like advertisements, the almost two-thousand members his “Centre”
had recruited by 1910 did not end in the formation of an international center for
education.
Writing near the same time as Kurnig, Hungarian educationalist Francis Kemény
actively built on the ideas of Jullien and Molkenboer as he promoted his plan for an
International Institute of Education. Of special interest to Kemény was cultural
internationalism, which was likely influenced by his experience as a Hungarian subject
under the rule of the Habsburg Empire. As he later wrote in 1914 of his early views: “We
know that each national culture, considered as a whole and in its origins, is an
international culture, inasmuch as it reflects the foreign cultures which are the
groundwork of any nation.”156 However, just as the IBE would maintain in their vision of
international education in the 1920s, he believed the autonomy of the nation should not
be compromised. In his notably transnational view, he thought internationalism and
nationalism need not be opposed. In fact, he argued that if internationalism was set up in
opposition to nationalism it would only cause a reaction that would hinder cultural
internationalism, which could only be developed through international education.
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In 1905, he argued for the establishment of an international bureau of education.
He identified six characteristics of international education that would be instrumental in
the development of cultural internationalism. First, he focused on an understanding of the
condition of national education in each country, then the use of organizations in which at
least several countries benefit, such as conferences, and efforts aimed at uniting
educational practice. In the social realm, he emphasized international education based on
universal human rights, the counteraction of chauvinism through peace education, and,
finally, to work against racism, inter-racial education.157 Kemény also proposed that an
International Review of Education, published in French, German, and English, be
disseminated across the globe. When he submitted his plan to the Ministry of Public
Instruction at Budapest, the organization recognized the need for such a publication, but
did not feel that they could undertake it. It would take the First World War to launch such
an idea as not only desirable, but also necessary.
The appearance of international schools also illustrated the changing attitude
towards international education, years before the establishment of the League of Nations.
Although the impact of these schools was limited and they are more an implementation of
international reform, rather than a cause, their formation and spread is indicative of the
transnational movement of ideas in international education. The pattern followed in these
schools migrated transnationally, notably from secondary schools Abbotsholme and
Bedales in the United Kingdom to Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Holland.
The underlying notion of Bedales was that “International goodwill is to be encouraged in
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every possible way.”158 In 1910, Paul Geheeb formed the international school
Odenwaldschule in Germany. Characteristic of this school was the lack of assigned
grades and grade-levels and an overarching objective of educating cultured,
internationally socialized students. Towards this end, he treated nationality as
“incidental” and “non-essential.”159 When Denmark established a secondary international
school in 1921, it was with funds from Danish, English and American contributors.160
In the early 1900s, Edward Peeters, a contemporary educationalist and friend of
Kemény, was the first able to move beyond conceptualizing an international educational
organization as a possibility to a reality. After his love of carrying out reform did not fit
well with his initial career in the army, he turned to education with a position as assistant
master of the Aténée Royal, a secondary school for boys in Ostend, Belgium. Soon after,
he obtained his teaching diploma and applied his zeal for reform to education. Difficulties
encountered with publishers prompted him to found his own publishing firm in 1908 and
after a successful reprinting of Rousseau’s Emile; he began to make connections with
educationalists abroad. These connections prompted him to publish a small quarterly
bibliography that reviewed recent educational works, which by 1909 became A Review of
Information Relating to Education and the Teaching Profession. Although he had the
support of Kemény, and a few other members, and the patronage of the Roumanian,
Bulgarian, Tunisian and Haitian departments of education, without widespread
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founding of the École d’Humanité in Switzerland. See Dennis Shirley, The politics of progressive
education: the Odenwaldschule in Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
160

International Folk (Peoples) High School in Helsingor, Denmark

85

international support he was forced to abandon his bureau in 1914. The start of the First
World War and the following years of conflict completed the ruin of his undertaking.
Along with Kemény and Peeters, several other important figures were working on
making international education a reality shortly before the First World War. E. Lebonnois
envisioned both an international bureau of vacation courses and an international bureau
of teaching of foreign languages that eventually led him to envision an International
Institute of Education at Caen. Dr. Fannie Fern Andrews of Boston was influential in the
formation and organization of the International Conference on Education that was set to
convene in 1914 but was aborted because of the war. As Andrews argued in 1908, “The
teacher of the twentieth century is an international figure, and he can never perform his
highest function until he is imbued with this international consciousness. He should stand
shoulder to shoulder with his fellow-teachers in the world for the achievement of a higher
civilization.”161 That same year, Andrews had formed the American Peace League, which
promoted the teaching of “international justice” as a means to promote peace. Walter
Scott, also from the United States, introduced a bill to Congress to create an International
Board of Education. Like Peeters’ plan, these were all halted by the outbreak of war.162
The efforts of these early pioneers revealed that the support of numerous national
governments was required in order to make international education possible; educators
working on their own had little impact.
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Regardless of the long history of international education before the First World
War, education was not included in the League of Nations Covenant. However, many
who had been actively campaigning for international education before the LN tirelessly
worked to bring education within the purview of League efforts. One of those striving
towards this goal was Dr. Andrews. In 1918, Andrews presented to the Inter-Allied
Conference for the League of Nations a resolution for the creation of an international
bureau of education. This unofficial conference adopted the resolution and sent her on to
present it to the “Big Four” in 1919, but they never discussed the resolution. Indeed, the
word “education” did not even appear in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
It was not until almost two years later, in 1921, when an international bureau of
education began to look feasible. The work of the CICI in the area of intellectual
cooperation and child welfare made an opening for education possible in League work.
By 1925, the LN had formed the Child Welfare Committee, which also helped justify the
establishment of the IBE in the same year. However, there was still confusion regarding
the intended aims of an international bureau of education, let alone its structure. Would
the IBE form positions in relation to international politics or remain neutral? Would it
support a specific political ideology? Would it have a religious affiliation? Would it show
preference to internationalism at the expense of nationalism? While the IBE never
officially answered these questions, it did claim neutrality, though later, as the Second
World War loomed, it began to align itself if not with democracy, at least against fascism.
Additionally, although the IBE generally gave deference to national politics, its main goal
was promoting cultural internationalism as the means to bring about peace.
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Along with Andrews, among the founding members of the IBE were Edouard
Claparède, Pierre Bovet and Adolphe Ferrière. The latter presented his overview of “New
Education” in 1924—a movement that was central to the goals of the IBE. New
Education formed near the end of the nineteenth century in various European countries
and the United States. Besides Ferrière, among the supporters of the “New School” were
Paul Geheeb as well as Maria Montessori of Italy, John Dewey of the United States, and
Cecil Reddie in England. Unlike many of the educational movements that preceded it, it
was based on moral, social and political principles. In the 1924 issue of the Educational
Yearbook, published by Teachers College, Columbia, Ferrière explained New Education
to be one that respected the individuality of the child.163 The educator would train a child
to “supremacy of the spirit” with special allowance for the individual interests of that
child. Individuality, however, would not mean an allowance of “selfish competition,” but
an emphasis on cooperation and service to the group. “New education,” Ferrière
explained, “trains in the child not merely the future citizen capable of fulfilling his duties
to his relations, his nation, and humanity as a whole, but also the human being conscious
of his human worth.”164 Again, this movement was transnational in that it transcended the
nation-state, but did not seek to supersede it.
A number of contemporary, national institutions also studied international
education and its organization. Among the most influential was the International Institute
of Teachers College, Columbia that published the Educational Yearbook starting in 1924

For a full explanation of the characteristics of New Education see Adolphe Ferrière “The New
Education Movement: An International Movement” in Educational Yearbook of the International
Institute of Teachers College, Columbia, Columbia University Teachers College (1924), 599 698.
163

164

Ferrière, 600.

88

and ending in 1944. The United States Office of Education, located in Washington, D. C.,
actively researched the educational systems of other countries, as did the University of
London Institute of Education. The New Education movement established an extensive
international network through the cooperation of national journals and organizations, as
well as congresses. Journals from countries such as France, Germany, England, Italy and
Bulgaria were all in direct contact with one another because of the New Education
movement.165 The LN’s publication, the Educational Survey (1929-1934), later renamed
the Bulletin of League of Nations Teaching (1935-1938), also supported the New
Education movement.
Although the previous chapter established that the goals of the Great Powers
limited LN internationalism, promoting cultural internationalism was at the center of
CICI educational efforts. Though education was left out of the LN Covenant, teaching
international cooperation was central not only to the goals of many LN officials, but an
important concept they planned to pass on to their own children. Erroneously regarded as
the “first” international school, the International School of Geneva, founded in 1924, was
formed primarily by parents from the League, with a large number from the International
Labor Office. These parents worked in conjunction with Adolphe Ferrière and German
scholar and peace activist Elisabeth Rotten.166 The school taught primary and secondary
students in both French and English. Like the international schools that preceded it, the
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International School of Geneva was centered on educating for an international
community. As one report stated, “The school has deliberately set about the task of
breaking down the narrowly nationalistic prejudices and building up sympathetic
understanding of individuals and groups of other cultures,” the school board explained.
“This is achieved most successfully in courses in social science designed to treat modern
civilization as a composite of the contributing elements from all the nations now in
existence.”167 Like many LN efforts, the International School of Geneva attempted to
subvert national sentiment in favor of international cooperation, but without actually
challenging the supremacy of the nation-state.
While it did not overturn national supremacy, archival records reveal the CICI did
serve a centralizing role in the formation of international education. For instance,
American educationalist G. W. A. Luckey, was able to forward his 1925 pamphlet “The
Vital Need of a World Bureau of Education” to the CICI through his connection with
American biologist Vernon Kellogg, who put him in touch with CICI member and Polish
historian Oskar de Halecki. In turn, Halecki made use of his relationship with British
educator and CICI member Alfred Zimmern in order to introduce Luckey to the IBE
committee. As Luckey wrote, “the object of my plan is not to multiply organizations, but
to correlate and combine them” and the IBE committee, which met at the IIIC at the time,
was just the organization that Luckey argued the world needed.168 Of course, Fannie Fern
Andrews had already made a strong, though unsuccessful, case for such an organization
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within the auspices of the League of Nations and even her efforts were part of a much
longer history of attempts to form an international bureau of education
Propaganda and the Challenge of Nationalism
The methods of peace and war propaganda in the interwar period were in most
ways similar. As with other forms of minor utopia, the movement held within it the
contradictions that would ultimately destroy it. While the LN may have had a peacemaking goal, the differences were only in “degree” from the propaganda supporting
efforts of, for instance, fascism. 169 In both cases, education played a central role in
propaganda campaigns, albeit the LN was using this toward the ostensible goal of world
peace in an organization heavily influenced by the Great Powers, whereas fascist use of
education supported the goals of a specific nation-state. Essentially, the CICI hoped that,
in order to prevent war, individuals could have both a national and international sense of
citizenship. They could both identify with their country of origin and have a coexisting
sense of belonging to an international community. In the CICI’s view, patriotism, or
national citizenship could, and would, coexist with international goodwill.
The promotion of cultural internationalism through education was a principal area
of consideration for the CICI because the Committee believed the most radical change of
views would be achieved through youth. The CICI utilized the promotion of textbook
editing not only as a way to ensure that national histories did not malign other nations and
possibly advance hostilities, but also as a way to fundamentally change depictions of war
in national histories. The CICI considered this step essential to the goal of peace, or
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moral disarmament. Swiss historian Gonzague de Reynold argued that although the term
“moral disarmament” did not enter the rhetoric until the early 1930s, it had been a goal of
the CICI from its inception. In his view, the CICI began directly encouraging national
committees to support its efforts towards moral disarmament in 1925 with the proposal
raised by Julio Casarés of Spain concerning the revision of school textbooks.
In their July 1925 meeting, the CICI adopted this proposal after some debate over
the likelihood of it working. Swiss member Gonzague de Reynold pointed out that
previous efforts had been made by those after the First World War who were infused with
what he called “international romanticism” and who were convinced that they could
“change at a stroke the methods of teaching history and to give their methods a purely
pacifist and international character.”170 While pacifism was not their goal, the CICI felt
they could effectively “free national teaching from the false judgments and errors which
have crept in, more by ignorance than malice, and which mask or disfigure the true aspect
of other peoples by attributing to them characteristics which make them unrecognisable
and even odious.” The Casarés resolution, as the CICI textbook editing process was
called among members, followed a process of application, with months in between
phases to allow a country to address the issue. First, someone from a country would need
to consider it “desirable that a foreign text concerning its country and intended for use in
schools should be amended” in order to prevent misunderstanding and then request their
national intellectual cooperation committee to submit an application including a draft
amendment “on the desired lines.” The national committee would then decide if it was a
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worthy request and make “friendly and private” contact with the publisher to propose
changes to the textbook. Such requests had to be limited to “fact” and those relating to
“personal views of moral, political or religious” issues were “strictly prohibited.”171 After
the resolution was also adopted by the wider League, this process expanded to one where
the LN representatives of the country were also notified and part of the process. In this
way, political pressure was applied in order to maintain reputation with the League.
While also dealing with the issue of preventing misunderstanding, the CICI felt
such efforts also needed to be complemented by encouraging cultural internationalism.
One way they did this was through the promotion of international student/teacher
exchange and an international curriculum. Reporting on a committee meeting of the CICI
in 1926, The American Association for the Advancement of Science noted the
importance the CICI placed on the exchange of students and professors between
countries. The American Association pointed to the words of US delegate Dr. Vernon
Kellogg to highlight the significance of international scholarship. “In my opinion,”
Kellogg stated, “no more important step toward fundamental development in
internationalism has been made in recent times than the multiplication of international
scholarships for the élite of the younger generation of scholars.”172 To facilitate
international scholarship, in 1926 the committee discussed the encouragement of less
stringent passport regulations, less expensive visas, the formation of international student
associations and travel discounts to international students. Also in their purview were the
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establishment of information offices in universities and the implementation of courses in
internationalism.173 In 1928, the exchange was expanded to secondary school teachers,
which The British Medical Journal compared to the exchange of public health workers
by the Health Organization, calling both “equally fruitful.”174
The fear of propaganda, however, severely limited the support the CICI received
from individual countries. For instance, Gilbert Murray repeatedly expressed frustration
concerning the lack of support he received from the British government for education
initiatives. Writing in 1927, after nearly a decade of trying to garner support for the LN,
he still found it difficult to convince the British public—which he thought “no doubt
tends to be over practical”—that the CICI was “achieving definite and useful results.”
Though less optimistic at this point, he still thought that there was real interest in
education in Britain, especially in a conference of experts on the subject, and this interest
merely needed to be cultivated.175 However, in the following two years he was only
successful in securing the “sympathy” of the British government, which did not come in
the form of tangible support, such as funding for the IIIC.
While still hopeful and convinced of the need to think transnationally, Murray
recognized the challenges facing the CICI in a 15 April 1929 memo to Committee
members. He suggested some of the topics that they might discuss in their July 1929
meeting. “In the first place,” Murray wrote, “considering the high hopes with which the
Commission was inaugurated and the comparative lack of success in realizing those
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hopes which, through no fault of its own, it has experienced, I cannot but feel that the
Commission should make an attempt upon some problem of more general international
import likely to arouse wider interest and sympathy.” He thought they could pursue
topics such as the ill effects of increased specialization “involving not only a decrease in
general culture but also a weakening of the spiritual links which bind nations together.”
While this alarmed him, he recognized the limits of what the CICI could do to address
this. He continued: “Of course the Commission could do little more than institute an
inquiry in various countries and publish a report without taking up a position; but this
report might be of great interest to all scholars, professors and administrative educational
bodies, as well as a practical stimulus to intellectual co-operation between nations.” He
recognized that the CICI’s role was largely one of providing national and international
education organizations with information, but thought that it was only a matter of time
before the approach to teaching history would change. “Sooner or later,” he argued, “as
Europe gradually realized its essential unity, it seems inevitable that History will be
studied in each country less from a national and more from an European point of view.”
While he felt that “such a change of direction in the teaching of history” was likely better
studied by historians during international conferences and then the CICI could continue
their work, he thought it was a “subject which should not be entirely forgotten.”176 That
he only discusses a European unity is a telling indicator of the CICI’s main sphere of
influence. He also thought they must take a long view and continue to work towards this
goal and the smaller projects that could ultimately support the suppression of national
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history in favor of European. His vision of displacing national histories within curriculum
in favor of European history was an extremely difficult hurdle, even within his own
country of Great Britain, which opposed even the use of an official text of British history,
let alone one that emphasized European unity.
Although Murray wrote the Manchester Guardian on 9 December 1929 that the
British Local Education Authorities had agreed to include the aims and work of the LN as
part of school curriculum, a letter written only three days earlier had delivered very bad
news. On 6 December 1929, Maxwell Garnett, secretary of the British League of Nations
Union, wrote Murray to say that the British Education Committee had reaffirmed it was
opposed to an official textbook of British history that included a discussion of the League
of Nations and its work. The British Education Committee believed “that teachers should
be free to select their teaching material from any and every available source.”177 Murray’s
frustrations with his government’s lack of financial support bubbled over in a personal
letter to Labour politician Arthur Henderson in 1931. He explained that the League of
Nations Union wanted Great Britain to no longer “stand conspicuously aloof from the
work of Intellectual Co-operation” and thought that the government’s lack of financial
support led Germany also to hold back. He noted that while British individuals and
organizations had been active in the work, placed him, an Englishman, as President of the
Committee on Education of Youth in the Methods and Spirit of the League, and had
insisted on “drastic reform of the Institute on English lines” they continued to “refuse to
contribute a penny to the expenses.” Aside from putting him, as President, “in an
awkward position” he thought it gave the impression the English were “indifferent to
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artistic and intellectual things.” Even more alarmingly, he thought, it allowed the
League’s “opponents to argue that Great Britain does not really care about the spirit of
the League or the educational work.”178 While he was concerned about such a public
image, lack of financial support from his home country continued to trouble him and
certainly, as he suspected, did not go unnoticed by other CICI member countries.
In 1929, while the CICI again noted that each nation was “sovereign unto itself in
its conception of the teaching of history,” it was still concerned about nationalism and it
argued that “the undue spirit of nationalism in the majority of the present handbooks
should be abandoned.”179 Again at the urging of Casarés and towards the aim of
educating for cultural internationalism, starting in 1929, a series of Educational
Surveys180 were commissioned by the CICI in order to better understand the
contemporary nature of education in various countries, the steps needed to promote
internationalism in those countries and the impact of efforts towards that goal.181 A year
later, former CICI deputy Mariano Cornejo once again stressed the importance of cultural
internationalism. He argued that the goals of peace in CICI efforts differed from those of
the Council and the Assembly of the LN because they were aimed at “freeing culture”
from “individual and national” mindsets that led countries and individuals to “arrogance
and intolerance in respect of the other peoples.” He pointed out that at times even
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scholars considered it their “duty” to “lend their fame to cover up the errors of their
country.”182 In the CICI’s view, this tendency had to be reversed and education was the
most important sphere in which to bring about this change.
Murray was also concerned and wrote in a letter to British liberal politician Sir
Charles Philips Trevelyan arguing that it was “almost impossible to preserve the
internationality” of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) when
France was heavily contributing to the work, other nations were making considerable
contributions and Great Britain and Germany “almost ostentatiously refuse to subscribe a
penny.” He thought leaving other countries to provide funding for the educational
policies British members spearheaded within the LN was a significant error in their
foreign policy.183 While the sting of personal embarrassment brought this issue to the
fore, it does illustrate that, just as Molkenboer had noted in 1890, educationalists and
governments were still out of step with the value they placed on international education.
Lack of funding continued to plague the CICI’s efforts in education and the British
government was not the only one withholding financial support. For instance, the
American National Committee of Intellectual Cooperation ran into similar problems of
budget constraints. Namely, in 1931, during the Depression, they were unable to secure
funding from the US government for the exchange of secondary school teachers.184
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In a letter sent on 25 March 1931, which warned that the CICI had to be cautious
not to overextend itself, Gilbert Murray suggested that instead of trying to make an
inquiry about intellectual life of as many countries as possible, they should instead focus
on educational systems in a select few. He suggested they focus on European countries,
but they could also consider drawing some comparisons, such as the “reciprocal
influences of European and Japanese culture.” He thought it could be part of a series
studying “the context between higher and lower civilisations and the problem of
discovering ways in which the higher may improve the lower without corrupting
it.”185 Unfortunately, as long as the mindset of “higher” and “lower” with the possibility
of “corrupting” influences existed in the interchange “high” and “low,” little could be
done to inculcate an international mind.
Later that year, in September, Murray sent a letter revealing another stumbling
block to peace—recognizable even in the interactions between the Great Powers—that
involved separation of “high” and “low” based on disparaging terminology. As Murray
wrote: “However, my motive in writing is to mention to you a woman who would be very
good as a secretary in the Disarmament Conference—daughter of Sir Patrick Agnew,
League of Nations, very good linguist, married to a Frog, whom she seems to have
divorced or put to death, competent all round and a woman of the world.”186 This passage
reveals two significant issues. First, it reveals how even a figure who daily supported the
need to avoid misunderstanding between nations, was nonetheless apt to use disparaging
slang in his personal correspondence. The term “Frog” is a slang, denigrating term for the
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French and in this section Murray seems to be providing a flippant endorsement for
divorcing or putting to death said Frenchman. Second, it highlights one of the many roles
women took up in relation to disarmament, which often went unnoticed and unattributed.
That this woman had divorced or “put to death” her French husband, was likely an
important qualification for her being a “woman of the world.” It is doubtful that had she
sloughed off an English husband it would have gone without negative commentary, but
Murray seems to approve in the event it was a Frenchman.
Not only were continuing national stereotypes a significant challenge to their
work, but gathering information about the state of textbooks also proved increasingly
difficult after those who provided the CICI with information faced backlash in their home
countries. For instance, in a letter from J. David Thompson, executive secretary of the US
National Committee, to Henri Bonnet in January 1931, it was clear that providing
evidence of national histories that might incite conflict was a sensitive undertaking.
Thompson cautioned Bonnet to not make public the work the Commission of the
American Historical Association had taken up to study national historical textbooks.
“Because of the mixture of nationalities in our population,” Thompson wrote, “the reform
of historical textbooks is a very delicate matter and the writers who have attempted to be
truthful rather than nationalistic have been violently attacked by unscrupulous politicians
and so-called patriotic organisations.”187 While such challenges were considerable, the
CICI continued to call for similar studies in all member countries. However, participation
would not expand as long as those who participated were prone to public censure and
attack.
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Publicly, however, the CICI talked of textbook editing in terms of success. In his
opening statement of the Thirteenth Session of the CICI in 1931, Murray noted that some
progress had been made in the area of textbook revisions. He affirmed that while a
documentary report had found that in “nearly all” the countries studied, world history
books were written in a “narrow nationalist spirit,” such depictions were no longer
considered by many countries to meet “educational requirements.”188 The CICI worked to
eliminate from history textbooks (and later geography textbooks, atlases and
dictionaries), any phrases which could lead to conflict and prejudicial misunderstanding.
Such misunderstandings worked against the ultimate goal of “accustoming the rising
generations to regard international co-operation as the best method of conducting world
affairs.”189 For instance, looking back on their work in this area while the Second World
War raged in 1941, Henri Bonnet, despite the start of another World War, still argued that
textbook editing had made important contributions to peace education. In an interview
with the executive secretary of the American National Committee on 21 March 1941,
Edith Ware paraphrased that he thought “the French and Germans had gotten together
very well in their attempt to define what should be taught concerning so-called dangerous
periods in history, e.g., the War of 1870.” The success had been reported in 1933.190 “He
said,” she wrote, “that they had even found formulas for teaching the beginning of the
war in 1914 in such a way as not to prejudice one country against the other.” The
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“footing of equality” he described as an important part of their success in the early 1930s
had evaporated by 1941, when, according to Bonnet, the Germans were “attempting to
force the French” to write in history textbooks “that the Germans were never the
aggressors.”191 However, that Bonnet stressed textbook editing had been a success at the
very time his home country of France was under occupation by the Germans is a telling
indicator of how effective he thought it could have been—or at least how invested he had
been in the work.
It was not only institutions who recognized the danger of historical
misinformation in textbooks. Informal networks were also important in this work and the
CICI provided a forum for individuals to discuss and seek information about textbooks.
For example, in 1933 Roland T. Patten, editor of a small local Maine, US newspaper, was
advised to contact the IIIC by the World Peace Foundation because they felt the IIIC
would be best able to answer his inquiries. He had asked other places but had not “as yet
received a sufficiently helpful answer.” He wrote: “I am convinced the textbooks in
American schools give an entirely wrong idea of the reason for the entry of the United
States into the World War. I presume that textbooks in Germany, France and England or
elsewhere are equally erroneous, all no doubt presenting a standard prejudice in favor of
the country where the books are used.” He felt that each country likely misrepresented
the reasons for their entry in the First World War, which might lead to further conflict.
He asked the IIIC to furnish him with examples of historical writing on this topic from
other countries’ textbooks. “When suitably informed I shall be glad to do my part, as an
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editor and public speaker, at correcting that unfortunate situation.”192 Letters such as
these likely bolstered the CICI’s conviction that by providing a central location for
discussion and an informational resource they could affect change.
Despite such support, the official publications of the CICI and IBE also reveal
tension between international and national interest. The March 1933 volume of the
Educational Survey was exclusively dedicated to training teachers on how best to give
instruction regarding not only the structure of the LN, but also its aims. The disclaimer
included in the preface of this volume is illuminating, especially when one considers that
it was an overall aim of the CICI to educate for international goodwill. As the
introductory note stated, “the fundamental aim of national education is to prepare the
younger generation for their future career in the land of their birth… its ultimate goal
must be the training of useful citizens.” However, while recognizing that nation-states
were wary of international influences in the sphere of education, the introduction
claimed: “no country can elude the facts of international life. In these days it is no longer
possible for each State to tread its own particular path.”193 No doubt a result of the
relative impotence of the CICI, the volume also maintained that “national freedom of
educational policy must be strictly respected.”194 However, this statement was shortly
followed with a contradictory one that better reveals the true aim of the CICI in the area
of education. In the view of the CICI, the success of the League would not only affect
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public opinion, but would have the result of changing outlooks of international
organizations in general. They hoped that this would “lead to a convergence of
educational efforts and a beneficial rivalry between individuals and the State.”195
Towards this aim, teachers needed to be prepared to promote cultural internationalism
through careful training. As Dr. William Russell, dean of Teachers College, Columbia,
noted in the 1933 volume, “the school cannot accomplish any purpose in the mind of the
pupil unless already there has been achieved a similar purpose in the mind of the
teacher.” 196 International goodwill had to begin with those in the position to best
cultivate such sentiments in the young. “We are all international,” Russell continued, “but
we do not know it. It is the function of the teacher and the teacher-training institution to
bring this to light.”197
Beyond training teachers, who would then educate students, toward an
international mindset, the materials of education also had to be regulated in order to align
with CICI goals. The CICI felt the tendency to show “arrogance and intolerance in
respect of the other peoples” had to be reversed and education was seen as the most
important sphere to bring about this change. 198 “Patriotic they may be,” Russell argued in
1933, “they may love their own land beyond all else; but this must be based positively on
virtues at home, and not upon evil gossip about others or the belittling of neighboring
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states.”199 Following the First World War, it became painfully obvious just how
interdependent nations had become when networks of alliances brought much of the
world into war. However, it was the CICI’s aim that by calling attention to this
interdependence, and having it taught as a reality of life to the rising generation, war
could be avoided. Additionally, competition based on “evil gossip” and “belittling” was a
recipe for further conflict and the CICI felt that removing such instances fell under their
stated mission.
How tension could spark conflict became all too apparent as Germany began to
separate itself from the LN. Gilbert Murray, writing 9 September 1933, a little over a
month before Germany left the League of Nations, wrote about German Ewald Banse’s
book Wehrissenschaft (Military Science) that glorified war based on ethical value, with
some alarm. “It seems hardly right or consistent with our self-respect,” Murray argued,
“as a serious League Commission to allow this atrocious propaganda, and direct breach
of the unanimous [Casarés] Resolution, to be carried on without protest.”200 Henri
Bonnet, director of the Institute, outlined the procedure for such a protest, which first
involved contacting the German National Committee of Intellectual Cooperation and
referring to the Casarés resolution. Six months would have to then be given in order for
Germany to respond with a plan of action and if they did not do so, the CICI could refer
the issue to the League Council.201
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The following month—the same month that Germany left the LN—the Nazi
German government did decide to prohibit the book because of the negative foreign
attention it attracted. Banse remained in his post as chair of military science at Brunswick
Technical College, despite this ban. Murray wrote 20 October 1933 that he hoped the
German decision to leave the LN would “not upset things” while at the same time finding
the prohibition of Banse’s book “most amusing.”202 German historian Margarete
Rothbarth, who worked for the IIIC’s “German service” as a sort of liaison between the
Institute and Germany, also appreciated this development. She was quite pleased that the
German government had “repudiated” Banse’s ideas, but pointed out that since he was
still a professor of military science he could still spread his ideas through his students. “I
wonder,” she wrote, “whether the second step will be to forbid him to communicate his
ideas verbally.”203 However, the Casarés resolution—as nothing more than a mutual
compact between League of Nations members—held no binding effect on Germany after
they left the LN. Despite this, Wehrissenschaft was not reissued under Nazi rule, even
after war broke out.
Like other areas of CICI work, textbook editing was also a Eurocentric concern.
As British educationalist Frederick J. Gould pointed out in a memo to the CICI during the
same year, whereas he thought the “grand aim” of education “should be a universal cooperation of heart and mind” he thought that textbook editing initiatives had “shown a
tendency to a somewhat narrow association with European races.” While he agreed with
the sentiment of textbook revision, he argued: “I doubt if an intelligent Zulu, or Nigerian,
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or Arab, or Hindu peasant, or Chinese farmer, and Malayan trader, etc (and these
represent very many millions) would put the same emphasis as Paris and Geneva do on
the problem of revision of school books.” Not only was Gould emphasizing the Eurocentric nature of this work, but also the different properties of what Murray called
“higher” and “lower” civilizations. Gould also thought that this would likely only result
in the formation of a “superficial etiquette” in international relations. “Even in intervals
of war,” he maintained, “the speakers ‘pourparlers’ revise their customary language, and
use polite terms; then resume the war!”204 Using the term pourparler, or preliminary
negotiations, effectively emphasized what he viewed as the ineffective nature of the
venture.
Despite Gould’s insightful commentary on the limits of textbook editing—and
faced with increasing international tensions—the CICI continued their efforts. By 1935,
the revision of textbooks had expanded to include the promotion of including “as large a
space as possible” to the history of other nations and the prominence in history textbooks
to “facts calculated to bring about the realization of the interdependence of nations.”205
The word “calculated” is especially interesting in this context, since it seems to imply a
certain amount of willful selection of the “facts” which, as a process, might have been
similar to the nationalistic leanings they were attempting to overcome. However, the
power that the CICI held in the area of textbook editing was only the power of
suggestion. Like the League itself, it had no teeth.

204

Frederick J. Gould to CICI. 1933. UNESCO, I.II.1.

205

LNP International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation: Report of the Committee on the
Work of its Seventeenth Plenary Session, Official No. C.290.M.154.1935.XII (Geneva, 1935), 12.

107

As one 1935 report stated: “The Intellectual Co-operation Organisation has
always paid special attention to the rising generation. In particular it has endeavoured to
imbue the instruction given in the various grades with a spirit of mutual understanding
and to make young people realise the international aspect of the great problems of today.”206 Despite this emphasis on cultural internationalism as a way to solve the “great
problems” of the day, what moral disarmament through education was quickly associated
with after the start of the Second World War was the defeat of France. While the CICI
was not pacifist, the movement itself was tied to the failure of the French to mount a
successful defense. The wartime French government, known as Vichy after the town it
moved to, specifically blamed such movements for the fall of Paris. For instance, in a
conversation with Edith Ware, in March 1941, Henri Bonnet was still concerned about
the “problem” of history textbook and felt that “there must be obliteration of Nazi text.”
However, he also noted that “it is very difficult to talk of world citizenship to the French”
because “the French of Vichy blame the reforms in history text in France for the failure
of France.” He showed her a clipping from the French press blaming “Pacifist tendencies
of the League for the inability of France to withstand the Germans.”207 Such a view,
though it has been challenged by historians, effectively stalled textbook editing
initiatives.
The promotion of internationalism, as a general League goal, was supported by
specific nation-states, but also implemented in ways unique to their national sensibilities
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and national goals. Historian Mona Siegel addressed what she thought were
misunderstood aspects of French history: pacifism, nationalism, and moral disarmament
in the interwar years. Arguing against common depictions of the 1940 “Strange Defeat”
at the hands of the Germans, Siegel challenged the assumption that moral disarmament
and pacifism led to a decline in national sentiment, and thus a quick defeat in 1940.
Siegel used a variety of sources, such as the personal writings of teachers, textbooks and
school policy, to support her argument that pacifism did not cause a degradation of
French nationalism, but that teachers placed moral disarmament and pacifist teachings
firmly in patriotic, national rhetoric. As one 1929 lesson read:
On Monday [November 11] we celebrate the holiday of peace, which
recalls the end of the long and terrible war of 1914-1918. On this day,
think of the 1,500,000 dead who gave their lives to save us. The League of
Nations is in Geneva. Its role is to prevent the return of another scourge as
horrible as war. France wants peace, it has always aided and supported the
weak…it has always tried to bring all people closer together. Damned be
war, and may universal peace unite all men!208
While this statement effectively illustrated how teachers generally addressed war in
French primary classrooms, according to Siegel, moral disarmament, as taught by French
teachers, was not to blame for the 1940 defeat. The pacifism taught in French schools the
interwar years was militant pacifism. As normal school director Max Hébert wrote in
1931, “In the current state of our civilization, along with the new forces of peace,
symbolized in the institutions of the League of Nations, armed forces remain necessary
for the very defense of peace and justice.” As the Fellowship of Reconciliation pointed
out in 1922, this approach was essentially a form of hoping for the best, but arming for
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the worst. Hébert continued: “It is the duty of educators to make their students understand
why they will one day be soldiers, citizen-soldiers.”209 In France, international
cooperation and moral disarmament, while taught as ideals to cultivate for world peace,
were not promoted at the expense of nationalism.
While Vichy’s blame may have been misplaced, it was nonetheless a potent
deterrent for other countries. After the Second World War, not only were textbook
editing initiatives tied into this severely damaging association, so was the term moral
disarmament itself. Indeed, the term fell out of favor after the outbreak of the Second
World War because of its connections to not only the League of Nations, but also
France’s defeat and Vichy’s subsequent blame.

Conclusion
As the interwar history of LN education reveals, promoting transnational thinking
was not an easy task. Competing national goals, as well as insufficient motivation were
central to how long it took to form an international centralizing organization. As this
chapter has argued, these same limitations plagued the work of the IBE and similar work
in the CICI. Fears of propaganda, rivalry between nation-states, and an unwillingness in
national governments to fund the CICI’s education work all severely limited their
progress. However, the CICI was essential in the formation of the IBE and therefore the
first true realization of a centralizing body for international education. This chapter has
used the example of textbook editing to illustrate the specific use of these networks
within the context of the CICI. Textbook editing was central to moral disarmament
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efforts made within the movement and, while limited by national agendas, did provide a
platform for discussion of national histories on a then-unprecedented international scale.
The outbreak of the Second World War, although it did not destroy the IBE (it
continues to this day), did crush the League of Nations in its pre-war structure. However,
the Second World War did not completely sever the links made in the interwar years in
the areas of education and intellectual cooperation. In 1942, while the war still raged, the
United Kingdom hosted the Conference of Allied Ministers in Education, which led to a
United Nations conference in November of 1945 centered on the establishment of an
educational and cultural organization. Thirty-seven countries, including the United States,
which was conspicuously absent from the League of Nations, founded the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).210 Two main pre-war
organizations were folded into UNESCO: the CICI, including its executing agency the
International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (IIIC), and the IBE. The CICI and IBE
worked as separate, cooperative organizations until they were combined into
UNESCO.211 That these institutions merged following the Second World War is
illustrative of their close working relationship in the interwar years.
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Chapter Four: Anti-War Film and Fascism
The influence of film was significant in the interwar period. In a 1924 report,
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) director Julien Luchaire likened
the “latest film from Los Angeles” to the influence of the Bible and the Qur’an. “This
new and extraordinarily efficient instrument of intellectual action is intrinsically
international,” he argued. “The mere possibility that the cinema might become a great
universal art should earn the attention of all who have the intellectual future of humanity
at heart.”212 Such international goodwill, the International Committee of Intellectual
Cooperation (CICI) hoped, would prevent any future outbreak of war. Although film had
been used effectively by national governments as propaganda to support their war efforts
during the First World War, the CICI believed it also had the power to engender anti-war
sentiment. However, as was the case with moral disarmament and the textbook editing
initiative, hopes regarding the internationalizing potential of film were directly
challenged as another World War loomed, the sound film undermined the international
character of the medium, and—faced with worsening economies and rising threats—
nation-states cultivated patriotic fervor to support governmental aims.
In 1924, the French government offered to house a cinematographic institute in
Paris that would work closely with the already established IIIC, but mounting criticism
that intellectual cooperation was unduly influenced by the French caused the CICI to seek
funding elsewhere. While Italy would ultimately take up the funding for such an institute,
inquiries and studies about film were undertaken by the CICI for several more years
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before an institute was officially formed. In 1928, the Italian government founded the
International Educational Cinematographic Institute (IECI), with its seat in Rome at Villa
Torlonia. Soon after, the IECI formed an international journal that published submitted
articles, editorials and reports called the International Review of Educational
Cinematography (IREC). The IECI encouraged the production, exchange and distribution
of educational films, as well as the study of all aspects of its effect on viewers and
audience reception. Italian politician, jurist, CICI member and president of the IECI
Alfredo Rocco, explained the Institute’s work as the effort “to find out everything that is
going on in the world in connection with Educational Film; to make known everything
that may help towards a wider diffusion of the Educational Films; to carry on unceasing
propaganda in support of the idea.”213 While the goals of the IECI were very broad, this
chapter will focus on one main area: anti-war film as a minor utopian moment. The
following chapter will address another important focus of the IECI concerning the moral
censorship of film.
The CICI was trying to mediate cultural production. To work internationally to
attempt to change mentalities was a unique—and challenging—approach to peace. With
the rise of new types of media, including film and radio communication, the option to
reshape public opinion seemed like it could be a reality. Of course, education and film
were ultimately very effective tools for militant nationalism. While ostensibly a limb of
the League of Nations that worked closely with the CICI, the IECI was heavily
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influenced by fascism. Benito Mussolini took a special interest in the IECI from its
opening and attended weekly film screenings. Presidents of the institute were also highranking individuals in the Italian fascist regime. 214 While this did not directly affect the
content of League films, it did limit the influence of the institute and ultimately led to its
comparatively short-lived tenure. Although the IECI remained open until 1938, it was
largely inactive after 1935. Fascist influence is increasingly observable in the writings of
the institute in the 1930s, especially the closer it time it was to 1937, when Italy left the
League of Nations (LN). However, the IECI made a true effort, especially when the
institute was first formed, to gather and consolidate international attitudes towards film.
In 1928, the fascist president of the IECI, Luciano de Feo, was offset by the inclusion of
German, American and British members in the first board of directors.
This chapter assesses the impact of fascism on the work to the League of Nations
film initiative. This context will provide an important foundation for discussing anti-war
film in this chapter and the development of moral film censorship in the following one.
This chapter argues that while the IECI was undoubtedly fascist, its journal still
accommodated a wide range of cultural and ideological contributions, opening an
important field for debating the influence of war films. Because of their broad definition
of what constituted “educational” film, the IECI accommodated discussions of how film
of all types, including commercial films, could educate viewers. This broad definition
made space for a debate about children’s exposure to war films and sparked a number of
surveys aimed at studying their influence. Half a decade before the rise of the mass
survey, and before the technique of sampling, the IECI took on the impressive task of
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gathering thousands of survey responses from children regarding children’s film
preferences and the influence of film on their development. This chapter illustrates how
the IECI used these findings to transform a debate about the possible anti-war effect of
film to one that ultimately supported patriotic warfare, thereby quashing the CICI’s minor
utopian hope for anti-war film from within.

Historiography
Only a handful of recent works have addressed League of Nations film, but they
very effectively argue the undoubtedly fascist nature of the IECI. While topics such as
Soviet and German propaganda or Hollywood’s support of consumer culture have been
well researched, a satisfactory scholarly examination of the IECI has been neglected. As
Zoë Druick, Canadian professor of communication, pointed out in 2007, the IECI, an
organization which lies at the “centre of these issues,” has largely remained absent from
serious research in film studies. Druick tackled the question of why the IECI’s legacy had
been “erased from the field of film studies.”215 She noted that its location within fascist
Italy might have caused the IECI to be effectively pushed into obscurity. As Druick
pointed out, “for the most part, film studies has opted to cleanse film history of its taint
by both official politics and the institutions designed to apply political aims through
education.”216 The “taint” of fascism no doubt has had an influence on why the IECI has
received, until recently, little attention from historians.
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Much of this work has focused on the influence of fascism. Historian of
communication Jürgen Wilkes challenged the common negative depiction of the IECI as
a propaganda organ for Italian fascism, with the example of the Institute’s influence on
German Jewish film theorist Rudolf Arnheim.217 Arnheim worked for the IECI in Italy as
a researcher from 1933 until the institute closed in 1938. In 1934, when the magazine
Cinema Quarterly accused the institute of being a propaganda service for Mussolini,
Arnheim went to the IECI’s defense. “I have been working for over a year in the
Institute,” he stated, “I am a foreigner and I believe myself unbiased. In all cases I have
been in a position to observe that it was Luciano de Feo’s endeavor to secure the
collaboration of outstanding men in all countries and to make use of the material supplied
by them in the spirit of international objectivity.” Of Italian motivation in funding the
IECI, he noted, “because it would enhance Italy’s prestige in so important a factor of
modern life as the film had its international headquarters in Rome.”218 While prestige was
certainly a factor, Arnheim overestimated the IECI’s “spirit of international objectivity.”
Though the following two chapters take a similar approach as Wilkes in pointing out that
women were able to take advantage of fascist ideology in order to take part in the debate
surrounding the influence of film on children, this does not change the underlying fascist
propaganda efforts of the IECI.
It was no accident that Luciano de Feo, the president of L’Union Cinematografica
Educative (LUCE)—an Italian agency charged with production of film “for the purposes
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of beneficence and national patriotic propaganda”—was also appointed by Mussolini as
president of the IECI. Mussolini viewed film as “l’arma più forte” (the strongest weapon)
in his propaganda campaign.219 No doubt also because of Italy’s desire to thoroughly
study this “strongest weapon,” the IECI took the role of gathering international views
towards film seriously. In order to analyze these views, one of the IECI’s first tasks was
to assemble a list of various educational film institutions, groups and publishers to make
them aware of the formation of the IECI. The institute sent out almost nine thousand
letters to locations all over the world.220
In the early work of the IECI, the power of film to support cultural
internationalism was highlighted. “By the cinema language frontiers and even the limits
of civilizations are overcome,” the first article in the first edition of the IREC proclaimed.
The editors continued: “it is indispensable that the Governments should recognise the
high educational and moral power possessed by the new organization to develop
sentiments of international solidarity and pacification amongst the peoples by means of a
deeper reciprocal knowledge of their customs, traditions, and their way of thought and of
living.”221 However, only a few short years later, articles emphasizing the importance of
nationalism displaced this utopian narrative of the power of film. Indeed, as more
aggressive nationalism came to prominence in the 1930s, the League’s preference for
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international cooperation in the production and distribution of film fell out of favor. This
was illustrated in a 1933 article of the IREC where Italian author Alberto Consiglio
maintained that it was “the duty of the modern state to influence the character of
cinematographic production directly and to impose certain limitations within which the
views of life must be kept. There must not be a conflict with the views of the state.”222
The French Republic—influenced by Enlightenment ideals—Italy’s goal to create a
“New Man” under Mussolini’s fascist government, and the influence of the “American
Way” in the United States, were all clearly distinct in their motivations regarding film
and its content during the 1920s. However, in one way they were similar: they each
supported their own nationalist agendas.223
IECI goals went beyond gathering knowledge and included studying the power of
the cinema to influence public opinion. “We should wonder,” said LN worker Fayette
Ward Allport, “if films faithfully reflect thought about the nation or if our national
thought stretches simply to reflect them.”224 The assumption that national thought would
“stretch” to conform to the ideas of film was basic to League efforts in the area of
cinematography. Additionally, war films, even those considered more theatrical than
educational, were considered by some to be of clear value in anti-war education. This
sparked a debate in the IREC, discussed later in this chapter.
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Although the ultimate lack of neutrality of the institute is a vital consideration, it
is important to note that it was still influential in both Europe and beyond. For instance,
by 1932, France, Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Holland, China and Chile all had
national film committees associated with the IECI, though one could argue that these
countries were just as interested as Italy in studying how film could be effectively used
for propaganda. Additionally, the British Film Institute was indebted to the work of both
the IECI and LUCE. However, as the Depression wrecked economies, nationalism began
to overtake sentiments of international cooperation. With Italy’s 1935 invasion of
Abyssinia, and resulting LN economic sanctions, support for the IECI quickly dissipated.
A few months after the invasion, in December of 1935, Interciné (as the IREC was then
called) ceased publication. Interciné, unlike the IREC, had not maintained a commitment
to dialogue and articles remained in their language of origin. The final publication of the
IECI was Cinema, which was only published in Italian for national consumption.
Although the Institute remained open until 1937, it was largely inactive. By the time it
ceased publication, the IREC had over two thousand subscriptions and can still be found
at quite a number of libraries.225
However, while influenced by fascism and subsequently short-lived, the IECI did
provide an environment for transnational exchange. Questions about the influence of film
on children, which were mainly being addressed in the United States and the United
Kingdom in the interwar years, were given an international forum through the IREC. The
IREC was published in multiple languages and, although circulation was limited, was
therefore available to a wider international readership. Like broader LN efforts, the IECI
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was not ultimately successful in preventing war, but it was based on a system of
transnational exchange that, while limited, created transnational connections among
intellectuals. For instance, Rudolf Arnheim’s tenure as researcher for the IECI helped
shape his views towards film, which informed his influential writings on art, psychology,
and visual perception.226 The IREC attracted the contribution of a wide range of
individuals; in part due to degree Italian Fascism could accommodate cultural and
ideological diversity.227 Women used this international platform to insert their voice into
the debate over anti-war film, as well as moral censorship (discussed in the following
chapter).
The International Educational Cinematographic Institute
In the context of the League of Nations, film became the technological medium
that encompassed efforts made in a variety to areas—from health and social conditions,
to the shaping of public opinion. In League formulation, it was closely tied to broader
social issues such as morality and education and was considered a powerful medium for
social and educational development.228 The League provided an international platform to
discuss film and modernization, carefully billing itself as extra-governmental to avoid
claims of self-interest. While the League carefully projected non-self-interest, Italy was
far from a disinterested when they offered to fund an institute to consolidate League film
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work. Italy had multiple motivations, including the desire to compete with the French
IIIC, displace German and French dominance of the European film industry, and improve
how other countries viewed them as a modernizing force.229
Towards these goals, the IECI set about the task of gathering any and all materials
associated with educational cinematography. It was not long before they had a collection
considered to be the largest in the world. Among this collection were fifteen thousand
pamphlets published between 1890 and the latter part of the 1920s. The Institute also
subscribed to 742 newspapers and periodicals and actively collected any yearbooks,
books and catalogues published on the topic.230 The IECI’s collection of films was also
rumored to be extensive, but because the archive was lost during the Second World War,
it is difficult to know just how many films were in its library. Arguably, this collection
was necessary to support the sweeping goals of the IECI, which sought the daunting task
of “collecting everything in the world” in order to examine:
…the nature of cinema as related to the social life of today; the influences
of the cinema on the spiritual and mental state of children and young
people; precocious criminality and morbid exaltation; the development of
abnormal nervous and psychic powers; the development of sensual
tendencies; the influence of the cinema on the mentality of country folk
and uneducated persons in general…on the formation of a civic, political,
religious and national consciousness… on the formation of manners,
habits, standards of living, extravagance, luxury, character, etc…. Our
Institute desires…to attack all of these problems systematically, with the
help of qualified experts…to carry out enquiries throughout the world,
even in the remotest countries; to make a world investigation into the
exact views held by all the principal students, psychologist, philosophers,
teachers, criminologists, sociologists, etc. …We hope thus to secure…an
effective system of cooperation with the great cinema industry in
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researches designed to bring about the constant improvement in the type
of film produced.231
In other words, the IECI wanted to study cinema as commodity, art, educational tool,
and, no doubt carefully inserted in the center of their goals, regime builder.
Although the exact goals of the IECI may have been overly broad, it started
setting out its ideas from the inauguration in a monthly multilingual journal entitled the
International Review of Educational Cinematography (IREC), later renamed Interciné in
its final year of publication. The publication ran from 1929 until 1935 (two years before
Italy left the LN in 1937) and was published in Italian, Spanish, French, German and
English. A variety of contributors, including politicians, academics and technical
innovators, debated the role of film in contemporary life. In addition to these
contributors, the IREC published reviews of documentary films, extended studies on the
effect of film on viewers, especially children, as well as reports of film’s use in the areas
of education, health, and work efficiency. Readers were also kept informed of the
proceedings of international film conferences.
In the preface to the IREC’s first publication in July 1929, the goals of the IECI
were clearly outlined as not only studying the effect of film, but how film could be used
to promote closer relations between countries and educate the populace. The IECI noted
in this preface that reports “from far India and torrid Africa” described the cinema “as the
most powerful means of propaganda and culture” and that these reports, as well as the
continuing debate over film legislation, would be closely considered. Indeed, from the
outset the IECI emphasized that the influence of film on illiterate populations proved “the
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evident importance of this new instrument of civilization, the need of it that is being felt
everywhere as a medium of science and knowledge.” They continued, commenting that it
was necessary for “all nations to take an interest in it with a view to directing it towards
the maximum welfare of the peoples.”232 The IECI aimed to provide a consolidated field
of debate for all nations in the development of cinematography.
As mentioned above, although film was a widely considered topic of interest to
the LN, it was not until Italy volunteered to fund a film institute in 1928 that it had an
official central location for study. While Italy provided funding for the IECI, it was not
located in Geneva, but rather in Rome. This was not without precedent. As previously
explained, its close intellectual complement, the CICI, established the office for the
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in a Paris location in 1925. Just
as in the case of the establishment of the IIIC in France—discussed in chapter one—the
IECI’s establishment in Rome indicated that Italy had motivations beyond providing a
neutral ground for studying international film concerns. Indeed, in an article immediately
following the preface of the July 1929 edition of the IREC, the autonomous nature of
both the IIIC and the IECI were emphasized several times by IREC editors.
In the article “The Role and the Purpose of the International Educational
Cinematographic Institute” French agriculturalist Louis Dop argued that the formation of
the IECI—under the inspiration of Benito Mussolini—was a direct result of the
“tendency more and more marked in the different peoples to direct their various efforts
and conceptions toward a collaboration and a cooperation which becomes every day more
close between the nations” in order to “establish the foundations of the kingdom of peace
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amongst the men of goodwill.”233 However, after establishing the autonomous nature of
all other such organizations, including the IIIC, he stated that while the IECI would
maintain close working relations with the League of Nations he placed heavy emphasis
on the IECI’s autonomous nature. He stated that, “like all other special organisations
already in being, the International Educational Cinematographic Institute, is juridically
distinct from the League of Nations. It has been created by the Italian State in order to
develop an international collaboration in the educational field by means of the
educational film.”234 As was in the case with the establishment of the IIIC in France, the
IECI enhanced Italy’s prestige and hosting it in their own country underscored Italy’s
autonomy. At the same time, the location helped explain Italy’s considerable influence on
the institute’s work. While competition with the 1924 bid for a French film institute that
would have been set up in Paris under the guidance of the CICI was one motivation,
opening up an educational film institute in Rome helped solidify Italy's position in
competition with France and Germany for dominance of the European film industry. The
country was especially keen to consolidate their professed influence in cultural
production and organization.235 An institute studying educational film helped improve
Italy’s international reputation as a modern country advanced beyond its neighboring
nation-states.
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Film and Anti-war Education
Within the context of the IECI, the term “educational” was broadly defined.
Depending on the context, it could refer to the education of children and adults, but could
also mean moral education or even scientific progress. This vague formulation allowed
for the discussion of all types of film, including commercial, and may mislead present
day readers accustomed to clearly defined film genres and a separation between
educational and commercial film. Of most concern to the IECI was the power of film to
influence social development. The CICI and IECI recognized the power of visual
stimulus to encourage international attitudes in young people. “For some time past,”
stated a 1935 CICI report, “all who consider one of the bases of international organisation
to be a real knowledge and intelligent understanding of the different national outlooks
have realized the importance of performances which appeal primarily to the eye.” The
report compared the use of the cinema to that of broadcasting because “maximum
advantage” could be attained when trying to promote cultural internationalism.236
Films supporting anti-war sentiment were of special interest to the League, though
as the IREC reported several times over the years (discussed below), the influence of war
films was not reliable. In 1925, after production in Great Britain with Hans M. Neiter as
director, the LN adopted and began to disseminate its first film entitled Star of Hope.
This film was widely disseminated by the LN to schools and viewed by a large number of
children. 237 The twenty-minute film outlined both the evils of war and the benefits of the
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League of Nations and was sent with a pamphlet for teachers suggesting ways to use it in
their curriculum. The content mainly consisted of cobbled together scraps discarded from
a range of information film reels with the addition of “cleverly drawn diagrams and
maps” complemented by stills of documents procured from the British Imperial War
Museum and from international organizations such as The Save the Children Fund.238
The film was later remade in a longer form in 1926 under the title The World War and
After also directed by Neiter.
In addition to promoting Star of Hope, for IREC readers who believed in the
power of film to instill anti-war sentiment—either through education about peace or by
instilling a horror of war—the IREC pointed out films they thought would be particularly
helpful. For instance, the IECI felt the 1929 film Pitiless was of “incontestable social
value” because it depicted the “horror of the war that disseminated death and destruction
on the fields of battle.”239 Other LN films mentioned by the IREC, but now lost, included
a film supporting League efforts against drug trafficking in the 1920s entitled Drowsy
Drugs.240 Films utilized by the League’s International Labor Organization, were of a
more general educational nature, such as Reinforced Concrete, Modern Lighting, The
Romance of Oil, Apple Time in Evangeline’s Land, Underwear and Hosiery, and Fresh
from the Deep, a film about fishing, all focused on labor and consumption.241
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Motherhood and Baby’s Birthright, which discussed breast-feeding, centered on family
care issues and reproduction. These films presented accepted social values, such as in the
case of Motherhood, directed in 1933 by Jean Benoit-Lévy and Marie Epstien, which
campaigned against the practice of voluntary childlessness. Motherhood will be discussed
at length in the following chapter. The IREC addressed far too many films to assess here,
and so I have focused on those discussed in relation to anti-war film, patriotic warfare
and children’s reaction to films.
The IECI not only reported on protracted studies and surveys done by other
institutions and groups, but also took part in empirical surveys of education and the
cinema. These surveys were enacted by the IECI half a decade before the mass survey
became popular in the United States during the mid 1930s. The IECI’s first survey was
ambitious in nature with a total of twenty-four thousand questionnaires distributed
through schools to children in Italy. The daunting task of sifting through all of the
responses overtaxed the personnel resources of the Institute and led them to take on
future efforts on a less extensive scale.242 This first study asked questions relating to the
emotional states provoked by films, physical fatigue, war sentiment and frequency of
attendance. Later surveys asked students, both in Italy and abroad, to discuss their
preferred types of films and favorite stars and polled them on the connection between
literacy and the understanding of film. These were not related to content analysis of any
particular set of films, but studied audience response to certain film genres, such as war,
gangster or cowboy films.
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Reports in the IREC concerning the possible anti-war value of war films—by
showing the true cost of war—were more common in the early years of publication. This
hope in the power of film to engender anti-war sentiment, however, was short-lived. In
1929-1931, contradictory articles lauding the benefits of war films to support peace
agendas and those cautioning that they actually served to exalt war in the minds of
viewers stood side-by-side in the IREC. After 1932, more emphasis was placed on the
power of film to support war (rather than anti-war) sentiment. Beginning in 1929, the
IREC had disseminated a number of inquiries through questionnaires published in the
journal. Replies were received and analyzed by the IECI and the most interesting
quotations were published as a response.243 In this way, a much broader range of national
and cultural views towards the influence of film were given voice in the IREC. These
studies revealed that war was a popular cinematic theme for adults as well as children.
Similarly, the 1929 LN report “Children and War Films: An Enquiry” found that there
was a strong correlation between watching war films and anti-war sentiment in children.
“It is one thing to know about war and to be told of its evils, quite another to envisage it
as something real and appalling,” the enquiry stated. “War films, however, censored,
modified, doctored, or distorted, come to children as a revelation. They are the first
glimpse of modern war as a real thing…”244 According to the study, what was more
important than the theme of war in films was the way it was depicted. Films that lauded
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war had the effect of making it more popular to young viewers, whereas those that
focused upon the consequences of war garnered anti-war sentiment.
When editors of IREC reported on this 1929 LN study, they noted that while they
considered it valuable, they also stressed that the study only reflected the opinions of the
children of certain families in Yorkshire, England and was “not necessarily the universal
viewpoint.” 245 The unattributed IREC article pointed out that of the 1100 children who
responded with anti-war sentiments, some pointed out the positive effects “war brings
out,” for instance, “50 pointed to patriotism and 28 to the development of character.”246
The IECI argued that the responses of the students reflected the pacifist teaching of the
area’s schools and that the minority of students in favor of war cited excitement, glory
and patriotism as their reasons. The article closed by once again stating that more studies
had to be conducted “in all countries that took part in the war” in order to gather a
“volume of opinion which, though neither fundamental nor final for adjudicating a social
problem of such immense scope and magnitude, may influence the thought of future
generations through the life and thought of the children of to-day, who will grow into the
men and women of to-morrow.”247 Considering the first IECI survey had only been sent
to Italian children, it is telling that the IREC editors criticized the LN on grounds of its
limited scope. How were English children’s responses less representative than Italian?
National competition and disagreement with the goals of the Fascist state seem to be the
obvious answer.
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During the same year, as part of their study tracking what interested children
about film in Switzerland, the IECI found patriotism to be a common reason for the
popularity of war films. The editors shared what they called a “characteristic answer” for
this theme:
The war subjects are especially interesting; they show how one ought to behave,
even in the most difficult moments, in order to serve one’s country. We learn
there to know the life of the soldier at the front and the damage cause by the war;
we see the mines laid by the enemy.248
While these initial surveys established the popularity of war films, it was not clear if war
films created an aversion to war in children. As a 1930 article in the IREC stated, “All
those concerned with the study of social problems are unanimous in regarding the
question of the influence of the screen on the minds and education of children and young
people as the most crucial of all questions connected with the cinematograph.”249 They
may have been unanimous in considering the influence of film on children an important
matter, but contributors to the IREC were certainly not unified in their views of whether
or not children should be exposed to war films.
While a topic of concern from the start of the IECI, a debate was sparked in the
September 1930 IREC issue concerning whether or not children should see films
depicting war. French writer Marianna Hoffman, while recognizing the possible ill
effects of the cinema, emphasized its educational value in her IREC article. She argued
that “commercial films frequently have a disturbing effect upon the minds and emotions
of young people. They confuse the judgment, dull the moral sense and by the power of
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suggestion lead to acts of crime.” Indeed, she wrote that, because of the common
emphasis on sensuality, for young girls they could be a “training-ground for the streets.”
That said, she still felt: “Nevertheless, children cannot and should not be prevented from
seeing pictures, which can be of very great educative value.”250 Writing a month later,
Swiss contributor and film scholar Eva Elie more strongly stated this case in relation to
war films in her article “Should War Films be Seen by Children?” She noted that this
question was still under debate, with censorship in some countries even prohibiting “an
impartial document” such as Léon Poirier’s 1928 documentary film Verdun.
Elie argued that in too many cases the choice was left to parents, who were more
apt to allow their children to watch comedic presentations of war. She viewed the choice
of the comedic representation as a mistake: “No doubt, laughter and gaiety are as
necessary for children as they are for adults, but what idea of war will the men and
women of to-morrow derive from all these scenes of ‘fun in the trenches’ with Charlie
Chaplin in the midst of it, if the other side of the picture is not shown?”251 When she
mentioned “fun in the trenches” she was referring to the 1918 film Shoulder Arms!,
which depicted actor and film director Chaplin, a private in the army, doing heroic deeds,
fighting back and routing the Germans in comedic fashion.252 Rather than comedic
representations, Elie thought children should views films such as King Vidor’s The Big
Parade (1925). She felt the latter to be one of the first war films to show the cost of war,
including death and dismemberment. Elie felt that scenes of sadness and loss connected
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to certain war films would imbue children “with the spirit of peace nurtured by hatred of
slaughter” and submitted a formal recommendation that the IECI should take on the task
of searching out films that would provide such an education.253
The editors of the IREC added a very lengthy note to her recommendation
pointing out the “delicate” nature of such a suggestion and maintained that an empirical
examination of the question would have to be undertaken before they could successfully
answer her title question. They did, after many disclaimers, write: “War is not heroism
alone. It is also tragedy, death, destruction, however inevitable these may be. And when it
is combined with sentiment or an artificial plot, it loses its aspects of truth and even
confuses and misleads the spectator.” The IECI wrote that the documentary war film
“might perhaps within certain limits be shown to children and young people accompanied
by the necessary comments,” but they were not sure this would be the case with the
dramatic film. The IREC editors were also careful to repeat that the question would
“remain unsettled” until studies assessed the value of war films in a variety of countries
and different social factors.254
In January 1931, another Swiss contributor and school headmaster, R. Duvillard,
made a case for increased state censorship and disagreed strongly with Elie. He wrote:
“Madame Elie’s article shows—quite unintentionally, I admit—the impossibility of
deciding for others what is educational and what is not.” He argued that questions of film
selection were the responsibility of the father, as head of the family. He continued: “They
must be prepared, she says, to face the struggle for life and death that human laws decree.
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This is an opinion, not a fact.” He felt that it would be impossible to study the effect of
the war film on children, especially considering that children were “incapable of
analysing their feelings.”255 The IREC editors again intervened with a lengthy note,
pointing out that Elie had been writing specifically about war films and that Duvillard did
not propose a “practical solution” to the problem of moral censorship. They called for
empirical study and asked readers to write in with their opinions about what they thought
was the essential question: “is Government film censorship advisable or is it not?”256
With this intervention they very effectively channeled the discussion to consider a wider
debate: how to deal with the competing national views regarding state film censorship.
Although she did not answer the question posed by the IREC, Elie did take
umbrage at Duvillard’s dismissal of her views. She challenged Duvillard’s argument that
it should not be up to the state what a child should view or read; pointing out this was a
“strange opinion” for a headmaster at a state school with a prescribed curriculum. If
history texts could be assigned, then why not films, she challenged. “In the past,” she
wrote, “history, except for certain happy peoples, has meant mainly a long list of battles,
victories and defeats, but without that counterpart essential to an understanding of the
whole truth—the price of glory. Animated records of war can make good this omission
and inspire a love of peace by showing the horrors of war.”257 She argued that they
should use every means available to destroy war, “including the faithful picture of war
itself. The method is not a new one. Medical science has long applied it under the name
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of homoeopathy.”258 While supportive of this method, it is telling that Elie did not
endorse children viewing films such as All Quiet on the Western Front (1930).
Presumably, she would have been familiar with the film, especially since it had been
listed over a year before in the IREC as one of the films that make war “more
comprehensible” and lauded as an anti-war film. The April 1930 IREC article had noted:
“Mr. Carl E. Milliken, in a speech delivered to the Mother’s Club at Brooklyn, said that
the horrors of war exhibited in these films were a splendid argument in favour of the
ideas of peace and universal harmony.”259 While US National Committee member
Millikan had directed his support of the anti-war benefits of the film to a group of
mothers, Elie was not vocally supportive of showing All Quiet on the Western Front to
children. The 1930 film adaption of Erich Maria Remarque’s book of the same name,
directed by Lewis Milestone, depicted war from the perspective of a German soldier and
focused on the physical and mental strain of the war. Though it is difficult to say exactly
why she did not endorse the film, it may have been because it portrayed war too
realistically for children.
While Elie did not take a stand on the question of whether or not state censorship
was advisable, she did suggest that parental oversight had not been effective. She also
reiterated that she had not mentioned state censorship and that her argument concerned
the question of whether or not children over the age of ten should view war films from a
list vetted by the IECI. In an editorial note, the IECI pointed out once more that they were
“on extremely delicate ground,” but hoped that other contributors would be as eager to
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add to the debate and that other questions might spark such lively discussion. The editors
noted that the IECI would not “wash its hands of the question of war-films” and that a
study was currently underway of the impressions of war-films on Italian children.260
This study would have a profound effect on Elie and fundamentally changed the
tone of her writing in the IREC. This 1931 investigation was built on previous IECI work
started in 1929 as well as new survey responses. Though Elie was correct that films like
The Big Parade could appeal to children, they did not come away with the horror of war
she had hoped, but rather an appreciation of war films. In the IECI’s 1931 study of the
preferences of some 2,800 Italian children, boys and girls listed films such as The Big
Parade as a common favorite and shared reasons for their preferences such as “Because
you see soldiers at war.”261 Contrary to Elie’s arguments, the promised 1931 IECI study
of Italian school children found that war films exalted war in the minds of youth. Their
responses found that while boys were more generally in favor of representations of war,
girls were in favor when heroes were shown “defending hearth and home.”262 Boys were
more often in favor of going to war than girls, with one respondent commenting: “I want
to go to war even if I have to die. It is beautiful to fight and die for one’s country.”263
Notably, the study claimed that these feelings were part of a basic patriotism and a thirst
for heroism and argued that the latter might be channeled into areas such as science and
exploration. These studies better aligned—compared to the “pacifist” LN study addressed
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above—with the regime building goals of Italy and were therefore more favorably
reported in the IREC.
Although before the 1932 study of Italian schoolchildren’s reactions to war films
Eva Elie had held a “burning conviction” that children should be exposed to such films in
order to instill in them a horror of war, the results of the enquiry caused her to radically
reassess her views.264 Her response to the study also reveals how nationalism could very
effectively quash utopian hopes in the interwar period. The IREC published Elie’s August
1932 letter to the IECI director in which she responded to their findings and very publicly
acknowledged in what ways she had been proven wrong. She wrote that while she had
expected war films to “inspire in children above all else a strong sense of terror of
warlike phenomena,” she thought no one should condemn these children for their “heroic
sentiment,” but instead should applaud Italy for its strength. 265 She argued:
The offer of limitless and conditionless peace must not signify the creation of
cowards capable only of trembling for their own safety. The Italy of to-morrow
shows itself strong in the strength of its children, for it is certainly not by hiding
one's head in a sack, forbidding patriotic hymns for the love of peace, banning
war and cancelling the Word from questionnaires that the conflicts of mankind
can be avoided.”266
While she still held out a small hope that the war film might still do some good when it
showed the horrors of war, she made a considerable change in her opinion:
But if the film exalts on the other hand the sense of heroism in defence against an
aggressor, why not rejoice in such a proof of vitality? To do otherwise would be
to confess oneself a degenerate, and indicate a return to that Sybaritism that
destroyed nations vanquished by laziness or excessive sentimentalism. To the
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honour of the white race it may be said that civilization has not yet brought us to
this, and the children of Italy are the living proof of it.267
Though it is not clear what non-white races she is referring to in her reference to
sybaritism, or pursuit of pleasures, such a statement would have been found a willing
audience in a political regime committed to opposing racial degeneration through
increased reproduction.268 After this letter, she no longer wrote in the IREC in support of
children seeing war films and focused instead on more technical subjects, such as
dubbing, and a general consideration of the power of the cinema to influence public
thought.269
The IECI also considered the matter settled and, as was the case with all of Elie’s
contributions about war-films, they added a lengthy editorial note about the implications
of their findings. While stating that their “inquiry had no other result” than to show that
war should be avoided and believed that the answers they received “abundantly” proved
this to be the case, they added an important qualifier: “To recognize that a conflict
between peoples is a source of patriotism, and creates the desire to defend one's country
to the last coincides with the conception of Madame Elie, distinguishing between a war
of defence and a war of conquest or aggression.” Being a pacifist, they argued, did not
mean being a coward; war should be banned only “to a certain limit, a limit dictated by
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conscience, the sense of duty and sacrifice” to one’s country, home and family. 270 They
continued:
The war film has therefore lost or given up a great part of the objectives which it
started out to achieve. The opinions of writers we have cited at the beginning of
our inquiry, which receive another confirmation from Eva Elie, have shown that
the ultra-pacifist attitude brought to a fanatical conclusion evokes no sympathy
with the masses. The people understand the tragicalness of the phenomenon. They
can also understand that the hundred per cent renouncement, even if it is worthy
of the sanctity of Christ, is not human, lacking as it does the flesh and blood
appeal of the human body.271
They added that there were limits to the amount of suffering the public would accept in
films and that children understood that “war is necessary when the country demands it.”
Indeed, they argued, war films were unable to present war without showing acts of
courage and sacrifice and these very rightly evoke feelings in young children because
they are “the noblest of human virtues.”272 Although the IECI was careful to mention at
the beginning of their editorial note that they felt children understood the horror of war,
the rest of the article very clearly outlines their opinion that war was just—and therefore
should be considered honorable—when supported by the government. Elie did not
challenge this view. Later IECI studies found the same result: war films did not produce
pacifist reactions in children, but instead exalted war through patriotic fervor.
The IECI continued in the vein of supporting patriotic warfare, and as the
ostensibly international organization was increasingly influenced by the rising specter of
fascism, such utopian anti-war hopes were increasingly muted within the IREC. Soon

Editorial Note, Elie “Open Letter to the Director of the I.E.C,” IREC, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August,
1932): 604.
270

271

Ibid., 605.

272

Quoting Jules Destree. Ibid., 606.

139

after Italy’s 1935 invasion of Abyssinia, they ceased publication. The IECI remained
open until Italy left the LN in 1937, but their only publication circulated nationally, was
solely published in Italian, and supported the goals of the Fascist state. Not only was the
minor utopia centered on anti-war film crushed by the rise of fascism, but an important
platform for the kinds of important transnational conversations that helped lead the
development of film was silenced.273
Enquiries undertaken by the League of Nations showed similar results: film itself
was popular among children and the war film was especially popular with boys. The
question of the influence of film on youth continued to occupy the League of Nations,
even after Italy left in 1937. By 1938, in the IECI’s absence, the LN’s Child Welfare
Committee felt the need to address the influence of film on children and looked back over
the previous decade to assess its impact. “Within little more than a generation,” the
Committee argued, “the cinematograph has developed from an ingenious toy into an
important institution in the life, not only in every urban community, but also to an
increasing extent of all but the remotest rural areas. Its development has been so rapid
that it is still difficult to assess its cultural and social influence.”274 The 1938 report was
based on information gathered directly from the governments of forty-six countries,
several LN committees and compiled with the help of A. C. Cameron, a Governor of the
British Film Institute, and American professor of educational research Edgar Dale.275
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While the influence of film remained ambiguous, the study gathered important
information about child attendance at the cinema, claiming, “the majority of film
enthusiasts are said to be young people.”276 The League continued to grapple with the
issue of the possible negative effects of film on children and international amity.
Other studies suggest the preference for war films, especially among boys,
remained throughout the interwar period. Regarding inclinations in taste among youth,
the 1938 Child Welfare Committee report “The Recreational Cinema and the Young,”
found that “War and adventure are very popular with the boys. War is rather more
popular with boys of 8-10 than with those of 11-14. With girls, war films are definitely
unpopular.”277 Noting the differences in film tastes among female and male respondents
had the additional benefit of underscoring the “natural” tendency of women as moral
censors of the family—discussed in the following chapter—and supported League, and
IECI, views in this area.

Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated how a debate surrounding the possible anti-war
benefits of film was effectively transformed through IECI studies and IREC commentary
into one that supported patriotic warfare. In 1930, Eva Elie had held a strong hope and
desire that war films could prompt a horror and rejection of war, but by 1932, she wrote
in support of patriotic fervor and justified warfare. While this reversal can be at least
partially explained by the mounting war tension of the early 1930s, the IECI played a
significant role in this transformation. The narrative of Eva Elie’s contribution to the
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IREC revealed the influence the IECI could wield in changing the pacifist goals of some
of its readers. In a span of only two years, Elie transformed her opinion from hoping war
films would prompt a horror and rejection of war, to lauding Italian schoolchildren for
their patriotism—thereby supporting the IECI’s formulation of justified warfare.
The goal of “collecting everything in the world” led to a number of contradictions
in the material published in IREC; the cloak of international cooperation was an ill fit
over fascist ideology. Notably, while the journal included results of studies that
expounded on the negative effects of war films on child viewers, the IECI considered war
to be “the most important of all social phenomena” and an important supporter of
patriotism.278 Articles extolling film as a medium to promote international understanding
appeared with other articles promoting films that had Eurocentrist or Imperialist agendas.
While this seems like a contradiction of aims, it highlights the transnational nature of the
journal. International and national goals were both evident in the IREC.
Underlying many LN efforts was the problem of maintaining the sovereignty of
national cultures, which was reflected in IREC publications. Once silent film gave way to
sound, and national language overtook what was considered by the CICI to be the visual
equivalent to Esperanto in the early film era, the international debate was further
complicated. National themes were supported in national languages. In the early days of
IREC publication, the international nature of the medium was highlighted and its power
to foster understanding was the main narrative of articles. However, the IECI was heavily
influenced by Italian Fascism and as the Great Depression took its toll, the tone of the
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Chapter Five: Women and Film Censorship
“In every woman there is a mothers heart,” the International Educational
Cinematographic Institute (IECI) declared in the preface to its 1931 journal. “It is then
impossible to refuse women their natural function as educators, at least in as much as
social life is concerned.”279 The “natural” role of women as the moral compass of a home
was mentioned numerous times in the mouthpiece of IECI, the International Review of
International Cinematography (IREC). However, this idea especially gained traction in
the December 1931 issue when women’s organizations such as the International Council
of Women contributed articles claiming film censorship to be the natural domain of
women. Indeed, women taking an active role in addressing the moral influence of film
aligned with Fascist Italy’s view of women as mothers of the nation. This chapter argues
that while the location of the League’s film institute in Fascist Italy limited the impact of
its work, it also created an opening for women and a platform for their ideas in the debate
surrounding the impact of film on children.
While the IECI’s main focus was on educational film, the institute also studied
commercial films. Of special concern was the influence of such films on family cohesion
and the development of children. In this the IECI shared a common concern with
reformist women’s groups, including the International Council of Women, discussed later
in this chapter, but also women’s groups in the United States who were applying pressure
to the Motion Picture Producers of America to lift Hollywood films to a higher moral
quality. These same women’s organizations found a willing editorship in the IREC and a
welcome reception for their contributions. For instance, Chair of the Cinema Committee

279

Preface, IREC, Vol. 3, No. 12 (December, 1931): 1069.

144

of the National Council of Women (US), Mrs. Ambrose A. Deihl, wrote in the December
1931 edition that the “Unit of Civilization is the family” and staked out women’s claim in
the important role of regulating the influence of film in “their” sphere.280
Gender roles in the 1920s were in flux, which caused many nations and
international organizations to emphasize “ideal” roles for women as they related to family
and to protect the status of motherhood. The New Woman, Flappers, college enrollment,
an explosion of all-women’s organizations—all of these threatened the traditional
formulation of the family. Women were very publicly outside traditional gender roles and
much of what is described in this dissertation was the backlash as organizations such as
the IECI attempted to reestablish “ideal” roles for women. What roles women in the
public sphere during the First World War and after were far more vibrant than the
narrative suggested here due to the marginalization of women within the CICI and the
dominant message of the organization that supported reestablishing traditional formations
of the family.281 Maternalism was an area that effectively opened fields of participation
for women in the international political sphere. It was a central strategy for women to
claim a public space, but it also included limitations on the extent women could
participate. This chapter will discuss those limitations.
The First World War had not only left the European countryside devastated, but it
had considerable negative impact on the rural population. The daunting task of restoring
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both the population and infrastructure of these rural areas was made more difficult by
plummeting birth rates, widespread alcoholism and the spread of disease. On top of these
troubles, it was a common worry that rose-colored depictions of urban settings in many
popular films, such as Paris in Rex Ingram’s 1921 film The Four Horseman of the
Apocalypse, caused many to migrate out of rural areas.282 The fear of resulting food
shortages, if such an exodus continued, was another motivation for the LN and individual
nation-states to control the content of film available to viewers.283 However, while the
negative effects of unchecked representations in film were a concern, the potential power
to support European rural development in educating for hygiene, parenting and
agricultural methods proved to be a powerful motivation for nation-states to develop rural
film programs.284
The International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (CICI) and IECI
believed that film had an “immense influence” on the “moral growth of young people and
on the evolution of national consciousness” towards the goal of international
cooperation.285 As such, an important concern was also the censorship of film to protect
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this growth. The CICI referred to efforts to address this as moral censorship. Within the
IECI, studies lauding the educational value of film were closely interwoven with
concerns about its negative effect. The IECI felt an important aspect of maintaining the
best interests of all people was to guard against possible negative effects of film on
children and family through moral censorship. As was the case in their wider education
movement, which included textbook editing, the CICI recognized the importance of
youth in their education efforts, viewing that age group ideally suited to be inculcated
with the principles of international cooperation. The International Congress of
Educational and Instructional Cinematography held in Rome in April of 1934, made a
statement regarding youth commenting that the cinema was directly aimed at this goal. It
closely aligned with the CICI’s views in this area and what efforts they had made over
the twelve previous twelve years. As the resolution stated: “efforts must be made in every
country to forbid the presentation of any subject encouraging cruelty, crime or
immorality, as well as anything which may harm the efforts directed towards civilisation
and better understanding among the peoples.”286 The CICI firmly believed that by
limiting such negative impressions and by relying on children’s assumed natural
innocence and desire for peace, they could be developed into peaceful adults with an
international mindset.
Of course, the CICI was not the only organization concerned with censorship and
many nations had their own set of policies to restrict film. For instance, in the United
States, the Motion Picture Production Code, commonly called the Hays Code, was
established by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) starting with “The
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Don’ts and Be Carefuls” of 1927. This code outlined a number of prohibited depictions
(“Don’ts”), such as profanity, white slavery, suggestive nudity and the “Willful offense to
any nation, race or creed.” Restricted depictions (“Be Carefuls”) ranged from improper
uses of the US flag to prostitution, and included improper depictions of “the institution of
marriage.”287 This 1927 version was formalized by the MPAA in the Hays Code starting
in 1930. During the same year, China began publishing its own film censorship laws
enforced by the National Film Censorship Committee.288 Although Italy was the only
country that required a mother to be one of the three members of its film censorship
board, other European countries felt that women should take a central role as moral
regulators in relation to children and film.289
During the interwar years, nation-states recognized film as a powerful tool in
education and for control of public opinion. Both were central to nation and empire
building efforts. In their more optimistic hopes for the role of cinema, the CICI viewed it
as a potentially potent tool for promoting international understanding and goodwill. The
regulation of film, because of its perceived impact in almost all areas of life, therefore
became a concern for the intellectual cooperation movement. Educational film was a
central League concern in a variety of areas, from labor, health, and communication to
the formation of national and international public opinion. Because of its association with
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both formal and informal education, film was also an important tool for working-class
education, as well as child welfare and development.
While the ability of film to entertain, and possibly educate, was established by the
end of the First World War, film drew criticism from church groups and film theorists
over its influence on children, especially upon their moral and social development.290 A
1928 report published by the League of Nation’s Child Welfare Committee argued that
“the child acts under the influence of a film and reproduces mechanically, so to speak, the
example given on the screen.”291 As illustrated by the broadly defined IECI areas of study
cited in the previous chapter, the influence of film on child delinquency, crime, sleep
patterns, sexuality, and morality were all in question. In the United States, uncertainty
over the influence of film on children was addressed in a series of studies supported by
the Payne Fund between 1929-1933 entitled “Motion Pictures and Youth.” The thirteen
studies published in the series all focused upon three main considerations: film content,
audience composition, and the impact of film on children.292 As the preface of the 1933
Payne study Movies, Delinquency, and Crime stated, “Motion pictures are not understood
by the present generation of adults. They are new; they make an enormous appeal to
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children; and they present ideas and situations which parents may not like.”293 Articles in
the IREC made very similar arguments.
During this time, those studying film assumed a passive, rather than active,
audience. While passive audience theory has been largely replaced by active audience
theory—which assumes a free willed and engaged viewership—those studying film in the
interwar period believed viewers would be easily manipulated and controlled by what
they viewed on the screen. While the debate over film’s influence on children still rages,
the assumption that an audience would directly copy scenes from films, and therefore
film would wield a terrible and dangerous influence over viewers’ lives, has been
abandoned. However, early film theorists followed what is now termed the “Hypodermic
Needle Theory,” arguing that film had a direct, immediate and powerful effect on
audience behavior.294 With an underlying assumption that children would reproduce what
they saw on the screen, any violent or amoral acts were of special concern and served as a
strong foundational argument for film censorship in the interwar years.
The IECI was very interested in tracking the impact of film on audiences,
especially children. This was partly due to the ostensible goal of promoting cultural
internationalism. It was also influenced by the propaganda goals of the Italian fascist
state, as well as fears regarding the influence of film on the development of children’s
morality. In a 1929 IREC article titled “Concerning the Cinema,” CICI member Jules
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Destrée argued that because of its “international character, film excludes nationalist
passions, all doubtful or contestable affirmations, all inaccuracies of the truth.” However,
he still felt that—especially in the area of historical presentations—it was very important
to control its content. He pointed out that of course it was important that it not offer “bad
counsel” but thought that this was successfully addressed because all “civilised”
countries had laws “repressing outrage to morality.” As such, he felt what was then
necessary, and most important, was to repress “scenes of violence and artifice that may
become deplorable examples.”295 However, as Destrée continued to develop his views, he
favored not only repression, but also anti-war education.

The Role of the Mother
The IECI also felt it was essential to promote the involvement of women as
mothers of the nations, in the formulation of children’s views towards patriotic warfare.
While they welcomed participation of women in the IREC, the IECI felt the most ideal
way women could do this was in their role as mothers. Although, in his debate with Eva
Elie, R. Duvillard had argued that it should fall to the head of the family, or the father, to
serve as moral censor of films, the IECI had already decided that, while fathers did play
their part, this role was best taken up by women and especially mothers. In fact, it was of
special concern to the IECI that women fulfill their role as mothers, rather than choosing
to remain childless. As alternatives to the American dramatic film presenting women in
roles that challenged the family order, films appealing to women to take up their
reproductive roles, such as the 1929 Jean Bonoit-Lévy and Marie Epstien film Maternité
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(Motherhood), were of special interest to the IECI. While the co-directors were not part
of the IECI, the themes of the film were very appealing to the fascist institute. In fact, the
April 1930 edition of the IREC lauded Motherhood for “waging one of the worthiest
battles of modern life” by calling attention to “a social problem of vital important of the
Nations and the race,” namely women voluntarily not having children.296
The message of this film was twofold: 1) to illustrate the superiority of the
countryside over the city for the mental well-being of the populace and, 2) most
importantly, to emphasize a woman’s role as mother and the essential importance of
reproduction. The film compared a hedonistic family from the town to a family from the
countryside “with all its native energy” and urge to “increase and multiply.” The choices
of a woman from each family illustrated their vital differences. One woman from the
country, Marie, had many children and relived “her own youth and life in their youth and
their cares and joys.” In contrast, city-dwelling Louise had “never known the love of
children” and ultimately, “lest she be destroyed,” had to devote “herself to helping others,
through good works on behalf of motherhood.”297 Marie led a wholesome rural life of
productive labor while Louise led an idle and frivolous one in the city, with a small dog
as companion and an increasingly strained relationship with her husband.
After the death of her beloved dog and the desertion of her husband, Louise
moved to Marie’s native town and through an interaction with Marie’s son began her
development towards redemption: she began to think and act like a mother. In the end,
she devoted herself to supporting poor mothers, though her life, while better than her
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previous indolence, was still presented as a lonely existence.298 As the IREC stated, “In
their generous optimism,” the authors of Motherhood, “convinced that there is a mother’s
heart hidden in every woman’s breast, still point out the road to redemption to this
unhappy woman.”299 However, while a woman could find some fulfillment in taking on a
mothering role, she could not be truly happy, at least in the view of the IECI, unless she
was a mother in truth.
It was no coincidence that an emphasis on a woman’s role as mother was
highlighted in the IREC. As Zoë Druik pointed out in her 2007 article, the “vision of a
domestic woman fighting to improve the nation one family at a time dovetailed with the
fascist vision of women as mothers of the nations, not to mention as moral censors.”300
While the effects of the cinema may have been unclear, the role of the mother in
combating negative moral effects was not ambiguous to the IECI.301 War is often
legitimized through appeals to manhood, the need to defend vulnerable women and
children, the duty of the son to their father (or leader), and the direct correlation between
masculinity and national strength. Similarly, family and motherhood have been a
common theme associated with the role of women and correlated with the strength of the
nation. The need to stress the role of the mother rose out of the fact that many women
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were entering other spheres of activity. However, according to the IECI, the ideal role
women could play in the development of film was as censors.
An essential part of this role included the moral censorship of the family. In Italy,
film censorship boards, along with an official from the Department of the Interior and
magistrate, included a mother.302 In a 1929 discussion of censorship, German IREC
contributor Ernest Seeger argued that national prestige, specifically in Germany, but in
other nations as well, was negatively influenced by films that damaged national honor
and therefore place a nation at a disadvantage in relations with other nations. The two
main areas censorship addressed in order to protect national honor were films showing
violence as well as “piquant views of feminine charms who are intended to arouse
lascivious feelings in the spectator.”303 The life of a prostitute had to be presented as
reprehensible and anathema to a happy, normal life. Any sort of deception in marriage
was to be presented as a grave offence and never in jest, “which might be interpreted as a
low valuation of matrimony.”304 This view was well aligned with the Italian Fascist
emphasis on procreation as an important part of resisting racial degeneration and in
support of expanded national influence.305
Expectations for women across Europe, especially during times of war, revolved
around their role as mothers within the family unit. In wartime Britain and France,
propagandists took great pains to portray motherhood as the essence of female national
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identity and as the basis for any female patriotic contribution to the war effort. Whatever
the upheavals of war, the gender order was to be maintained and the centrality of
motherhood defended. Conceptions of femininity and masculinity were not just
significant but interconnected, just as neither the military fronts nor the home front
existed in isolation from each other. During war, these gender roles reinforced one
another and emphasized a return to conventional gender relations. Attempting to
reestablish gendered norms after war included an extension of this interconnection by
valorizing the gendered roles of men bravely protecting the nation and women serving it
by maintaining domestic stability.306 Considering the many roles women had taken
outside of the home during the war, and continued to do so afterwards, reestablishing
these roles was a tall order for nations and institutions such as the IECI.
Motherhood was universal in wartime discourse, regardless of national boundary
and it was essential to representing a unified national response to the First World
War. Unity of men in the trenches was supposed to accompany a unification of women as
mothers. During war, motherhood was each woman’s primary role and a central
expectation underlying the formulation of their national identity.307 Although motherhood
was actively used to support militarism during the First World War, it was elastic enough
to also support pacifist sentiments in the interwar period. The image of women as vessels
of moral sensibility was not a new representation and it is little wonder that this appeal
was linked to the patriotic pacifist movements. While feminist pacifists were not
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biologically led to their ideals, they did use traditional gender roles as cultural leverage
and to garner support for their cause.308 Of course, the IECI’s views were decidedly not
pacifist, but they agreed that women were not only to use their moral influence on those
around them, but were also supposed to pass on this sense of morality and the importance
of human life to their children. Whether in war, or in peace, a woman’s essential role was
as a mother.
In the IECI’s view, films that challenged this role were of far greater and
immediate concern than films that glorified war. If the war film increased patriotic fervor,
it worked in favor of the goals of the Italian Fascist state, but films that challenged the
very base of Italian culture—the family—were a true threat. In a 1930 IREC study titled
“Immorality, Crime, and the Cinema,” the IECI argued that while film could have a
negative influence, this was largely due to situations where aspects of life were presented
with “false values” and therefore children began to “emulate false heroes and false
prophets of the screen.” While they recognized that both boys and girls could be
negatively influenced by such presentations, their examples were all directed at women.
“Cinematographic representation,” the article argued, “by falsifying the concept of life in
the exquisitely plastic mind of children, by forcing on them new sensations, and opening
up new vistas of an unreal world, gradually destroys the respect due to women, the home,
and the family.” If women were separated from their roles as mothers or sisters, but
instead depicted in “the freer aspect of the girl for whom life is just a matter of
enjoyment,” the study argued, “the elementary notions of morality which the child’s
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upbringing gave him are overthrown.”309 The study summed up this argument by
pointing out that if a girl was to break any of the Ten Commandments and be shown to
lead a happy life it would foster immoral behavior. Considering that the default pronoun
in this era was male, the use of “girl” further underscores the IECI’s belief that women
shown in situations that undermined their role as mother were highly detrimental and in
turn undermined the strength of the nation. To the IECI, the protection of motherhood
was essential and women played their most ideal role when they built up and protected
the family—thereby supporting the goals of the fascist state.310
Editors of the IREC made it clear they felt that women were the natural guardians
of morality and therefore the ideal figures to enact moral censorship.311 Fathers were part
of the triad approach the IECI suggested as ideal, which included father, mother and
teacher. However, in their explanation of this approach they placed more emphasis on the
role of the mother in directing child development. In the commentary to their inquiry
“The Cinema and the School,” the IECI noted that it was a father’s duty to limit what his
children viewed: “Instead of constituting harmless recreation, a film, if not properly
chosen, will have opposite effects.” For the mother, it was to curb a child’s instincts,
direct how their character was formed and ensure that they were “lovingly directed
towards the pursuit of knowledge and the course of duty.” The IECI did not clearly
outline a father’s role beyond placing a limit on what children could see, and a teacher’s
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role was left unexplained. “A child’s mind and character are formed by the father, the
mother and the teacher; three forces which should act concurrently, each within its own
sphere but the one is indispensable as the other,” the IREC editors argued.312 This
commentary seemed to be especially aimed at the development of male children. Inquiry
responses reveal the role film could play in the development of children, especially
female viewers. “Its influence is strongest on very small children… It is suited for giving
girls lessons in domestic economy.”313 Notably, in this article, the IREC editors clearly
outlined the role of the mother as moral censor, while leaving the role of father and
teacher as rather vague, though still an “indispensable” part of the triad.
The IECI clearly announced their preference for moral censorship in a volume of
the IREC dedicated to the topic in December 1931. The “natural” role of women as the
moral compass of a home was mentioned numerous times in the IREC, but this idea
especially gained traction in the December 1931 issue when women contributed articles
claiming film censorship to be the natural domain of women. For instance, Mrs. Diehl
wrote that it was “natural” that women were concerned, because the “atmosphere” of the
family “is women’s responsibility. Women of all nations possess the legitimate right and
insist upon expressing the right to study at first hand and exert pressure upon every
agency influencing the character building of the family.”314 The IECI agreed and
prefaced the volume by claiming that women could fulfill two important roles in the
development of the cinema: to 1) “take care of those moral principles upon which social
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life is based” and 2) contribute to the educational and instructional development of the
cinema.315 At the same time, the IECI argued that there was a certain area in the
development of cinematography where women could play a critical role: as educators and
assistants in the moral aspect of social life. The IECI argued that a man was more likely
to view the issue from a scientific point of view and a woman a more practical one and
that the latter’s “special qualities as sister, wife and above all mother” made her
“especially suitable” to help guide the growth of cinematography.316 They pointed to the
specific example of censorship, and while they were careful to sidestep the question of
whether or not state censorship was advisable, they argued that all forms of censorship
involved women in the role of moral compass.
They added that women could apply their “level heads” towards the issue of
educational film, which was “quite apart” from the political considerations of state and
international diplomacy. If only men held judgment, they argued, life would be “hard and
bitter” without any rest:
It is therefore the function of women to smooth and soften this perpetual fight,
hard and bitter, to which humanity is pledged. To recognize this quality in the
women is to recognize her right to a profoundly human double function, to
educate and to assist. And what unbounded influence women may have in the
domains of international friendship and co-operation, to transform todays dream
of peace and friendship into the reality of tomorrow!317
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With these words they officially, albeit with qualifications, supported the efforts of the
women’s organizations—including the International Council of Women, as discussed
below—in the daunting task of improving film production through moral censorship.

Laura Dreyfus-Barney and the International Council of Women
The IECI was not alone in its concern. Faced with reservations concerning the
influence of film on children, organizations such as the International Council of Women
(ICW) emphasized the duty of the mother to protect her children from its possible ill
effects. Founded in 1888, the ICW, like many women’s organizations in the period,
emphasized the universal needs of women around the world. However, similar to the
CICI, the ICW was dominated by North American and European women.318 The ICW
maintained a committee on education throughout the interwar period and Dreyfus-Barney
served as an education liaison to the League of Nations, which favored the ICW over
other international women’s organizations.319 Representing the ICW, she served as Vice
President of the Peace and Disarmament Committee of Women’s International
Organizations (PDCWIO). The PDCWIO claimed the right of women to an equal role in
putting and “end to war” based on maternalist rhetoric. Writing to the League, they
claimed:
Women, who constitute half the population of the world, share with men in the
economic burdens imposed by armaments and in the suffering and distress caused
by war. They have made a recognised contribution to moral and social welfare
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and as mothers they are specially concerned with the well being of the rising
generation.320
In her role, Dreyfus-Barney was particularly interested in education, especially the
cinema and broadcasting, which she felt were “two of the most powerful weapons at the
disposal of the teaching profession throughout the world.”321 She linked her international
work directly to maternalism, commenting that “world affairs are home affairs.”322 She
brought her maternalist approach to bear not only her role as a member of the CICI, but
also as a contributor to the IECI.
The ICW’s representative to the League of Nations, Laura Dreyfus-Barney was
recognized for her work in the IREC starting in 1930 and continued to be featured over
the life of the publication. Leading up to their formal declaration of moral censorship in
1931, in April 1930 the IREC reported on the increased participation of women in the
cinema movement, which had culminated in the formal involvement of the International
Council of Women. “While the cinema is steadily making greater progress throughout the
whole world,” the article stated, “women are working to bring about systematic
collaboration between the industry and existing national and international organizations
aiming at the common weal.” The ICW, with Dreyfus-Barney as chair of the cinema
section, was addressing the topic in their upcoming congress, with special attention
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toward suppressing custom barriers for educational films and facilitating the international
circulation of these films. The article continued, in a rather patronizing tone:
These hopes are already on the way to being realized, thanks to the work of the
Rome Institute and the League of Nations. In any case, it is extremely interesting
and significant that woman, who is the natural guardian of children and youth,
should now be taking a stand that will serve as support and encouragement to the
work we are carrying on.323
This line suggests that while women were the target of the IECI’s campaign to promote
moral censorship, the IECI doubted their ability to play anything but a supportive role in
the formal organization of the movement, even if they were to play an important part in
their role as individual mothers.
This lack of support is an example of what has been observed by many
researchers as the double bind of using motherhood to enter the political arena. While
appeals to motherhood could open up space for women, it also placed limits on their
participation to areas of concern to “maternalism.”324 Often this meant overlooking the
complexity of feminist thinking about the family by associating a concern with
motherhood and the family with the political limitation of traditional domestic roles.325
However, limitations in role did not mean women lacked political power, as historian
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Sian Reynolds illustrated in her study of French women in politics between the World
Wars.326 This dissertation takes a similar approach by also focusing on areas outside the
realm of conventional politics where women held authority.
Despite a general lack of confidence from the IECI regarding how women could
contribute outside of prescribed areas—as supportive staff and ideal mothers—many
women served on multiple committees and peace organizations in the interwar period.
Similarly, Laura Dreyfus-Barney dedicated her life to the peace movement and served on
a great number of committees and in many organizations. For instance, she acted as the
Vice President of the Peace Section on the ICW as well as the Liaison Officer between
the ICW and CICI. She also served on the Sub-Committee of Experts for the Instruction
of the Youth in the Aims of the League of Nations and was dedicated to the question of
the role of film in education.327 Like all members of the CICI, her dedication to peace
was a product of her life experiences.
She was born Laura Clifford Barney 30 November 1879 in Cincinnati, Ohio to the
prominent Barney family and her mother, Alice Pike Barney, was an artist of some note.
Along with her sister, she was sent to a French boarding school in 1886. After a brief
return to study in the United States, she moved back to Paris with her family in 1898 and
spent most of her life in France. While continuing her studies in Paris, at the turn of the
century she met Canadian Bahá’í May Ellis Maxwell Bolles and converted to the Bahá’í
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faith. Barney’s lifelong commitment to women’s rights and international peace
contributed to her immediate acceptance of the Bahá’í teachings. Bahá’í was formed in
Persia in the mid-1800s and emphasized the unity of religions and humanity. The faith’s
emphasis on unity in diversity, which included racial and cultural acceptance, appealed to
Barney. In 1911, Laura Barney married a Frenchman of Jewish descent, Hippolyte
Dreyfus, and they took on the married name of Dreyfus-Barney. She was fluent in
English, French, and also Persian, which was essential in her work for the Bahá’í faith,
not only through personal relationships with Persians, but through translation as well.
From the time of her conversion she was an ardent supporter of the Bahá’í faith as
well as a philanthropist. Laura and Hippolyte traveled to the Middle East many times
together, before and after they were married. She made numerous trips to the prison city
Akka, Palestine (now Acre, Israel) to visit with the Baha’i Master, where he was confined
due to religious persecution in Persia.328 She spent many months over the next several
years in Persia in the house of Abdu'l-Bahá, the son of the founder of the faith, where she
studied Persian and was one of the Master’s few allowed visitors. She and her husband
hosted Abdu'l-Bahá in Paris, traveled with him in the United States to support the spread
of Bahá’í in the West and visited him in Persia up until his death in 1921. During her
1904 visit, Dreyfus-Barney also arranged for Abdu'l-Bahá’s secretaries to record answers
to her questions, mainly relating to philosophy and Christian theology, which, with the
help of her husband, she made into the book Some Answered Questions (1908). Her
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writings on the faith remain influential to this day. Her quiet, reserved nature was much
admired by fellow Bahá’í.329
During the First World War, Dreyfus-Barney served in the American Ambulance
Corps (1914-15), American Red Cross (in France 1918-19) and after the war worked
extensively with the League of Nations and later United Nations. Like many interwar
women active in international organizations, Dreyfus-Barney did not have children,
though she strongly emphasized the importance of motherhood in her work. Her husband
Hippolyte passed away in December of 1928. After his death, and that of her mother only
three years later, she threw herself into her work for Baha’i and world peace.330 Towards
the goal of fostering better understanding between people she formed, and served on, the
League’s Liaison Committee of Major International Organizations. Additionally, she was
also the only woman appointed to serve on the League’s Sub-Committee of Experts on
Education, starting in 1926. She also worked with the IECI to organize its first congress
for women in 1934. In addition, she was a member of the Advisory Committee of the
League of Nations on Teaching and the French Committee on Intellectual Cooperation.
Laura Dreyfus-Barney, in her role as ICW liaison and as a member of the CICI,
worked extensively in the area of film studies and, due to her religious background, was
very concerned about the moral censorship of film. In 1930, she held the position of
representative of the International Council of Women on the International Commission of
Educational Cinematography and Social Education. During a meeting, she asked the
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other delegates to make known the views of the organization they represented in order to
increase international understanding.331 The commission expressed their support of the
initiative to suppress custom barriers for educational films, in large part because of the
role film could play in increasing understanding between peoples, but the commission
also wanted to be sure that the producers were aware of the possible negative effects of
film on children.332 In the same year, while serving as treasurer on a French commission
of the same topic, she took the opportunity to call the commission’s attention to the
necessity of a “clearing house” to gather national views and information about cinema.
She thought it was imperative the CICI serve as a point of contact for international
organizations studying film.333
Dreyfus-Barney considered moral censorship a very serious matter and actively
campaigned for women’s involvement. While the ICW had been addressing this topic for
several years, the IECI provided coverage in the IREC beginning with the Conference of
the Cinema and Broadcasting Commission held in 1931. This conference, they noted,
was under the “spiritual leadership of Mme Laura Dreyfus Barney, who truly personifies
the highest conception of spiritual life, combined with the highly developed common
sense of practical existence. She revealed to us the infinite possibilities for feminine
action which the Cinema presents.”334 With this, the IECI formally introduced one of the
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moral censorship movement’s most ardent supporters, notably highlighting her sense of
practicality—an ideal they held in high esteem in the preface to the volume to the
December 1931 IREC volume.
In that volume, Dreyfus-Barney stated the most public presentation of her views.
In it, she reported on the results of the ICW’s conference about film held in Rome and
hosted by the IECI. She noted that conferences had been held in Geneva (1927), London
(1929), and Vienna (1930), but it was not until it was held in Rome and “ripened by
experience, study and discussion” and with the support of the IECI, that the ICW was
able to formally set out a program of action to address the problems that the cinema
posed.335 For instance, as president of the commission discussing censorship, DreyfusBarney supported a resolution suggesting that films with historical inaccuracies provide
subtitles before the start of the film listing what areas were falsely presented.336
The following year, Dreyfus-Barney called attention to a mother’s role as censor
in a 1932 IREC article “What Woman Can Offer the Cinema.”337 Echoing the IECI’s
argument, she felt women were most qualified to assess the effects of film on children
and thought they played a crucial role in censorship commissions. She added: “I appeal
also to mothers of families, to teachers, to all women in fact who according to their
circumstances can contribute to a work which, if well directed, will be a great help for

Laura Dreyfus-Barney, “Considerations on ‘The International Conference of Cinema and
Broadcasting’ held by The International Council of Women,” IREC, Vol. 3, No. 12 (December,
1931): 1071.
335

336

Elsa Matz, “Film Censorship”, IREC, Vol. 3, No. 12 (December, 1931): 1121.

Laura Dreyfus-Barney, “What Woman Can Offer the Cinema,” IREC, Vol. 4, No. 6 (June,
1932): 471. Emphasis in original.
337

167

happiness in our houses, for social tranquility and a coming closer together of the
peoples.” In an editorial note reminiscent of Eva Elie’s contributions relating to children
viewing war films, the IECI added that a “woman who is conscious of her responsibilities
is always on the side of the man who in the cinematographic field pursues educational
and constructive aims.”338 Although in support of Dreyfus-Barney’s views, the IECI was
quick to emphasize the role of women as assistants, rather than leaders, in the
development of cinematography.
Dreyfus-Barney disagreed with this sentiment, especially in the area of the
technical film. “Women’s work at the present day,” she wrote in 1934, “is practically
identical in extent with that of men.” Indeed, she felt that women’s interest in film rivaled
that of men’s.339 She added that the “important part taken by women in the
cinematograph world seems to show that they have a call for this field of social
activity.”340 She felt it was the mother’s duty to serve as censor and to prevent girls from
seeing “love pictures,” but instead, “see good films exalting the sentiments of
motherhood and sacrifice.” She did not say boys should be prevented from seeing
specific types of films, but should be encouraged to see “pictures where noble sentiments
are exalted.”341 In many ways, her views aligned with those of the IECI, but she did not
agree with the marginalized role for women proposed by the institute. Indeed, there was
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quite a difference between the IECI’s expectations and what women felt they could and
already were contributing. In her role as ICW liaison, Dreyfus-Barney herself took a role
outside the “ideal,” thereby challenging the IECI’s formulation of women’s contribution.
There were areas of agreement between the IECI and Dreyfus-Barney. Like the
IECI, she also appealed to women’s sense of patriotism. Just as Eva Elie had eventually
realized, Dreyfus-Barney noted that viewing war films did not promote pacifist
sentiment: “war films, for instance, do not give the results one might suspect. Despite the
cruelty of death and the sufferings of the solders, the children, show in their reactions an
admiration for the strong.” Similarly, she found the violence in gangster and cowboy
films to be similarly delightful to children, though pointed out that they had a “bad
influence” on young minds.342 She closed: “The woman’s task in the matter of
educational cinema is a serious one. It is an imperious duty which women must face, for
often enough the future of a person or a nation depends on education.”343 Dreyfus-Barney
called women to action not only on the grounds of taking up their natural roles as
mothers, but also appealed to their patriotism.
In an article titled “The Cinema and Peace,” published in the April 1934 IREC
issue, Dreyfus-Barney reaffirmed her belief in the power of the cinema to encourage
greater international understanding and goodwill, while also noting that with the advent
of the talking film it became increasingly a national tool “when the word began to assume
an equal place with the image.” This was a danger to international understanding and she
pointed out that the ICW had suggested in 1931 that films must avoid misrepresenting
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other nations and cultures. She gave examples of how films had aroused ill feeling,
arguing that the same that was done by the CICI for textbooks must be done for films:
“expurgate them, compile them with every care, and supply them with judicious
comments.”344 Additionally, she encouraged her readers to share films that supported
international understanding while at the same time reporting to the press films that were
“anti-international” and stirred up “evil and revengeful feelings.”345 In her final IREC
article, “Cinema and the Protection of Infancy,” Dreyfus-Barney continued in a similar
vein, once again calling for increased participation from women not only in formal
censorship roles, but to be aware and active as moral censors for their family.
Dreyfus-Barney continued to work on questions of film censorship after the IECI
formally closed in 1937and was very active in the peace movement. In the French Légion
d’Honneur she was named chevalier in 1925 and officer in 1937. Unlike other CICI
workers, discussed in the following chapter, Dreyfus-Barney’s efforts did not go
unnoticed and her personal wealth allowed her to weather the storm of another World
War. As a US citizen, she was forced to leave France after the outbreak of the Second
World War.346 However, during the war she was a delegate on the French National
Committee on Women to the Commission of Racial Affairs and continued her intellectual
cooperation work in the United States as a special member to the American National
Committee of Intellectual Cooperation. She continued her work under the auspices of the
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United Nations and was active in peace movements until her death in 1974 at the age of
94 in Paris.
Unlike Eva Elie (discussed in the previous chapter in relation to anti-war film),
Dreyfus-Barney called for women’s involvement and promoted their roles as moral
censors, but she did not abandon her emphasis on the power of film to promote
international goodwill. She did not agree that war was just, and based on Baha’i beliefs of
universal unity of mankind, she continued to pursue pacifist goals even after the Second
World War. Indeed, compared to Elie, it is likely that Dreyfus-Barney’s more extensive
involvement in international organizations beyond the IECI was central to her continuing
commitment to pacifism. Notably, Dreyfus-Barney fundamentally disagreed with the
IECI about the role of women in film studies. She felt their work was equal to that of men
and did not see them relegated to supportive roles, but as important leaders. Her version
of moral censorship departed significantly from the IECI’s views, which was illustrated
in their need to add qualifying—and often patronizing—editorial comments to her
articles. However, the fact that these articles were even published underscores that the
Fascist Italian state, though pursuing its own agenda, still left room for dissent in the
IREC.

Conclusion
As this chapter has argued, the IECI was fascist, but still effectively provided an
international platform to discuss film and women used this international venue to insert
their voice into the debate over moral censorship. The IECI felt it was essential to
promote the involvement of women in the formulation of children’s views towards
patriotic warfare. In contrast to Eva Elie, Dreyfus-Barney’s participation in the IREC
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revealed that not all readers were influenced by the IECI’s fascist propaganda efforts.
Indeed, though she disagreed with the IECI on the issue of women’s influence in film
studies and continued to support pacifist uses of moral censorship, her articles were still
published in the IREC. This suggests the important platform it provided for women to
debate the issue of film’s influence on children, which opened up for them precisely
because the issue was of special concern for the Italian institute. Indeed, the venue was
still open enough to allow for voices of dissent. While they welcomed participation of
women in the IREC, the IECI felt the best way women could participate was in their role
as mothers. Dreyfus-Barney argued that women could lead on committees, as directors,
and as important members of a wider discussion of film and its impact. There was a
difference between expectation and practice. Indeed, the roles women actually played,
and the ideology of the IECI did not align.
Film scholar Richard Maltby argued in 1999 that the IREC has been “condemned
to obscurity not only by its present scarcity but also the arcane nature of its content. It is
seldom that even the most dedicated scholar can unearth even a footnote to its output.”347
However, while studies of the IREC may be scarce, this chapter has illustrated that, at the
very least, the journal provides an important archive for assessing women’s roles in the
development of film studies and the debate over its effect on children. What have also,
sadly, fallen into obscurity are the educational films IREC reviewed and collected.
Possibly all of these films, and certainly many, were lost in the Second World War.
Unless these films are sitting in a basement or attic waiting to be liberated, researchers of
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the IECI and educational films used by the League must be content with studying how
these films were discussed at the time.
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Chapter Six: Celebrities and Hidden Histories
“I became a peon,” Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral wrote of her experience
working for the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) to fellow South
American writer Victoria Ocampo.348 Mistral was anything but a peon in her other work,
but she was certainly made to feel one within the context of the interwar intellectual
cooperation movement. She was an internationally renowned writer and had been central
in setting up a new educational system in Mexico. The marginalization she experienced
within the IIIC was significant and for someone so widely recognized, likely difficult.
She was not the only woman to suffer from marginalization within the International
Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (CICI) and its institute. Women were not
marginalized in interwar peace work, but they were certainly limited in the roles they
could take within the CICI. Most of the women discussed in this dissertation were quite
prominent, yet marginalized within this committee. This chapter explores this
marginalization by providing comparative case studies of both celebrity and “silent” CICI
workers. Analysis of these women working with the CICI provides a glimpse into what it
was like to take on international cooperative work with men, many of whom did not
appreciate what they brought to the League’s intellectual cooperation movement.
The work of intellectual cooperation relied on the labor of individuals with
multiple transnational connections, but this reliance in few cases led to public
acknowledgement. Many of those taking up the work of intellectual cooperation led
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transnational lives that saw them not only traveling extensively, but also actively
engaging with those from other countries and developing life-long international
relationships as a result. Many members, even those without the political prestige of
Gilbert Murray and James T. Shotwell—but rather the everyday workers—led such
transnational lives. For instance, Temperance Smith, mentioned in the first chapter in
relation to her Master’s thesis written about the CICI, used her research of this
international organization to launch a transnational career. After the publication of her
1935 thesis, she left the United States to work for sixteen months in Europe, including for
the National Council for the Prevention of War in Geneva. Her research and transnational
labor led to the development of personal relationships with those within the CICI in Paris
and Rome and eventually a position as executive secretary of the United States National
Committee in 1938.349 The success of executive secretaries within national committees
hinged on the health of their connections. For example, Smith’s successor in this role, Dr.
Edith Ware, utilized the extensive network of contacts she had established while
preparing her 1934 and 1938 surveys of US international relations.350 As executive
secretary, she used these contacts, including those in South America, to help guide the
US National Committee in their attempts to continue the work of intellectual cooperation
during the Second World War without the leadership and centralized institute Europe had
provided.351 However, while the international connections of these women were central
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to the work of intellectual cooperation, their personal labor has been, at best, a footnote in
the history of the CICI. They led transnational lives, but accounts of their labor remain
hidden histories.
In the case of the interwar intellectual cooperation movement, such hidden
histories include not only non-European countries and how they maneuvered within
hegemonic control, but also the work of so many of the lesser- or un-known women who
took up the work. As this dissertation has argued, education and moral censorship were
both central to the debate surrounding disarmament. At the time, moral issues were
considered the realm of women and especially mothers. Women’s traditional role as
moral censors opened up room in international debates in the interwar period and women
took advantage of assumptions of female authority in these areas to take part in CICI
moral disarmament and educational initiatives. However, this expansion of relative
influence has not translated into increased presence in the historical narrative. This
chapter attempts to address this by providing a glimpse into how the CICI intersected
with the lives of South American poets Victorio Ocampo and Gabriela Mistral, including
how Mistral viewed her role as a “peon” working for an organization without a vested
interest in South America. This chapter will also assess two extensive case studies: one
illustrating the work and lives of celebrity figures in the CICI, Marie Curie and Albert
Einstein, and the life of a “silent” worker, Margarete Rothbarth. In addition to assessing
the issue of marginalization, these case studies will illustrate the main theme woven
through this dissertation: the limits of internationalism due in large part to national
agendas and tensions.
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Certainly few readers will be unfamiliar with scientists Marie Curie and Albert
Einstein. However, even these well-known figures are not remembered for their work in
interwar international cooperation and this aspect of their biography will be addressed.
This case study will also serve as contrast to the second one related to how the CICI
influenced the life course of German Jewish historian Margarete Rothbarth. Compared to
Marie Curie, Rothbarth’s work went largely unacknowledged and the options facing
Rothbarth at the outbreak of the Second World War contrasted sharply with her fellow
CICI member and German Jew Albert Einstein. Unlike Einstein, she did not have the
prestige to leverage herself out of the dire situation caused by the threat of Nazi Germany
and its policy of revoking German Jewish citizenship. This chapter will give voice to
these hidden histories.

The Women of Intellectual Cooperation
Intellectual cooperation opened up space for the engagement of culturally elite
women in transnational intellectual circles.352 For instance, in one of the few studies of
the role women played in interwar intellectual cooperation, historian Joyce Goodman
used the example of Virginia Gildersleeves to illustrate the involvement of women in the
CICI and in the formation of the concept of the "international mind," which was central
to moral disarmament. Gildersleeves was Dean of Barnard College of New York from
1911 to 1947 as well as president of the International Federation of University Women
(IFUW) from 1924 to 1926 and 1936 to 1939. She also served on the American National
Committee of Intellectual Cooperation. It was Gildersleeves’ Columbia University tutor
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American Nicholas Murray Butler who originally coined the term "international mind."
Gildersleeves and fellow CICI member, British classical scholar Alfred Zimmern, refined
the idea in the interwar period. The development of an international mindset centered on
an understanding and familiarity of other peoples with the goal of promoting
understanding between nations. Gildersleeves described it as "the mind which accepts as
normal international co-operation rather than competition, and friendly understanding
rather than hostile suspicion."353 This, of course, was the same goal that underpinned
moral disarmament efforts. Gildersleeves also had a clear idea of the challenges that the
development of this sentiment faced. As Goodman explained: "She saw some barriers to
the international mind resulting from ignorance of facts and misconceptions, and
considered many to be deep-rooted and psychological. She considered 'real' international
understanding to be difficult because of racial psychology which comprised different
underlying ideas, traditions and values held by different peoples.”354 As this dissertation
has discussed, though CICI members recognized the challenges national and cultural
tensions posed, the scope of intellectual cooperation was still limited by Great Power
assumptions of superiority and an unwillingness to move beyond formulations of “the
other.”
This separation based on “othering” is a familiar theme in literature, and, indeed,
in human thought; self-identity is often formulated in direct relation to what one is not.
For instance, in his seminal work, Edward Said argued that Orientalism imposed limits
upon writers to the extent that even the most imaginative among them were constrained
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both in what they were able to experience or say about the Orient. The reason for this lay
in the basic structure of dichotomy between the familiar, or the West, and the strange, or
the East.355 While Said focused specifically on relations between East and West, the same
process was at work in the case of the Great Powers and less influential countries.
Though there were exceptions, such as Marie Curie, most of the female participants in the
CICI movement took on work that went largely unnoticed and many have fallen into
relative obscurity. It is important to note that women did take part in the CICI from
across the globe, though their participation was limited by cultural expectations in their
home countries as well as the exclusive nature of the Euro-centric League of Nations
(LN).
Women outside the United States and Europe participated, but were marginalized
not only due to their status as women, but also because of their nationality. For example,
South American writers Gabriela Mistral and Victoria Ocampo both took part in the
intellectual cooperation movement, but little has been written about their role and work.
Gabriela Mistral was a Chilean poet, journalist and educator and was a recipient of the
1945 Nobel Prize in Literature. She served as the representative for Latin America in the
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation from 1925 until it closed in 1939.
Argentinian Victoria Ocampo was a prolific writer, founded the literary journal Sur, and
was voted to serve on the CICI in 1939—just months before the start of the Second
World War.
After learning of Ocampo’s appointment, Mistral, who referred to the League of
Nations as an “Institute of Babel,” wrote Ocampo to explain the difference between the
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Institute and the Committee. The former, she explained, “only carries out what the large
committee plans.” She hoped Ocampo would share her experience, but argued that the
LN, CICI and its Institute were not very concerned with Latin America. “I don’t think
that these three organizations have done anything for Latin America, beyond the
‘Collection of Ibero-American Classics,’” she explained. She had been instrumental in
establishing the collection while she worked at the Institute. She continued, using
Ocampo’s nickname:
After that, Votoya, I did nothing more: that was six to eight years ago (I’ve been
in Europe for fourteen). Because I saw that whatever was of interest here didn’t
serve our America… I became a peon—writing articles for newspapers. It strikes
me as a very bad thing that it’s never occurred to them to find other real, effective
ways of actually giving back to South America all or part of the quantity of
money that South America has given to the League of Nations. Those monies
have only served European culture. You’ll be happy, not me. Now, since my
country isn’t in the League, I don’t feel like I have much right to appeal to them
for work on our behalf. It’s your turn now, Votoya.356
Though Chile withdrew from the League in June 1938, Mistral had continued to work for
the IIIC.
In addition to pointing out just how little the League and CICI had done for Latin
America, Mistral also eluded to the lack of women’s representation within the CICI:
I’m a sermon giver today. You don’t like sermonizing or emphasis, because both
things are prophetic. But I believe in prophetic speech…still. I believe in
Cassandra, I believe in Electra and in the charming Antigone. Reread them and
accept them, even though they aren’t Christian. For me, they’re more alive than
the Intellectual Cooperation and its choice group of old men…”357
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To Mistral, strong mythological women provided more hope and vigor than the
inspiration of the CICI and its “old men.” Even after working at the IIIC for thirteen
years, she felt her labor had not amounted to much and her efforts to support Latin
American interests had yielded very little fruit. In an institution dominated by European
interests where few women beyond Marie Curie were given credit for their work, making
such a change would have been difficult. Indeed, these women were doubly marginalized
due to their status not only as women, but also as South Americans. There were
exceptions for this marginalization of women, though not in the South American context.
Marie Curie was the most prominent exception to this marginalization.

CICI Celebrities: Marie Curie and Albert Einstein
Through Hendrik Lorentz, future second chair of the CICI, the two most famous
members of the committee became acquainted. This case study focuses on the friendship
of Marie Curie and Albert Einstein to illustrate the deep tensions between nations that
continually obstructed CICI work, as well as provide a point of comparison for assessing
the work of lesser-known members. Marie Curie and Albert Einstein continued a close
relationship for almost 25 years after they met for the first time in 1909 until Curie’s
death in 1934. Curie (1867-1934) was twelve years Einstein’s senior (1879-1955). Before
Einstein published his first major work in 1905, the Curies had already discovered radium
in 1898 and been awarded a Nobel Prize in 1903. Einstein and Marie Curie’s personal life
challenges provide an excellent case study for the national tensions that plagued the
interwar period and the work of the CICI. In fact, these same tensions cemented their
relationship and drew them together. Curie, who was Polish by birth, worked for most of
her life in Paris and was embraced by the French public for much of this time. An

181

important exception was a period from 1911 until the First World War after her affair
with French physicist Paul Langevin was launched into a scandal by the press. This left
her with an understandable aversion to the press. Einstein’s precarious position as a
German Jew placed him under similar scrutiny and, like all German Jews in the interwar
period, called into question his citizenship status. Their shared condition as
“foreigners”—both loved and at times denigrated—in their resident lands, cemented their
friendship.
Like many of those in the CICI, the First World War transformed Curie and her
political views. During the First World War, Curie used her developing expertise in Xray technology to aid soldiers in France and supported Poland in any way she could,
spending much of the money she received for her second Nobel Prize on the French war
effort. Her work in a mobile X-ray van helping injured soldiers effectively launched her
back into the good graces of the French public, which once again claimed her as their
own. She wrote Langevin about her radiology service and that she was “resolved to put
all my strength at the service of my adopted country, since I cannot do anything for my
unfortunate native country just now, bathed as it is in blood after more than a century of
suffering.”358 She saw the horrors of war working in radiological outposts:
To hate the very idea of war, it ought to be sufficient to see once what I have seen
so many times, all over these years: men and boys brought to the advanced
ambulance in a mixture of mud and blood, many of them dying of their injuries
and many others still recovering but slowly, in the space of months, with pain and
suffering.359
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However, she did recognize the role of war in advancing the application of science, as
with the “purely scientific” discoveries of radium applied to medicine in the form of Xrays.
Even after the horrors of war, she continued to stress the importance of
detachment in science, but her focus, which had been almost entirely centered on her
scientific work, began to shift. “Curie was dedicated to a higher cause and was part of a
community of disinterested researchers,” her biographer Sarah Dry wrote. “But at the
same time, she perceived herself as powerless—and thus licensed to make alliances
where she could.” This powerlessness stemmed from many years of struggling as a
woman in a male-dominated field, as well as the precarious position as émigré in a
country that had recently scorned her because of an affair. This feeling contributed to an
important transformation. Dry argued: “Curie’s battles with the establishment, her years
without a proper laboratory or academic job, the prejudice against her as a woman and a
Pole, even her experiences with reluctant French officials at the start of the war had made
her, in spite of herself, into a political animal.”360 However, she was loathe to relinquish
her title of “pure scientist” and rejected a number of requests to sign even the most
inoffensive manifestos calling for peace.361
Part of her refusal was due to her view of social justice. Curie did not believe
blame for the First World War was equal among all the countries involved. While her
long-term friendship with Einstein illustrates that she did not hold all Germans
responsible, she shunned German intellectuals who had supported the First World War.
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In 1914, some 93 Germans signed the “Manifesto to the Civilized World,” which was
written to justify the German war position. Einstein refused to sign and, along with two
German peers, created his own manifesto in response entitled “The Manifesto of
Europeans.” It called for a quick end to the conflict and urged fellow intellectuals to help
guarantee “the conditions of the peace [do] not become the source of future wars.”362 The
idea of educated individuals making connections as a way to prevent war underpinned the
efforts made by the CICI. However, this did not mean that Curie was open to working
with those who had supported war against her adopted country. After the war, if a
German scientist asked to meet with Curie she would make inquiries to see if they had
signed the “Manifesto to the Civilized World,” and if they had, she would refuse to meet
with them.363 As in the case of the wider CICI, Curie’s inclusivity only stretched so far.
While she shunned those who had supported the First World War, this did not
mean she agreed with signing documents that spoke out against war in general. For
instance, when asked in 1919 to sign an anti-war manifesto she refused, noting that
agreement in the group would only be imaginary. “The difficulty I have with the form of
your appeal,” she wrote, “is that it does not require the signers to be in agreement on
certain elementary principles of international and social justice.”364 However, after the
war, she became increasingly leftist and her views towards taking on political roles began
to change. Only a few short years later she would advocate just such a commitment to
peace in the form of the CICI.
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It was Curie's relationship with American journalist Marie Mattingly Meloney,
editor of The Delineator, an American women’s magazine, which opened the way for
joining the CICI. Meloney organized a fund drive to raise money to buy radium for
Curie’s research, which included a tour of the US. "Before meeting the journalist,”
biographer Shelley Emling wrote, “Marie abhorred any kind of publicity.”365 As a French
newspaper editor remarked: "She, who handles daily a particle of radium more dangerous
than lightning, was afraid when confronted by the necessity of appearing before the
public.”366
By the time the CICI formed in 1922, Curie was famous for her avoidance of the
press, which was in no small part caused by her experience during the 1911 affair. She
was also selective about who warranted her time, further bolstering her reputation as a
recluse. Looking back on her mother’s life, Curie’s daughter Irene explained:
The fact that my mother was not fond of socializing and did not seek to consort
with influential people is often regarded as evidence of modesty. I tend to believe
the opposite. She had a very precise idea of her own merits and did not consider it
an honour to meet titled people or government ministers. I think she was very
glad to have had the opportunity to meet Rudyard Kipling, but being presented to
the Queen of Romania was a matter of complete indifference to her.367
That Curie felt the CICI was worth the time she valued so dearly speaks to the faith she
placed in intellectual cooperation, not only for what it could do to help science, but to
support her political view of social justice. Though her distaste for the press did not
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change, and her estimation of who warranted her time remained selective, she did take on
a public role when she accepted the nomination to the CICI.
While Curie had previously avoided all work that would take away from her
scientific endeavor and remained politically neutral, she did make an exception for
intellectual cooperation. Curie’s daughter Eve claimed that her mother’s work for the
CICI was Curie’s “only real infidelity to scientific research."368 Though she did not seek
out the nomination, she did accept the invitation when the CICI asked her to join in 1922.
She was unanimously voted into the committee under the chairmanship of Henri Bergson
and was particularly interested in expanding scientific collaboration and sharing scientific
resources. Although Curie refused to patent her own findings, she supported scientific
copyright and the establishment of international funds for laboratories to finance their
research. “I believe international work is a heavy task,” she wrote, “but that it is
nevertheless indispensable to go through an apprenticeship in it, at the cost of many
efforts and a real spirit of sacrifice: however imperfect it may be, the work of Geneva has
a grandeur that deserves support.”369 Curie and Einstein’s mutual friend Hendrik Lorentz
already served on the committee, and Einstein also joined at Curie’s prompting.
However, as Emling noted, “Einstein's on-again-off-again membership was draped in
controversy—with Marie caught in the middle."370 Einstein’s revolving in-then-out
membership was caused not only by the realities of national and ethnic tension in the
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interwar period, but also due to Einstein’s ambivalent view of the League of Nations and
personal conflicts with other member in the CICI.
Before joining the CICI, Einstein was already a target for criticism in the German
press and this was exacerbated by his association with the League. At Curie’s invitation,
Einstein visited Paris to give a lecture at the Sorbonne in April of 1922. While she had
successfully convinced the university to invite him, it caused an uproar, with anti-Semites
actively protesting and thirty members of the French Physical Society—a mix of antiSemites and anti-German members—threatening to leave in protest during his talk. The
French press wrote strongly against it due to Einstein’s nationality, and—because
sentiment was so negatively aroused—Einstein had to be secretly taken over the border
into Paris. Attendance was limited to only a few trusted individuals.371 Though she noted
the protest, Curie strongly believed the lecture was important enough that they should
continue such ventures in spite of difficulties. "The avoidance of just these kinds of
conflicts,” she wrote, “was precisely why the International Committee of Intellectual
Cooperation had been set up in the first place. In fact, the committee’s overriding purpose
was to bring together intellectuals of different nations who had been isolated by the
war."372 While Einstein’s visit was lauded as a success in the international media, both
the French and German national press strongly criticized it. The French press wrote in
terms of condemnation for inviting the enemy into the capital, and German nationalists
portrayed Einstein as “a Jewish traitor to Germany.”373
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Such recriminations in the German press only increased after Einstein accepted a
position on the CICI. Einstein initially turned down the invitation because he felt the
League did not have clearly defined goals and did not align with his pacifist sentiments.
However, during his visit to Paris, Curie and French philosopher Henri Bergson
successfully convinced him to change his mind. As Einstein wrote in acceptance: “No
one, in our era, should refuse to participate in work to bring about international
cooperation.”374 Before the first meeting, however, he once again changed his mind and
resigned. In June of 1922, his friend and Germany’s foreign minister Walter Rathenau,
who was Jewish, was assassinated and Einstein also received death threats. Some of these
threats specifically mentioned his involvement in the League as traitorous activity.375
The following month, League Secretary General Eric Drummond, Gilbert Murray
and Curie all wrote urging him to change his mind. “It is precisely because dangerous and
prejudicial current of opinion do exist that it is necessary to fight them,” Curie wrote. “I
think that your friend Rathenau, whom I judge to have been an honest man, and whose
sad fate I regret, would have encouraged you to make an effort at peaceful intellectual
collaboration. Surely you can change your mind.”376 He did change his mind and
rejoined, but in the fall of 1922 resigned a second time and refused to attend another
meeting after the LN did not respond to French and Belgian troops taking Germany's
Ruhr district. In a letter to German pacifist newspaper Die Friedenswart, he wrote
scathingly of the League, commenting that not only did it not “embody the ideal of
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international organization, but actually discredits such an ideal."377 He explained to Curie
that he felt the League was simply a tool of power politics that held only the illusion of an
objective stance. Curie agreed the institution was not perfect, but pointed out that since
all organizations were comprised of humans they therefore had no hope of perfection.
Still, she thought the League had a real chance to make a difference, writing in January
1924: “it is the first attempt at an international understanding without which civilization
is threatened with disappearing.”378 At Curie’s prompting, he rejoined in May 1924,
though his seven-year membership continued to be draped in controversy centered on a
conflict with the CICI chair Henri Bergson.
This controversy had roots that stretched several years back, but began
increasingly to affect the reputation of the committee in the mid-1920s. In April 1922,
Einstein began a debate with Bergson regarding the theory of relativity that devolved
over the years into a bitter argument. Not only were they debating their views of
relativity, but the battle was of even broader significance, pitting science against
philosophy, with each side having its own group of intellectual backers. For two figures
publicly linked to an institution with the expressed goal of creating understanding
between intellectuals as a model for nations to follow, the open feud was a heavy blow to
the public image of the CICI.379 In an article studying Bergson’s and Einstein’s
disagreement, historian Jimena Canales argued that intellectual cooperation was a “failed
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experiment” as a result of their very public and bitter disagreement.380 Though there is no
denying that such conflicts negatively affected the CICI’s reputation, this seems a rather
hasty judgment to make when at the time the CICI was in its infancy.
Additionally, since Einstein was one of the main figures—and he was, by all
accounts, both charming and infuriating in equal measure—it does not give an accurate
view of what were generally cordial, if not always particularly warm, interactions within
the committee. Indeed, though this dissertation argues there was an undercurrent of
distrust within the committee based on competing national agendas, to dismiss the
movement as a “failed experiment” based on one, or even several, instances of personal
conflicts would be unwise. Any such group would have similar interpersonal conflicts,
and though we can make broader claims based on these disagreements, they should not
be the main basis of judgment regarding the effectiveness of the CICI.
In 1930, Curie pondered in a diary that, from the time she had first met him,
Einstein struck her as “the funniest man,” who was continually obsessed with relativity
and did not seem to get along well with the other scientists of the CICI. This was partly
due to his on-again-off-again early membership, the bitter dispute with Bergson, and his
annoyance that the committee did not focus enough of its time on political issues. Despite
this, in 1930 he still remarked on the League’s tenth anniversary: “I am rarely
enthusiastic about what the League has accomplished, or not accomplished, but I am
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always thankful that it exists."381 Though publicly critical of the League and the CICI,
Einstein still provided the organization considerable prestige.
By 1931, Einstein’s renown had reached such a point that, while his position as a
Jew in Germany became increasingly precarious, other nations courted him, especially
Great Britain and the United States. Gilbert Murray wrote Einstein on 31 March 1933
urging him to consider taking a position at Oxford.382 The United States National
Committee of Intellectual Cooperation set up a special sub-committee devoted to
addressing issues related to Einstein’s visa. Indeed, James T. Shotwell and the US
Committee helped him secure a visa in spite of resistance in the country, such as
allegations made by the Woman Patriotic Corporation that he was inadmissible under
immigration laws.383 Einstein was lecturing in the United States when Adolf Hitler came
to power in 1933 and, after considering an offer to settle in England, Einstein decided to
immigrate to the US. He took a position at Princeton University—despite the common
practice of Jewish quotas that limited the number of Jewish professors in the US—and
became a US citizen in 1940. As this chapter will discuss below, not all German Jewish
members of the CICI were nearly as fortunate.
After an on-and-off membership and relative lack of interest in the committee,
Einstein did eventually permanently leave the CICI. Though Curie had been instrumental
in each case of Einstein’s reversal of decision, she was not able to change his mind after
his seven-year term ended in 1931. His repeated invitations and intermittent stints on the
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committee effectively illustrate some of the inter-personal conflicts within the committee
and how continuing friction between nations affected not only CICI membership affected
the degree to which the committee could achieve its goals. Einstein ended his CICI
membership in 1931—on grounds that his term had expired—and refused attempts
urging him to reconsider. He later called the CICI “the most ineffectual enterprise with
which I have been associated.”384 Part of the reason for this was his view of the wider
failures of the League, but also because of the advisory nature of the committee’s work.
The CICI was essentially a clearinghouse that affected change or suggested areas of
change on a broad scale. This would have contrasted sharply with the type of scientific,
result-driven work he took on elsewhere. Curie, however, who had a very clear view of
what was worthy of her time, continued to serve for another few years. Indeed, she served
until shortly before her death on 4 July 1934 from overexposure to radiation. Though
Einstein had viewed the CICI as ineffectual, it was Curie’s only “infidelity to science” for
a twelve-year span of her life.
The value each CICI member placed on its work varied, as did the opportunities
open to them as war tensions mounted in Europe. The care put into ensuring Einstein
could successfully immigrate to the US was more the exception than the rule for CICI
workers. Writing to the US National Committee in 1933, Gilbert Murray suggested a plan
to help refugees by placing German intellectuals in open academic positions in other
countries. Though he was careful to point out that his plan was neither “pro-Jewish” or
“pro-Communist,” when Shotwell forwarded the plan to US universities it was still taken
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as such.385 For instance, Ernest Martin Hopkins, the president of Dartmouth College
replied to Shotwell saying in no uncertain terms that he would not fill positions with
Germans at the expense of struggling American academics. He had completed such a
project after the First World War with a “missionary zeal” but found that without
exception the German professors had turned out to be “trouble makers.” Noting that in
this case those seeking positions would be “preponderantly Semitic,” he was even more
loath to do so. “I feel as little inclined to add any Jews to our faculty circle as I do any
Germans. In fact, my present attitude is definitely God forbid that we should do both.” He
continued, after apologizing for such a “blast of opinion” noting that on the matter “I
think that I join the isolationists, and prefer to let Europe take care of its own troubles.”386
While the dean of the University of Minnesota, Guy Stanton Ford, did not dismiss the
idea as Hopkins had, he did not directly offer any positions at his university, instead
suggesting that a fund might be set up to “take care of one or two men here or there about
the country under proper circumstances.”387 He did not explain what such “proper
circumstances” would entail and he notably earmarked the hypothetical positions for
male professors. In a time marked by anti-Semitism, Einstein’s celebrity status provided
opportunities for him unavailable to most Jews, even within the comparatively elite CICI.
In fact, though Einstein was publicly critical of both the League and the CICI, members
of the CICI, such as Murray and Shotwell, helped smooth the way for Einstein to
immigrate. Presumably, faced with a similar situation, Curie would have also garnered
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the active support of the CICI and its members. This was not the case for all workers or
members, however.
CICI Silent Worker: Margarete Rothbarth
In 1939, while French IIIC director Henri Bonnet had taken a plane “at the last
moment” before the war started and also found refuge in the United States during the
war, those who worked under him were not necessarily as fortunate. For instance,
German IIIC employee Peter Lang received devastating news that his family had been
interned in Nazi Germany.388 Another IIIC worker, Dr. Margarete Rothbarth, while not
subject to internment, was left impoverished in Switzerland in spite of repeated pleas for
assistance to the CICI. This section will present a case study of Rothbarth as a “silent”
worker who did not benefit from the celebrity status of Curie and Einstein, with tragic
results.
In 1926, Frenchman and IIIC director Julien Luchaire began pursuing closer
relations with German academics for the work of intellectual cooperation. These talks led
not only to the formation of a German national committee of intellectual cooperation, but
also the appointment of German historian Margarete Rothbarth by the Prussian Ministry
of Culture to deputy chief of the IIIC in 1926. The IIIC contracted her to remain in this
position through 1940 and she lived and worked in Paris throughout her term. In addition
to laboring to further the textbook editing initiative, she worked with the IIIC to foster
links with German academics. Her appointment to this position, as well as that of fellow
German Werner Picht to the head of University Relations at the IIIC, was also an attempt
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of the IIIC to address claims made by countries such as Great Britain and Germany that
the French too heavily influenced the IIIC.389 Rothbarth’s connection to the institute and
her textbook editing work illustrates the importance of informal networks in the CICI’s
work that transcended the nation-state. However, it also underscores the national tensions
that plagued the intellectual cooperation movement and how this influenced individual
lives.
In addition to her liaison work, Rothbarth was quite active in the committee’s
textbook editing initiative. Her German-language book Intellectual Cooperation and the
Framework of the League of Nations was one of the first monographs on the topic of
intellectual cooperation and the League of Nations and was published in 1931.390 In fact,
she published several books and dozens of articles about the League of Nations and
international relations. Rothbarth has received very little scholarly attention and currently
the only research about her is a German language article that discusses her
publications.391 She was born in Frankfurt, Germany to a Jewish family on 7 June 1887.
Her father was a merchant and she had two siblings. After briefly studying science she
turned her focus to history and during this time likely pursed English Studies.392 She
received her doctorate in 1913, and after the war, through the auspices of historian
Freidrich Naumann and the influence of the German Democratic Party she began to

389

See Guido Müller, Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Das
Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund (Oldenbourg Verlag,
2005), 360.
390

Geistige Zusammenarbeit Im Rahmen Des Voelkerbundes

See Ute Lemke, “'La femme, la clandestine de l’histoire'. Margarete Rothbarth - ein
Engagement für den Völkerbund,” LENDEMAINS 37, no. 146/147 (2012): 45–59.
391

392

Ibid., 46.

195

publish articles not affiliated with a specific political party in Berlin supporting the
League of Nations and intellectual cooperation. As a contributing author to the German
magazine Die Hilfe, she served as an interpreter of national and international debates for
the magazine’s readers, including the Peace Conference. In these articles, she was also
critical of the development of a society of nations that did not include all of the major
powers, notably Germany, and argued that her country should join the League of Nations
immediately.393
Even before taking her position at the IIIC, her arguments aligned with the goals
of the CICI in the realm of education and moral disarmament. In a 1921 article, she
argued that the League would only be effective if it was able to penetrate into the human
consciousness rather than being imposed as an outside force. She also thought people in
Germany should not view the League as a tool of the Entente, but rather as a means to
address international policy issues essential to a peaceful future.394 She argued that
following the First World War, “almost all countries were much more concerned with the
problems and measures of political education. Everywhere you turned there was the
question of whether some things would have been different if the masses had had more
political, economic and social knowledge and if active politicians and statesman enjoyed
a more thorough education and knew more of the psychology other nations."395 She felt
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an important part of this increased understanding was a common lexicon of political
expression and she continued to support international education and increased
understanding between nations in her work as deputy chief at the IIIC. One of her main
pursuits in this position was the use of textbook editing towards the goals of increased
understanding and the centralization of peace education in curriculum. Notably, the
connection between textbook editing and children meant that it fit nicely within the
bounds carved out by maternalism. Though Rothbarth did not have children, her work
was legitimized through rhetoric of women’s assumed proclivity for the domestic sphere.
Although Rothbarth was not officially listed on any of the committee member
lists for textbook editing, in her role as deputy chief she worked extensively in this area,
was frequently contacted about it, and seemed to be passionate about her work. Her work
required her to make connections with colleagues in a variety of countries and she drew
heavily from her contacts in the United States and Great Britain to further her work. For
instance, she was influenced by American CICI executive secretary Edith Ware’s surveys
about internationalism in the United States and was in frequent contact with the US
national committee to gather information about historical textbooks and general teaching
practices in the country. Through this work, she also established contacts in Great Britain,
including with Gilbert Murray, but also with British medievalist and economic historian
Eileen Power.396 The two women formed a friendship and supported each other in their
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efforts to form textbook editing committees in their home countries. Power and Rothbarth
became acquainted through their shared commitment to the textbook editing initiative.
In 1932, in the space of only a couple months, their letters progressed from formal
correspondence to written interactions that suggested a growing friendship based on
shared interest and respect. Writing in April 1932, Power wrote Rothbarth: “the British
Committee of Intellectual Co-operation has agreed to father my text-book committee” but
she first had “to persuade the British Committee of Historical Sciences” to provide their
support in order to avoid resistance of British schools to LN meddling. She thought the
latter body, which was not a part of the LN, was essential because it would “command
the respect of all historians, whereas they are rather apt to suspect propaganda in bodies
such as the committee on Intellectual Co-operation. The great thing is to proceed suaviter
in modo, 397 so as to arouse no oppositions and win confidence in advance…” She noted
that Gilbert Murray had been “most kind and helpful” in her efforts.398 Power illuminated
the very reason that Murray failed to gain the support of Great Britain for intellectual
cooperation despite all his years of effort towards this goal in the interwar period. While
the country may have been instrumental in the formation of the League, it resisted efforts
made by the CICI—such as textbook editing—that were aimed at changing national
policy or culture.
Rothbarth had been working towards the same goal of creating a movement in
Germany and wrote Power in June 1932 happy to report that she had just returned from
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Berlin and had helped form the Subcommittee on Education of the German National
Committee and that the first task of the committee would be the revision of school
textbooks. She planned to publish the composition of the committee in the next bulletin
and hoped that she could also include an announcement about the British committee
Power had been working on forming. She hoped to see Power at the upcoming Congress
on the Teaching of History at The Hague so they could continue their conversation about
textbook revision work completed by national committees.399 Power replied several days
later expressing her regret that she could not attend the upcoming conference and to
update Rothbarth on the status of the British textbook editing committee. In another
situation that illustrates how the LN’s form of internationalism was careful not to
challenge nationalism, Power reaffirmed that it was a delicate situation and that the
initiative needed to be founded as a joint committee between the British Committee of
Intellectual Cooperation and the British Committee of Historical Sciences. She reiterated
that this was an essential step because if the textbook revision committee was formed
only by the British Committee on Intellectual Cooperation it “would be regarded with
great suspicion by historians” in Britain. She warned Rothbarth not to let any news leak,
or publish any announcements about the British Committee, before the British Committee
of Historical Sciences had “dealt with the matter.”400 Power was ultimately successful in
forming this committee and the CICI later listed her as one of the members of the
committee of experts on textbook editing.
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Official CICI publications make only passing reference to Rothbarth’s role in
textbook editing in official CICI publications. That Rothbarth did not hold an official post
on CICI or IBE committees, while at the same time being very active in the work, is not
surprising, however. Women working in international organizations such as the LN were
often relegated to unofficial and unacknowledged posts.401 Regardless, in September
1938, a request from the American Committee of Intellectual Cooperation that arrived
while Rothbarth was away attending conferences reveals just how central was her role in
the IIIC’s textbook editing work. In her absence, director Henri Bonnet was unable to
respond to a general inquiry about the Report on History Teaching in the United States.402
While her influence on the work was considerable, as tensions between Germany
and the rest of Europe intensified, her position and livelihood became increasingly
tenuous. Rothbarth wrote to Murray in October 1933 after reading, “with great
disapproval,” Ewald Banse’s book Wehrissenschaft (Military Science). She pointed out
that it might also not be possible to invoke the LN agreement set up to discourage such
texts, the Casarés Resolution, because his book was not an official textbook. Gilbert
Murray had similar thoughts, but the book was banned by the Nazi government without
this intervention. This point, however, was also likely moot because, she pointed out, the
members of the German Committee of the Revision of School Text-books had all just
been dismissed. “Of the new ones,” she explained, “I do not know anybody.”403 While
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Germany did ban Banse’s book, the sentiment behind that ban did not mean the situation
improved for German Jews, especially for Rothbarth.
When Germany left the League in 1933 all German LN workers were ordered to
leave their positions, but Rothbarth thought it would be unwise for her to leave a
contractual position to return to Germany. She wrote the German ambassador in Paris,
Botschafter Köster, in November 1933 asking for advice, while also explaining her
decision to remain at the IIIC. She argued: “as a Jewish woman I do not have the slightest
chance of earning my living in Germany.”404 Return to Nazi Germany had become
impossible for a Jew—and doubly so for a woman—who had been publicly supportive of
the League of Nations. In the same letter, she assured the ambassador that her future
work would be “strictly factual” and she would discontinue her work on text-book
editing.405
Despite saying she would only stick to the “facts,” after losing her connections in
the German textbook editing committee she put her energy into making citizens of other
countries, including the British public, aware of how war was glorified in German
textbooks. She also hoped to expand interest for textbook editing in the United States,
while at the same time making the country aware of the growing threat Germany posed to
international peace. In 1934, she contacted New York City lawyer and reformer Richard
Welling and sent him a copy of School Text-Book Revision and International
Understanding, which the Institute had published a year before. “This book,” she wrote,
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“is by itself the biggest result we have yet achieved. As it has appeared at a very difficult
moment I am sorry to say that it has not had the repercussions we hoped.” For this
reason, she hoped that Welling would be able to “launch” the book in the United States
through newspapers and journals.406 Although Welling, who was chairperson of the
National Self Government Committee—which had the goal of “making boys and girls
public minded”—had only contacted the CICI for information about textbooks that
glorified war, Rothbarth took the advantage of this informal connection in hopes of
making the committee’s work known in the United States.407
She had used these informal connections to interest the American Association of
University Women in the work of textbook editing, and they were the first organization
to take up the work in the United States. While the American Historical Association
wrote in support of historical accuracy in textbooks, they did not feel the main issue was
one of “patriotism,” but rather as “faithlessness to fact.”408 Because the United States did
not hold official membership in the League of Nations, other US reports shared in School
Text-Book Revision could only include similar statements of vague support. On the list of
countries providing official declarations and reports, which included Germany, France,
China and Australia. Germany, for instance, provided a quote of the Constitution of the
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German Reich: “All schools must aim at moral development, a sense of citizenship, and
personal and professional efficiency in the spirit of the German people and the
reconciliation of the nations.”409 France reported that a special committee had been set up
to address textbooks by the Minister of National education.410 Great Britain and the US
were conspicuously absent.
Though School Text-Book Revision did not have the impact Rothbarth hoped, she
continued to work for the Institute and remained in contact with Gilbert Murray. In
January 1935, Murray asked for her help in improving his continued, and persistently
ineffective, efforts to interest the British government in providing monetary support for
the CICI’s education initiative.411 Murray also wrote to her for advice and information
about how war was presented in Germany under the Nazi regime for an article he was
writing.412 Rothbarth was a source of valuable information for figures such as Murray and
Bonnet, who were able to add to their prestige by utilizing the fruits of labor from silent
workers such as Rothbarth.
While the prestige and influence of Murray and Bonnet rose, Rothbarth’s
position, as a German Jew, became increasingly precarious. Rothbarth was fully aware of
the difficulty of being a German woman working for an international Institute located in
France and that was well known for being dominated by French opinion. As late as
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October 1937 Rothbarth was still working with Murray towards the goal of editing
German textbooks as well as calling attention to how the country was becoming
increasingly militarized. She urged him in a letter to help her with the translation and
publishing of extracts from German schoolbooks.413 In a follow-up letter of the same
month—marked personal and confidential—she shared the aforementioned textbook
excerpts with Murray. She said that the people who had compiled them wished “to
remain anonymous,” but she thought it would be of special interest. “We have spoken,”
Rothbarth wrote, “so often of the spirit which really inspires German educators and
which is so difficult to discover that you will appreciate these exact details… I think that
the survey gives excellent examples, not only for German history teaching, but for
German teaching in general which, as you see, is imbued with a more chauvinistic and
warlike spirit than one can imagine.” One of these examples was from a math book,
which she claimed only used questions relating to race and war. She hoped that Murray
would make this known in Britain, while also stressing that her name “must not be quoted
in this affair.”414 By March 1937, letters providing information about textbooks that were
once a routine part of her work were increasingly marked as “personal and
confidential.”415 While this was likely due to her wanting to protect the identity of
contributors who were in contact with her, she may have also wanted to, at least
outwardly, maintain the illusion that she had kept her promise to the German ambassador.
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In the increasingly tense political environment leading up to the Second World
War, Rothbarth’s caution was quite understandable. Despite this vigilance, during the war
her situation became quite desperate. She was in Switzerland at the outbreak of war,
France denied her entry back into the country and the IIIC did not honor their contract to
keep paying her. As a German woman who spent over a decade working in France and
was publicly critical of Nazi ideology, her options were quite limited. On 13 August
1940, Rothbarth wrote Murray from Zurich. She had not heard from any of her
colleagues in France or England, but fellow German Hans Simons had written her to say
that Princeton had offered to host some sections of the League to continue their work in
the United States. Simons had immigrated to the United States in 1935 after being
blacklisted by the Nazis and he hoped that Rothbarth could come over as well. She
thought this was the only opportunity to continue her work and of, as she wrote Murray,
“getting out of Switzerland where I am caught as in a trap…all the countries abroad are
shot for me..” She was not allowed to work in Switzerland and was rapidly running out of
money. She had contacted the IIIC, but had only received a “cold” response. “Nobody
knows better than you,” she continued, “that most people of the old staff have
disappeared and that the new ones are neither friends of Intellectual Cooperation
(Institute) nor do we know them well.” She beseeched Murray’s assistance, writing: “I
think that you are the only person who could help me. We are all hoping here (all: my
friends and all the honest people here) that those decisive days through with we are going
will finish by England’s victory. May we have a better future than these presnt (sic)
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days.”416 While Murray provided sympathy, this did little to improve Rothbarth’s
conditions.
Rothbarth’s pleas for assistance were also sent to the US National Committee of
Intellectual Cooperation, and met with a similar reply. Bonnet mentioned her situation to
the US National Committee, and they forwarded the issue on to the American
Association of University Women. Rothbarth also asked an American friend, Dr. Emmy
Heller to make inquiries on her behalf, suggesting she talk directly with Edith Ware, the
executive secretary of the US National Committee, who had helped Rothbarth gather
information for her textbook editing work.417 Ware suggested Heller contact several
organizations of university women for aid. Heller also applied for a position in the New
School of Social research for Rothbarth, which required references not only from Henri
Bonnet, but from individuals in the US as well.418 Bonnet wrote in June 1941 that a visa
had been obtained for her in Zurich, Switzerland but she needed transportation. “It would
be tragic,” he wrote, “if this scholar could not leave Europe soon enough, in view of the
present circumstances.”419 Funding remained an issue and the US committee was unable
to resolve it.420 While several years before Shotwell had set up a sub-committee dedicated
to managing issues associated with Einstein’s visa, he noted that there was nothing else
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the US committee could do for Rothbarth and he left it in the hands of Switzerland to
resolve.
During the war, she remained trapped in Switzerland and her situation did not
improve when the war ended. Of course, compared to many Jews in Europe she was
fortunate to still be alive, albeit impoverished. In April 1947, she exchanged letters with
Murray and explained that she, along with three others, had recently won a lawsuit
against the IIIC before the administrative tribunal of the LN for unpaid labor. “I am
personally very glad for this moral victory,” she wrote, “as the Institute had sent very
disagreeable memoirs against me to Geneva—which are refuted by the Tribunal’s
verdict.” However, she had yet to see any sort of payment and added: “My outlook is still
hopeless, and I am doubting whether this will ever become better.”421 Murray replied
with his sympathies, calling it a scandal. She shared the further development that the
Quai d’Orsay had refused to pay and told them to apply to the League, but she noted that
the LN never had financial obligations to the IIIC. She was also doubtful that the former
heads of the IIIC would offer assistance: “It is very queer how Bonnet forgot us all in the
very moment he was nominated ambassador in Washington. We all are needing it badly,
perhaps nobody as much as I.”422 Though archival records reveal that Bonnet had made
inquiries for her, this did not actually come to any result and Rothbarth felt abandoned.
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Three months later, they had yet to be paid. Though they had managed to seize
the IIIC’s bank account, it was still not clear that they would be able to access that
money, which would only be half of what they were owed. She had turned 60 that year
and explained to Murray that due to recent illnesses she was no longer fit to fully support
herself. Rothbarth sought his advice on whether he thought “it could not be possible that
those who worked for a long time at the Institute and were loyal during the war, could
receive pensions as our assurance shrink to nothing by inflation.” She hoped that he
would offer his support and that she would be able to write soon that the judgment was
“fully executed.”423
She was eventually able to secure the wages owed to her, though it was not
enough to comfortably live and she was still too ill to work. When Einstein sought shelter
from Nazi Germany his prestige—not to mention his knowledge of atomic theory—
opened up many doors for him. As Murray wrote Einstein in 1933:
I need hardly tell you with what feelings of indignation and almost despair your
friends here have been watching the persecution of Jews and of Liberals in
Germany, or with what great personal sympathy we have thought of you.
Fortunately you are out of Germany and if you choose to renounce your
nationality all the world will be ready to welcome you. It is not for me to
influence your choice. I know your friends in Oxford would love to have you
here, but I know also that there will be competition among all the civilized
countries for the honour and pleasure of having you as a citizen.424
This contrasts sharply with Murray’s expressions of sympathy for Rothbarth that were
unaccompanied by concrete action. Bonnet’s successor in the role of IIIC director, JeanJacques Mayoux, ignored her repeated requests for help in returning to France and
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continued to do so even after the end of the war. Rothbarth remained trapped in
Switzerland without relief or the ability to properly support herself. When she died in
Zurich on 7 September 1953 she was stateless and impoverished.
Unlike better-known members of the intellectual cooperation movement, such as
Henri Bonnet, or fellow German Albert Einstein, Rothbarth did not have nearly the same
opportunities open to her following the war. In contrast to Albert Einstein, who
repeatedly joined and resigned from the CICI based on personal views and fears of his
position as a Jew in Germany, Rothbarth had devoted herself fully to the work of the
IIIC. This devotion came at great personal cost. Rothbarth’s story illustrates many of the
internal inconsistencies that challenged the CICI’s minor utopia, including the separation
of “high” and “low,” divisions based on nationality and ethnicity, as well as
marginalization based on gender. There were Jews on both ends of the “high” and “low”
scale within the organization, but only those at the “higher” end were able to weather the
storm of Hitler and war. All of these contradictions had very real effects on the life of this
“silent” worker. Her story illuminates the challenges of the whole endeavor as well as the
internal inconsistencies that ultimately challenged their minor utopia. The CICI was
trapped in its own contradictions, just as Rothbarth was trapped in Switzerland.

Conclusion
While just as in the case of disarmament, women used their roles as moral censor
as an entry point into educational initiatives, the same Great Power hegemony that
challenged the efforts of the CICI also worked to marginalize them. This was illustrated
in the case of Gabriela Mistral and her inability to significantly interest the CICI in Latin
America and her lack of influence within the IIIC. Similarly, Margarete Rothbarth, as a
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German Jew, took on largely unattributed work in textbook editing, but when this work
put her in a precarious position, the CICI essentially washed their hands of her. She was
neither famous nor considered especially important and therefore had little hope to
leverage herself out of her stateless limbo.
Peace work was a common next step for many women who had taken part in
women’s suffrage and they played very important roles. Jane Addams, for instance,
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931 as a result of her founding of the Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom in 1919 and her long-term disarmament
work. Many of the women discussed in this dissertation were highly influential women,
but not in the context of the CICI. That they continued to work with a committee and
organization that repeatedly marginalized them suggests the importance they placed on
the work, especially when a majority of women remained within all-women organizations
to address peace work during the interwar years. However, they remained in the
committee despite this marginalization and provide a window into what it was like for
women working in international organizations along with men.
While the CICI may have been successful in promoting the exchange of
transnational ideas, the nation-state and national interest continued to hold significant
sway. This dissertation has fleshed out some of the hidden histories of the CICI, but until
researchers take more interest, this will remain a significant gap in CICI historiography.
While the celebrity figures of the committee provide a wealth of source material, the
daily workers provide a better indication of the impact of national and international
politics on the daily lives of individuals. More powerful and wealthy individuals were
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better able to weather the storm of war and conflict and so they give a distorted lens to
understanding the lives of most individuals.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Writing shortly before the Second World War in August 1938, Southern
Methodist University student Lillian G. Noyes assessed the work of the International
Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (CICI) and found that it had been hobbled from its
very roots in 1921. She pointed out, quoting French politician Léon Bourgeois, that the
official policy from 1921 had been “to avoid interfering with the way each country
expresses its own national genius, and instead to afford each the opportunity of
developing vigorously and abundantly by drawing freely upon the common fund of
knowledge, methods and discoveries.”425 She was not impressed with the result of this
policy. “Today,” she commented, “Germany is expressing her ‘national genius’ through
Hitler in Austria; Italy, hers through the troops in Spain; Japan, hers through the Chinese
bombings. The League has done nothing successful about these situations.” However, the
League was not the only one to fall short in her estimation: “Neither has the [CICI] been
able to make much of an internationalist dent upon the fanatic Nordic racial-cultural myth
of Hitler, the Roman atavism of Mussolini, or the Emperor-Sun-God delirium of the
Japanese. Always there are exceptions to the rule of conformity to these nationalist
myths, but the exceptions are usually shot, ‘concentrated,’ or exiled, as was the former
member of the [CICI], Professor Albert Einstein.”426 That Einstein’s fate was actually
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considerably better than many other German Jews working for the CICI was not
mentioned.
In an assessment of the intellectual cooperation movement, this dissertation has
illustrated how competing national interests challenged the work of this group at almost
every turn. This dissertation has argued against the common approach made by historians
for many years assessing the League of Nations in terms as a “failed experiment.” I have
illustrated how the most significant challenge to the CICI’s work were national tensions
and their most important contribution was the growth in the transnational networks they
facilitated. The League of Nation’s limited conception of internationalism concentrated
its sphere of influence largely to Europe. While the CICI improved this by also gaining
significant participation from US members, the committee was still dominated by Great
Britain, the United States and France, at the cost of less influential national members.
Their intentions were noble, but their focus was constrained. During a time of significant
flourishing of international interactions—such as in South America—the CICI’s focus
was too strongly centered in Europe at the expense of creating a robust, inclusive
internationalism with a global view. Such an emphasis on the Great Powers left them
especially prone to losing influence as countries such as Germany, Italy, and the Soviet
Union left or were expelled from the LN in the 1930s.
The CICI attempted to use internationalism as a step stone to peace. In contrast to
the economic focus of Communism, the CICI’s form of internationalism focused on ideas
and posited an alternate approach. Akira Iriye called this approach “cultural
internationalism” and this dissertation has used this term differentiate the CICI’s form of
internationalism as a key form of cultural work. Communism was an internationalizing
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idea, but, along with militant nationalism and fascism, worked counter to cultural
internationalism because of its emphasis on economic rather than cultural
transformations. While the League attempted to involve a wide range of countries, it did
not dispute Great Power hegemony. Additionally, the League of Nations’ conception of
internationalism was Eurocentric and the CICI formulated moral disarmament within an
Anglo-American context. Both of these limitations narrowed the influence of the CICI’s
peace work to certain geographical areas of influence. Indeed, the tendency for individual
members to assume their respective countries could best take the lead in efforts to make
moral disarmament a reality made them prone to disagreement. Gilbert Murray and
James T. Shotwell considered their countries to be ideal to lead the CICI’s peace efforts.
Murray based this on assumptions of Great Britain’s “neutral” political position and
Shotwell made a similar argument for the United States, but based on rhetoric of
American exceptionalism. However, British and US interests did not align, let alone
those in continental Europe and beyond.
Additionally, countries with less political power were correspondingly less
influential within the intellectual cooperation initiative. In the case of the CICI, though
many countries took part, the United States and Great Britain were disproportionately
influential. At the heart of all of the issues discussed in this dissertation were competing
interests. For a committee formed with the express goal of providing an example of how
individuals and the nations they represented could effectively work together in harmony,
such competition ran counter to their stated mission, and, as illustrated in the examples of
the conflict between members, negatively affected their public image.
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It also limited the efficacy of their peace work. Material disarmament sparked the
development of moral disarmament as an official consideration of CICI work and moral
disarmament provided a centralizing term for the CICI’s utopian vision of maintaining
peace. However, while the CICI had been pursuing peace in intellectual channels from its
inception in 1922, its official use of the term moral disarmament was a late addition and
rather desperate attempt to stem the “rising tide” of nationalism and its competing
interests. It was a minor utopia specifically developed to address a behemoth with far too
much momentum. In a time where national self-determination was considered a cure,
cultural internationalism faced a significant hurdle. Even though members of the CICI
were genuine in their desire that moral disarmament could attain peace, they were unable
to garner any significant support for it within their respective countries.
National tensions challenged the CICI’s work in education, which included a fear
of super-state propaganda and a resulting reluctance to provide support and funding for
initiatives such as textbook editing. Promoting transnational thinking was not an easy
task and this was apparent in the challenges facing the CICI in their education efforts.
Though a utopian hope for its power to create an international mindset, like other areas of
CICI work, textbook editing was also a Eurocentric concern and one dominated by
European interests within the movement. The fear of propaganda severely limited the
support the CICI received from individual countries. This fear plagued the work of
textbook editing, especially as individuals providing information to the CICI about
negative portrayals in their national textbooks were subject to social attack within their
home countries. Both the CICI and the IBE worked together towards the goal of moral
disarmament, but in a formation already narrowed by fears of a “world state.” Before the
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CICI even began working in connection with the IBE, their efforts had already been
limited in scope by competing national interests. Despite these challenges, some progress
was made, such as in the case of German and French agreement in how to portray the
War of 1870 within history curricula. Like all areas of LN work, the Second World War
cast a long shadow in the historical narrative obscuring these small, but—considering
interwar tensions—impressive successes.
Though challenged by the nature of attempting to inculcate international thinking
while not contesting national sovereignty, the CICI had many such successes. Most
importantly, however, it helped expand and establish a sprawling transnational network
of international education. This was despite fears of propaganda, rivalry between nationstates, and an unwillingness in national governments to fund the CICI’s education work.
Notably, the CICI was essential in the formation of the IBE and therefore the first true
realization of a unifying body for international education. Textbook editing was central to
moral disarmament efforts made within the movement and, while limited by national
agendas, did provide a platform for discussion of national histories on a thenunprecedented international scale.
In the case of CICI efforts in film, the location of the closely associated
International Educational Cinematographic Institute (IECI) in Fascist Italy effectively
limited not only the influence of the institute, but also prematurely shortened its work. As
a minor utopia, not only was anti-war film faced with the same challenges of their other
movements, but it was also physically based in Italy and ultimately overturned by rise of
the same militaristic nationalism it hoped to address. However, while the IECI was
undoubtedly fascist, its journal still accommodated a wide range of cultural and
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ideological contributions, opening an important field for debating the influence of war
films. Like broader LN efforts, the IECI was not ultimately able to prevent war, but it
was based on a system of transnational exchange that created transnational connections
among intellectuals. The IECI’s broad definition of “educational film” made space for a
debate about children’s exposure to war films and sparked a number of surveys aimed at
studying their influence. They took up the task of launching mass surveys to study the
effect of film on children, though they ultimately used these findings to transform a
debate about the possible anti-war effect of film to one that ultimately supported patriotic
warfare.
The “taint” of fascism no doubt has had an influence on why the IECI has
received, until recently, little attention from historians. However, fascist influence within
this committee and Italian views of the mother’s role in moral censorship also opened up
a public platform for women to debate the future of film and its use. Women’s
organizations such as the International Council of Women contributed articles claiming
film censorship to be the natural domain of women, which aligned nicely with Fascist
Italy’s view of women as mothers of the nation. Certainly, while the location of the
League’s film institute in Fascist Italy limited the impact of its work, it also created an
opening for women and a venue for their ideas in the debate surrounding the impact of
film on children. In the IECI’s view, woman’s essential role was as a mother and films
that challenged this role were of far greater and immediate concern than films that
glorified war. If the war film increased patriotic fervor, it worked in favor of the goals of
the Italian Fascist state, but films that challenged the very base of Italian culture—the
family—were a true threat. To the IECI, the protection of motherhood was essential and
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women played their most ideal role when they built up and protected the family—thereby
supporting the goals of the fascist state. However, while women were the target of the
IECI’s campaign to promote moral censorship, the IECI doubted their ability to play
anything but a supportive role in the formal organization of the movement, even if they
were to play an important part as individual mothers.
While women were marginalized within the CICI, they successfully used such
assumptions about their “natural” role as mothers for entry into international debates
surrounding education, film censorship and cultural internationalism. Notably, Laura
Dreyfus-Barney fundamentally disagreed with the IECI about the role of women in film
studies. She felt their work was equal to that of men and did not see them relegated to
supportive roles, but as important leaders. Her version of moral censorship departed
significantly from the IECI’s views, which was illustrated in the tendency of the IECI to
add qualifying—and often patronizing—editorial comments to her articles. However, the
fact that these articles were even published underscores that the Fascist Italian state,
though pursuing its own agenda, still left room for dissent in the International Review of
Educational Cinematography. This suggests the important platform it provided for
women to debate the issue of film’s influence on children, which opened up for them
precisely because the issue was of special concern for the Italian institute. Indeed, though
heavily influenced by fascism, the venue was open enough to allow for voices of dissent.
While in many ways Dreyfus-Barney’s views aligned with those of the IECI, she
did not agree with the marginalized role for women proposed by the institute. Although
women’s traditional role as moral censors opened up room in international debates in the
interwar period and women took advantage of assumptions of female authority in these
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areas to take part in CICI moral disarmament and educational initiatives, they were still
effectively marginalized within them. This marginalization has translated into
underrepresentation in the historical narrative. Additionally, though CICI members
recognized the challenges national and cultural tension posed, the scope of intellectual
cooperation was still limited by Great Power assumptions of superiority and an
unwillingness to move beyond formulations of “the other.” Though there were
exceptions, such as Marie Curie, most of the female participants in the CICI movement
took on work that went largely unnoticed and many have fallen into relative obscurity.
Women outside the United States and Europe participated, but were marginalized not
only due to their status as women, but also because of their nationality. While, just as in
the case of disarmament, women used their roles as moral censor as an entry point into
educational initiatives, the same Great Power hegemony that challenged the efforts of the
CICI also worked to marginalize them.
At the heart of all of the issues discussed in this dissertation were competing
national interests. This proved significantly debilitating for the work of the CICI in the
interwar period. However, while the CICI was certainly part of an organization that quite
publicly failed in its effort to avoid another World War, the focus of historical
scholarship should not be whether or not it was a failed experiment. Instead, the CICI
should be regarded as an indicator of changing views concerning international
cooperation. While the CICI’s peace efforts may have had little impact on political
events, they contributed to evolving peace strategies within education, media and
intellectual work. The central importance of the CICI to historical study is not in its
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successes or failures but as an example of how transnational connections were facilitated
for the cause of peace and intellectual progress during its tenure.

Withering Away: UNESCO and the United Nations
Though the CICI placed much of its peace work under the umbrella term of
“moral disarmament” in 1931, the wider failures of League disarmament machinery by
1933 negatively affected CICI efforts as well as public faith in moral disarmament work.
Though initially exciting to many peace groups, such as the CICI, the Great Powers
refused to support the concept because of its vague nature. By late 1933, the
Disarmament Conference was essentially a shell with little power and was simply a
political ground for public stances that did not match internal national policies. Germany
and Japan had left the League, the United States refused to take any significant part and
other major Powers were waiting anxiously to see what rival nations would do while only
making a public show of participating.427
In June 1934, Murray wrote the Kent Quarterly commenting about recent events
and the devolution of national support for the League. “All had agreed in principle except
Germany and Japan,” he argued, “and those who have not refused. They have only made
the sort of reservation which in an individual is attributed to childish vanity and in a
nation to patriotic pride.” He then talked about how Italy had broken away from such
agreements: “On those principles how can any progress ever be made—except
downward?”428 After 1934, progress was indeed “downward.”
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Shortly before and during the conflict, the participation of the CICI fared better
than the general participation in the LN. In January of 1939, during the landmark 100th
Session of the Council, the tone was somber, but still hopeful. Iranian delegate Mostafa
Adle, while still recognizing the setbacks that were “surely inevitable in all major
undertakings,” pointed to the “impressive record of accomplishment” of the League as
good reason for continued support of LN efforts.429 In his speech verbally renewing the
support of France, Yvon Delbos argued that the League was criticized “no doubt because
too much was expected of it.” Responding to accusations of misplaced idealism at the
heart of the League, Delbos went on to argue that idealism need not be seen as
“chimerical” but as the “condition prerequisite to action” and that while some may
malign the idealism of the League they are simply “compelled to invoke another
ideology.” Recognizing this, he argued, “If we were to ignore the principles of the
League of Nations, we should very soon be obliged to rediscover them.”430 Chinese
delegate Wellington Koo shared the concern of the other speakers and added that it was a
lack of faith and conviction or “the persistent spirit of national egoism” that accounted for
the weakening of the League and “the steady eclipse of its authority and prestige.”431 He
urged against surrendering to critics by remaining immobilized by fear. “It would be,”
argued M. Koo, “to refuse to eat for fear of being choked by the food.”432

429

LNP, The League of Nations, A Vital Necessity in the Modern World: Addresses delivered on
the occasion of the 100th Session of the Council, January 27th, 1938 (Geneva, 1938), 4.
430

Ibid., 9-11.

431

Ibid., 26-27.

432

M. Koo quoting Chinese proverb, Ibid., 27.

221

Regardless of such national renewals of faith, the work of the LN suffered during
the war. In the same way, the work of the CICI was heavily truncated throughout the
conflict. As the intellectual cooperation section of one LN report stated, “In the
intellectual sphere, as in the economic sphere, the war is extending its ravages.” The
report also cautioned against forgetting what they had learned in the interwar period:
At the end of the conflict, the world will have less artists, less scientists, less
technical experts...This will make it more difficult for the artist, the scientists and
the student to resume their work. The Intellectual Co-Operation Organisation
might be expected to facilitate such a resumption.433
Though the war complicated efforts, some progress was still made.
More generally, work continued in the area of intellectual cooperation with a
conference held in Paris from November 30 to December 3 1939 for the International Act
Concerning Intellectual Co-operation. Fifty governments sent representatives to the
conference and thirty-seven signed the Convention to bring the Act into force.
Considering such “rare” participation “in these days,” the CICI surmised that “the
eagerness of nearly every Government in the world to collaborate in the work of
intellectual co-operation proves that its activities stand in the very first rank among
questions of urgent importance at the present day.”434 When the LN gave way to the
United Nations (UN) after the war, this sentiment would prove to be true, at least when it
came to the willingness to continue efforts in international intellectual cooperation.
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Indeed, the CICI viewed the intellectual cooperation efforts made in the Americas as an
important continuance of their goals.
However, the formulation of its continued work in the Americas was not without
disagreement. While the previous IIIC director Henri Bonnet and Gilbert Murray wanted
the US to host the institute during the war, US members themselves felt it was best to
move on to other strategies, such as increasing cooperation between American states.
Though Bonnet immigrated to the United States in large part to continue the work of
intellectual cooperation with the support of the US national committee, the US
Committee did not envision a continuation of a formal institute in the Americas. In
August 1940, US CICI member and historian Waldo Leland wrote to US executive
secretary Edith Ware requesting that she help orient Bonnet to his work in the United
States. He explained that while Bonnet had been brought to the US for “an indefinite
period” in order to continue the work of the IIIC, this did not mean the US would support
its reorganization as a formal institute.435 On 23 October 1940, Ware wrote Leland
commenting that Bonnet was upset with the lack of progress made in his work in the US.
“I finally convinced him that it was foolish, under the present circumstances, to try to
salvage the Conference from the European view,” she wrote. She was convinced they
needed to get their work in a “Western Hemisphere Conference” because little could be
done at the time in Europe and so they should instead focus on what could be done in the
Americas.436 However, she did not feel a continuation of the IIIC was necessary in order
to fulfill this goal.
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In a likely attempt to support this agenda, she asked Bonnet to write a memo for
the American national committees “concerning the German’s attempt to take over the
Institute,” which seemed to only include talks with those in charge of the institute.437
Though the IIIC was largely inactive at this point, Bonnet obliged, but his memo did not
provide a clear indication of direct Nazi influence, aside from German discussions with
members.438 While some American CICI members had doubts to the extent of Germany’s
influence —such as US William Vogt who thought the Nazi influence had “been
ridiculously exaggerated”—the memo did have the desired effect of moving conferences
to the Americas.439 While conferences were held, the IIIC was not moved out of Europe.
In a 28 October 1940 letter to Leland, Ware explained that Bonnet and Laura
Dreyfus Barney were committed to “re-vivifying” the Institute, but she thought it was a
mistake to “try to salvage and continue all phases of the work of the Institute” and felt it
best to avoid recreating the Institute as it had been. “This is the time,” she wrote, “for
creative and courageous thinking and planning.”440 She felt it was time to expand their
work without the fetters of the previous structures. In a clear reversal of previous CICI
efforts to gain support of non-European nations, Leland wrote James T. Shotwell on 9
September 1940 that they would have to be careful to “emphasize the world-wide
character of the movement in order to interest the other American countries and in order
to save the principle of world-wide intellectual cooperation. It should not be conceived in
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exclusively American terms.” Towards this goal, he hoped that the Cuban national
committee would soon call an international conference.441 It is notable that he did not
suggest one should be hosted in the United States.
Not only was there resistance to maintaining the status quo by recreating a formal
IIIC from US members, Latin American national committees resisted the centralization of
the CICI’s work in the United States. In a conversation with Edith Ware in January 1941,
Henri Bonnet expressed his continual interest in the United States forming an Intellectual
Cooperation Institute in place of the Paris Institute. Ware explained that there had been
resistance to this idea because a similar institute, the Pan American Union, already had a
headquarters in Washington, D.C. and Latin American members of the CICI were
opposed to forming another institute centralized in the US. While she noted that some of
this resistance had waned due to the recent policies of the French Vichy government, it
would be unlikely to gather support in Latin America.442 In the annual meeting of the US
National Committee on 6 June 1941, the members discussed Bonnet’s proposal, but felt
there was too much opposition to the idea to make it a reality. The minutes of the meeting
noted that “the Mexican Committee did not wish to see the culture of Paris exchanged for
the culture of Washington” though they were interested in increasing cooperation
between Mexico and the United States.443 Bonnet and Murray continued to hope,
however. In a letter to Bonnet, Murray expressed his frustration that he had not been able
to keep apprised of the status of the institute. He thought the US was the best option since
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France was “for the present out of the question” and though he thought “Great Britain
will be less grudging in her attitude than she was in the past, I doubt if she has either the
wish or the right to be the centre of the movement.” Murray wrote that he was starting to
feel his age and would be passing the chairmanship on, but would continue to champion
the cause in his home country. Even at this point, Murray was both hopeful, yet also
resigned, that Great Britain would support intellectual cooperation.444
The conference Leland hoped would form became a reality later in the year with
the Havana Conference of National Committees on International Cooperation held in
November of 1941. Although much of the effort of the CICI work during the war
centered on American countries, the hosting of the Havana Conference was based on an
international theme of cooperation. The influence of the CICI was apparent in the general
purpose of the conference, which was to “examine the basic principles on which depend
the existence of intellectual cooperation and the means of assuring the survival of
difference cultures in an atmosphere of tolerance and liberty.”445 However, the only
intellectual cooperation efforts of note that continued in Europe were by the International
Museums Office, a branch of the CICI which labored to improve museum relations,
promote museums to the public and preserve artifacts. This office continued to work on
preservation of art and architecture during the war.446
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However, Murray held his conviction about the importance of education in future
peace efforts. Murray wrote Shotwell a long letter on 7 July 1941 including his concern
over the tendency of British opinion to look to some new scheme, such as religious
education or Socialism, or worse yet towards increased armaments, rather than the
“outlawry of war” as a way to secure peace. He also wrote to reaffirm his belief that
cooperation in education would play a “very important part in any rebuilding of peace
and civilisation in Europe.” He added that, while only in the forms of reports and
discussions, the Education Committee of the League of Nations Union was doing “very
good work on this subject.” He did not, however, think change would be quick to come
and closed his letter: “It will be a wonderful thing if people like you and me and Lord
Cecil could live to see the fruits of our work, but of course the odds are against it.”447
Writing to Shotwell in May of 1942, he commented: “I should much like to have a talk
with you over the difference and similarities between this war and the last, but that must
wait. It is certainly hard on what Winston called ‘this unhappy, but not inglorious
generation’ to have had the experience twice.”448
Shotwell wrote in a similar dejected state during the Second World War, although
international cooperation was still central to his vision of peace. “It is not too much to say
that unless the fanatic nationalism which rules by terror is uprooted, or at least rendered
harmless, the second world war will not really be won by the nations of freedom,” he
wrote. “For total war reaches into the intellectual and spiritual domain as well as over the
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whole material world.”449 While education could support international cooperation and
goodwill, it had also supported Fascist and Nazi ideology. A lack of understanding of
national environments had proved to be a considerable limitation to interwar efforts in
education reform. For those faced with the task of continuing the work of intellectual
cooperation after the Second World War Shotwell cautioned: “There could be no better
way to strengthen the hold of Nazism on the German mind than for educational
missionaries to attempt to recast the German school system in terms foreign to its own
past developments.”450 However, Shotwell continued to view national interest as outdated
and renounced war as an instrument of national policy. In order for peace to be
maintained, he believed, each nation-state had to interpret its national interest through the
wider interests of all nation-states.451
Despite the difficulty the ongoing war presented, the CICI felt that they had
learned quite a bit from the Great War and resulting years of reestablishing intellectual
communication and could expect to apply what they had learned at the close of
hostilities. Rather than the usual report of CICI efforts, a 1942 publication contained a
hopeful message that the CICI might be called upon to use their experience to resume
intellectual cooperation after the War. The report drew attention to the work of the CICI
following the First World War to emphasize the importance of continuing efforts at the
end of the current war. “If the difficulties encountered in re-establishing intellectual

449

James T. Shotwell, in I. L. Kandel, Intellectual Cooperation: National and International, (New
York: Bureau of Publications Teachers College, Columbia University, 1944), v.
450

Ibid., vii.

451

Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America (Rutherford:
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), 178.

228

relations after 1918 are recalled,” the report stated, “it will be seen that, in the work of
reconstruction which must follow the present war, the world cannot afford to neglect the
teaching of twenty years of experience of the fruits of efforts of men of goodwill who, in
ever-increasing numbers an in all parts of the world, gave the League of Nations their
collaboration in the organisation of intellectual co-operation."452 The framework of the
CICI itself did not completely dissolve and much of its work was taken up by its
successor in the United Nations.
Historian Patricia Clavin formulated transnationalism as “best understood not as
fostering bounded networks, but as creating honeycombs, a structure that sustains and
gives shape to the identities of nation-states, international and local institutions, and
particular social and geographic spaces.” This definition is important in understanding the
reformulation of intellectual cooperation after the Second World War. “A honeycomb
binds,” Clavin wrote, “but it also contains hollowed-out spaces where organisations,
individuals and ideas can wither away to be replaced by new groups, people and
innovations.”453 This process was apparent in the replacement of the League of Nations
by the United Nations in 1945. While the overall organization of the League withered
away, the individual connections survived. The League of Nations disbanded and in its
place emerged the United Nations (UN).454 With the dispersion of the LN and the
forming of the UN, the CICI gave way to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). As the 1946 LN publication The League Hands Over
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stated: “General satisfaction was expressed in the First Committee at the foundation” of
UNESCO to “carry on and develop the League’s work in the field of intellectual cooperation. Intellectual co-operation was “one of the best forms of international
friendship.” The publication went on to state that “if intellectual co-operation was to-day
a universally accepted reality,” it was “in large measure” due to the work of the CICI.455
A testament to this sentiment was that while no consideration of intellectual cooperation
was made in the League of Nations Covenant, it was in the charter of the United Nations.
As an agency of the United Nations, UNESCO had similar fields of action to what the
CICI focused upon during its term.
The broad mandate of UNESCO was restructured in 1948 to include the headings
of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Communication, Education, Cultural Interchange,
Human and Social Relations and Natural Science. The first two lines of the UNESCO
Constitution, signed in London on November 16, 1945, were quite similar to the aims of
the CICI. Namely, “That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men
that the defences of peace must be constructed; That ignorance of each other’s ways and
lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and
mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too
often broken into war.”456 The influence of the CICI is clear throughout the rest of the
1945 Constitution, but UNESCO membership was different in one significant way—in
order to be a member of UNESCO, countries had to have membership in the United
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Nations. Had this been the case in the CICI, it would have been even more heavily
influenced by European thought.
Cultural understanding did not preclude the possibility of war, as the Second
World War, and the subsequent closing of the League, made apparent. However, it did
create individual as well as institutional ties that survived another war, although in a
different form. Gilbert Murray and Laura Dreyfus-Barney continued to work in
intellectual cooperation within UNESCO. Margarete Rothbarth indicated that had she
been given the choice—rather than living in a stateless limbo in Switzerland—she would
have continued her work indefinitely. Other members, such as James T. Shotwell and
Temperance Smith moved on to other projects. Smith, for example, used the skills she
developed in the US National Committee to form “Shopportunity,” a company that
sources international goods for individual consumers.457 Shotwell changed his focus after
the war. He dropped him membership in the United Nations Association (a continuation
of the League of Nations Union), saying he was interested in its work, but did not have
time to devote to it because his work in other international organizations.458 The
institutions and individuals who survived the war re-forged their networks—albeit in
some examples in very different forms—and indeed expanded them.
Moral disarmament through education has remained an important component of
peace activism. Many peace advocates still consider altering mentalities towards war to
be a crucial step towards peace and believe there is an essential moral, as well as
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material, component to disarmament. For instance, in a recent media advisory entitled
“Nuclear Weapons and the Moral Compass,” president of the Global Security Institute,
Jonathan Granoff, argued that nuclear weapons are not only a threat to world peace, but
also a challenge to “the moral dimension of our humanity.” He warned the world: “Our
technological abilities must not outstrip our moral insights and render us less than fully
human. For in this age, acting without the gifts of morality, law and wisdom will be
lethal.”459
However, the feasibility of this education-based approach to peace has been
contested. In fact, the term “moral disarmament” continues to be used but with a very
different connotation that illustrates how, in a political climate of heightened national and
cultural tension, the process can be viewed negatively. For instance, at the one year
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, American journalist Robert Bidinotto argued that it was
Western determinism and pragmatism that opened the door to the terrorists by essentially
mentally disarming the United States, which he called “unilateral moral disarmament.”
He claimed that these ideals had “long lurked in the shadows of Western consciousness”
effectively eroding confidence, certainty and strength, while also giving power to “onceimpotent enemies.”460 This was written in the midst of the early years of the so-called
“War on Terror” when in the shock that followed 9/11 many nations had an ostensibly
unified focus in their outcry. In the interwar and post-9/11 periods, this term arose in the
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public debate, though there was a marked difference in how the primary powers
responded, at least publicly, to perceived threat. With the United States at the helm, the
most recent generation started a "War on Terror." The inter-war generation, with the
United States government conspicuously aloof, started a "war" on war. Unlike in more
recent years where moral disarmament has been considered a weakness, following WWI
the eradication of war in the minds of people and material and moral disarmament were
considered central to establishing a lasting peace.
In our current international culture, pacifism is now equated with powerlessness.
This has taken no small part in the relative lack of interest in the historical study of peace
movements. This ideal should not remain as a word deployed to connote weakness. In a
world full of war-mongering discourses, resistance to a mainstream culture of violence
should be recognized for its courage and its strength. Although riddled with internal
conflicts, limited in its understanding of internationalism, elitist, and ultimately unable to
prevent another World War, the CICI was committed to actively pursuing peace through
transnational networks. It was an initiative strongly founded on the belief that only
through resolute efforts and a hopeful outlook a peaceful, better future could be obtained.
Present day culture may find something to learn from such an approach, though ideally
expanded by lessons learned and progress made. The CICI was not able to successfully
intertwine cultural internationalism with economic internationalism towards the goal of
peace. We are still faced with this very issue. How much do ideas matter in our definition
of prosperity? How important is cultural work to future success? Certainly, the national
realities remain, but the dreams must still be dreamt.
Copyright @ Juli Gatling Book 2016
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Appendices

Appendix A: Abbreviations
CICI
IIIC
IBE
IECI
ICW
IREC

International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
International Institute on Intellectual Cooperation
International Bureau of Education
International Educational Cinematographic Institute
International Council of Women
International Review of Educational Cinematography

Appendix B: CICI Member Nations and Individual Committee Membership
Argentina 1936-39 ---------------------------------- L. Lugones 1924-1928; V. Ocampo 1939
Australia 1925-39
Austria 1923-39 ------------------ H. von Srbik 1931-35; F. Degenfeld-Schonburg 1936-37
Belgium 1922-39 ----------------------------------------------------------- J. Destrée 1922-1932
Brazil 1922-39 ------------------------ A.de Castro 1922-1930; M. Ozorio de Almeida 1939
**Brazil withdrew from LN in 1926**
Bulgaria 1923-39
Chile 1930-38
China 1933-39 --------------------------------------------------------------- Wu Shi Fee 1930-39
Columbia (no national committee) -------------------------------------------- S. Cano 1931-35
Cuba 1925-39
Czechoslovakia 1923-39 ----------------------------------- J. Susta 1928-38; B. Hrozny 1939
Danzig 1931-39
Denmark 1925-39 ----------------------------------------------------------- N. Norlund 1937-38
El Salvador 1928-37
Egypt (no national committee) ------------------------------------------------- T. Hussein 1939
Estonia 1924-39
Finland 1923-39
France 1924-39 ---------- H. Bergson 1922-25; P. Painlevé 1926-1933; E. Herriot 1934-39
France/Poland ------------------------------------------------------------------- M. Curie 1922-33
Germany (no national committee) --- Albert Einstein 1922, 1924-1932; H. Krüss 1931-34
Great Britain 1928-39 ----------------------------------------------------- G. Murray 1922-1939
Greece 1922-39
Hungary --------------------------------------------- C. de Tormay 1935-36; P. Téléki 1937-39
Iceland 1929-39
India 1935-39 --- D. Banerjee 1922-23; J. S. Bose 1924-1930; S. Radhakrishnan 1931-38
Iran 1936-39
Italy 1928-37 --------------------- F. Ruffini 1922-25; A. Rocco 1926-35; B. Giuliano 1937
Japan 1936-38 ---------------------------------- A. Tanakadate 1926-30; M. Anesaki 1934-38
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**Japan withdrew from LN in 1933**
Latvia 1923-39 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Qadir 1939
Lithuania 1922-39
Luxembourg 1926-39
Mexico 1931-39
Netherlands 1926-39 -------- H. Lorentz 1923-27; B. Loder 1933-35; J. Huizinga 1936-39
Norway 1924-39 ---------------------------------- K. Bonnevie 1922-1930; E. Gleditsch 1939
Peru (no national committee) ---------- M. Cornejo 1929-30; G. Garcia-Calderon 1936-39
Poland 1923-39 ---------------------------------------------------------- C. Bialobrzeski 1935-39
Portugal (no national committee) --------------------------------------------- J. Dantas 1934-39
Romania 1925-39 ----------------------------------------------------------- N. Titulesco 1930-39
South Africa 1933-39
Spain (no national committee) ------- L. de Torres-Quevedo 1922-25; J. Casares 1926-35;
J. Castillego 1931-38
Sweden 1926-39 --------------------------------------------------------------- G. Forsell 1931-38
Switzerland 1924-39 -------------------------------------------------- G. de Reynold 1922-1939
Syria 1933-39
United States 1926-39 ----------- G. Hale 1922; R. Millikan 1923-32; J. Shotwell 1933-39
USSR (no national committee) ------------------------------ V. Obelensky-Ossinsky 1935-38
Yugoslavia 1923-39
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